Researching preferences, valuation and hypothetical bias

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 465-487

  Guzman, Rolando M ^a   Kolstad, Charles D ^b,c  

^a Grupo de Consultoría Pareto   (Dominican Republic)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE   (United States)

Author keywords

Bidding; Contingent valuation; Hypothetical bias; Information acquisition; Private values auction; Researching preferences; Uncertainty; Valuation; Value discovery

Indexed keywords

DATA ACQUISITION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

CONTINGENT VALUATION (CV); HYPOTHETICAL BIAS; PRIVATE VALUES AUCTIONS; RESEARCHING PREFERENCES; VALUE DISCOVERY;

ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING;

DIVERGENCE; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; RESEARCH WORK; VALUATION;

EID: 34249829628     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9034-y     Document Type: Article

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