Legal moralism and retribution revisited

Criminal Law and Philosophy

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 5-20

  Murphy, Jeffrie G ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Legal moralism; Nietzsche; Retribution

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248641383     PISSN: 18719791     EISSN: 18719805     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11572-006-9000-3     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. (1973). Marxism and retribution. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 217-243.
2. (1985). Retributivism, moral education, and the liberal state. Criminal Justice Ethics, 4, 3-11.
3. (1987). Does Kant have a theory of punishment? Columbia Law Review, 87, 509-532.
4. (1988). Forgiveness and mercy, with Jean Hampton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. (1995). Legal moralism and liberalism. Arizona Law Review, 37, 73-94. This essay contains an appendix in which I try to respond to critiques from Jean Hampton and Herbert Morris on the main body of the essay.
6. (1997). Repentance, punishment, and mercy. In A. Etzioni (Ed.), Repentance - a comparative perspective (pp. 143-170). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
7. (1999). Moral epistemology, the retributive emotions, and the 'clumsy moral philosophy' of Jesus Christ. In S. Bandes (Ed.), The passions of law (pp. 149-167). New York: New York University Press.
8. (1999). Shame creeps through guilt and feels like retribution. Law and Philosophy, 18, 327-344.
9. (2003). Getting even - forgiveness and its limits. New York: Oxford University Press.
10. (2004). Law like love. Syracuse Law Review, 55, 15-32.
11. (2006). Remorse, apology, and mercy. Forthcoming in Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law.
12. Burgh, R. (1982). Do the guilty deserve punishment? Journal of Philosophy, 74, 193-213. Powerful skeptical case against certain forms of retributivism.
13. Devlin, P. (1965). The enforcement of morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. This contains as Chapter 1 a reprinting of the 1959 Maccabaean lecture 'The enforcement of morals' and some responses to Hart's critique of that essay.
14. Dolinko, D. (1991). Some thoughts about retributivism. Ethics, 101, 537-559. One of several insightful essays in which Dolinko develops a critique of retributivism.
15. Dressler, J. (1990). Hating criminals: How can something that feels so good be wrong? Michigan Law Review, 88, 1448. In this essay Dressler accuses me, with some justice, of exhibiting excessively 'macho' attitudes in my defense of retributive hatred in Forgiveness and Mercy.
16. Duff, R. A. (1986). Trials and punishments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sympathetic treatment of some forms of retributivism while locating them in a framework of more communitarian values.
17. Dworkin, R. (1985). A matter of principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Develops the idea that governmental neutrality is central to liberalism.
18. Feinberg, J. (1987). Some unswept debris from the Hart-Devlin debate. Synthese, 72, 249-275. Seeks to meet with a principle of fairness Devlin's critique of Millian liberalism.
19. Hampton, J. (1985). How you can be both a liberal and a retributivist: comments on 'Legal moralism and liberalism' by Jeffrie Murphy. Arizona Law Review, 37, 105-116
20. Hart, H. L. A. (1963). Law, liberty and morality. Stanford: Stanford University Press. A critique of Lord Devlin's Maccabaean lecture 'The enforcement of morals.'
21. Hart, H. L. A. (1968). Prolegomenon to the principles of punishment. In Punishment and responsibility - essays in the philosophy of law (pp. 1-27). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Distinguishes between a distributive question about punishment and a question about punishment's general justifying aim.
22. Kant, I. (1960). Religion within the limits of reason alone (pp. 33-34), trans. T. M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. New York: Harper.
23. Moore, M. S. (1987). The moral worth of retribution. In F. Schoeman (Ed.), Responsibility, character and the emotions (pp. 179-219). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. In my view, this joins Herbert Morris's 'Persons and punishment' as one of the two most powerful philosophical defenses of retributivism.
24. Morris, H. (1968). Persons and punishment. Monist, 52, 475-501. A powerful defense of robust retributivism that almost single-handedly rendered such retributivism philosophically respectable again.
25. Morris, H. (1995). Professor Murphy on liberalism and retributivism. Arizona Law Review, 37, 73-104
26. Nozick, R. (1977). Anarchy, state and utopia. New York: Basic Books. Challenges fairness arguments based on mere receipt of benefits.
27. Rawls, J. (1955). Two concepts of rules. Philosophical Review, 64, 3-13. A generally rule-utilitarian defense of retribution conceived as limiting punishment to the legally guilty.