The incentive effects of increasing per-claim deductible contracts in automobile insurance

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 441-459

  Li, Chu Shiu ^a   Liu, Chwen Chi ^a   Yeh, Jia Hsing ^b  

^a FENG CHIA UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249075398     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: 15396975     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2007.00220.x     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Abbring, J. H., P.-A. Chiappori, J. J. Heckman, and J. Pinquet, 2003, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish? Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (2 512 521.
2. Abbring, J. H., P.-A. Chiappori, and J. Pinquet, 2003, Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (4 767 820.
3. Boyer, M., and G. Dionne, 1989, An Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard and Experience Rating, Review of Economics and Statistics, 71 : 128 134.
4. Browne, M., and H. Doerpinghaus, 1993, Information Asymmetries and Adverse Selection in the Market for Individual Medical Expense Insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 60 (2 300 312.
5. Butler, R., and J. Worrall, 1991, Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard in Workers' Compensation, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 58 : 191 204.
6. Chiappori, P., 2000, Econometric Models of Insurance Under Asymmetric Information, in : G. Dionne, ed., Handbook of Insurance (London : Kluwer).
7. Chiappori, P., and B. Salanié, 2000, Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets, Journal of Political Economy, 108 : 56 78.
8. Chiappori, P., and B. Salanié, 2003, Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work, in : M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, and S. J. Turnovsky, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Econometric Society Monographs (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press 115 149.
9. Cummins, D., R. Phillips, and M. Weiss, 2001, The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, Journal of Law and Economics, 44 (2 427 464.
10. Cummins, D., and S. Tennyson, 1996, Moral Hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from Automobile Insurance, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 12 : 29 50.
11. Cutler, D., and R. Zeckhauser, 1997, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, NBER Working Paper No. 6170, National Bureau of Economic Research.
12. Dionne, G., and R. Gangé, 2002, Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 24 : 213 230.
13. Dionne, G., C. Gouriéroux, and C. Vanasse. 1999, Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets, in : G. Dionne and C. Laberge-Nadeau, eds., Automobile Insurance: Road Safety, New Drivers, Risks, Insurance Fraud and Regulation (Boston : Kluwer Academic Press 13 46.
14. Dionne, G., C. Gouriéroux, and C. Vanasse, 2001, Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment, Journal of Political Economy, 109 : 444 453.
15. Dionne, G., C. Gouriéroux, and C. Vanasse, 2006, Informational Content of Household Decisions with Application to Insurance under Asymmetric Infromation, in : P. A. Chiappori and C. Gollier, eds., Competitive Failures in Insurance Markets (Cambridge, MA : MIT Press 159 184.
16. Dionne, G., P. Michaud, and M. Dahchour, 2005, Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France, Presented at the 2005 seminar of the Risk Theory Society.
17. Ehrlich, J., and G. Becker, 1972, Market Insurance, Self Insurance and Self Protection, Journal of Political Economy, 80 : 623 648.
18. Lemaire, J., 1985, Automobile Insurance: Actuarial Models (Boston : Kluwer Nijhoff).
19. Li, C., and C. Liu, 2003, On Compulsory Per-Claim Deductibles in Automobile Insurance, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 28 : 25 32.
20. Puelz, R., and A. Snow, 1994, Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross Subsidization in the Insurance Market, Journal of Political Economy, 102 : 236 257.
21. Shavell, S., 1979, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93 : 541 562.
22. Winter, R., 2000, Moral Hazard in Insurance Markets, in : G. Dionne, ed., Handbook of Insurance (Boston : Kluwer Nijhoff 155 183.