Shame creeps through guilt and feels like retribution

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 327-344

  Murphy, Jeffrie G ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0033484305     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3505228     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. This paper was presented on April 2, 1999, in Berkeley, California, at the annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, at a special session "The Work of Herbert Morris." I was pleased and honored to be a part of this session, since my own thinking has been greatly influenced and enriched by Morris's work and my life has been enriched by my personal interactions with him. I thus dedicate this paper to him with esteem and affection. I have received useful comments on an earlier draft, for which I am very grateful, from Herbert Morris, Peter de Marneffe, Elaine Yoshikawa, Jerome Neu, Sharon Lamb, Betsy Grey, Dan Strouse, Rebecca Tsosie, and Margaret Holmgren.
2. Trevor William, Death in Summer (New York: Viking, 1998), p. 211. In Trevor's earlier Felicia's Journey - a novel ultimately of understanding and even forgiveness of the most apparently unworthy of people - a similar function is performed (at least for me) by this sentence: "Lost within a man who murdered, there was a soul like any other soul, purity itself it surely once had been."
3. Trevor William, Death in Summer (New York: Viking, 1998), p. 211. In Trevor's earlier Felicia's Journey - a novel ultimately of understanding and even forgiveness of the most apparently unworthy of people - a similar function is performed (at least for me) by this sentence: "Lost within a man who murdered, there was a soul like any other soul, purity itself it surely once had been."
4. Morris's ability to use stories as a basis for deep philosophical reflection is impressive - e.g., his use of Friedrich Durrenmatt's Traps at the beginning of "Persons and Punishment" and his analysis of the story of Adam and Eve in "Lost Innocence." And on the issue of dark sayings: I once chided Morris for quoting, with obvious appreciation, what at the time I took to be a stupidly obscurantist remark by Simone Weil. have since come to realize that there was more wisdom in Weil's remark and Morris's use of it than in my hasty rejection. (For my exchange with Morris on Weil, see the symposium on forgiveness and mercy in Criminal Justice Ethics 7(2)(1988).) Unless otherwise noted, the Morris essays cited in this paper will be found in his collection On Guilt and Innocence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
5. Morris's ability to use stories as a basis for deep philosophical reflection is impressive - e.g., his use of Friedrich Durrenmatt's Traps at the beginning of "Persons and Punishment" and his analysis of the story of Adam and Eve in "Lost Innocence." And on the issue of dark sayings: I once chided Morris for quoting, with obvious appreciation, what at the time I took to be a stupidly obscurantist remark by Simone Weil. have since come to realize that there was more wisdom in Weil's remark and Morris's use of it than in my hasty rejection. (For my exchange with Morris on Weil, see the symposium on forgiveness and mercy in Criminal Justice Ethics 7(2)(1988).) Unless otherwise noted, the Morris essays cited in this paper will be found in his collection On Guilt and Innocence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
6. Morris's ability to use stories as a basis for deep philosophical reflection is impressive - e.g., his use of Friedrich Durrenmatt's Traps at the beginning of "Persons and Punishment" and his analysis of the story of Adam and Eve in "Lost Innocence." And on the issue of dark sayings: I once chided Morris for quoting, with obvious appreciation, what at the time I took to be a stupidly obscurantist remark by Simone Weil. have since come to realize that there was more wisdom in Weil's remark and Morris's use of it than in my hasty rejection. (For my exchange with Morris on Weil, see the symposium on forgiveness and mercy in Criminal Justice Ethics 7(2)(1988).) Unless otherwise noted, the Morris essays cited in this paper will be found in his collection On Guilt and Innocence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
7. A later version of Deigh's paper appears above: "All Kinds of Guilt," Law and Philosophy 18 (1999), pp. 313-325. All subsequent quotations are taken from an earlier version of Deigh's paper.
8. Herbert Fingarette, "Punishment and Suffering," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 51 (1993), pp. 499-525. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Jean Hampton on Immorality, Self-Hatred, and Self-Forgiveness," Philosophical Studies 89(2-3) (1998), pp. 215-236 - reprinted in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Character, Liberty, and Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).
9. Herbert Fingarette, "Punishment and Suffering," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 51 (1993), pp. 499-525. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Jean Hampton on Immorality, Self-Hatred, and Self-Forgiveness," Philosophical Studies 89(2-3) (1998), pp. 215-236 - reprinted in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Character, Liberty, and Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).
10. Herbert Fingarette, "Punishment and Suffering," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 51 (1993), pp. 499-525. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Jean Hampton on Immorality, Self-Hatred, and Self-Forgiveness," Philosophical Studies 89(2-3) (1998), pp. 215-236 - reprinted in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Character, Liberty, and Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).
11. Italics mine.
12. Herbert Morris, "Nonmoral Guilt," in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, ed. Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 220-240.
13. On Guilt and Innocence, p. 60.
14. On Guilt and Innocence, pp. 60-62.
15. "Reflections on Feeling Guilty," Philosophical Studies 40 (1981), p. 192.
16. Deigh and I agree that some of the guilt that Morris identifies as nonmoral should be identified as moral, but our reasons are different. Deigh, seeing moral guilt only where there is rule violation, finds rules (and thus moral guilt) where Morris does not. On my view, the attachment of guilt to certain moral sentiments is sometimes enough to qualify the guilt as moral even in the absence of rule violation.
17. A.N. Wilson, Incline Our Hearts (London: Penguin Books, 1988/1990), pp. 143-144. Although Wilson speaks here of guilt, I shall later argue that shame must also be an important part of what is being felt here. I recalled the Wilson passage when I read this from psychologist Donald L. Nathanson's book Shame and Pride: "Whatever portion of us is revealed during a shame experience causes the unfolding of a process that brings from their hiding places a host of other hidden memories. Our ability to group memories, to order our experience so that it may be handled in some intelligent manner, this very facility that allows us to organize our internal world becomes the source of the very images we would most like to forget. Shame can be triggered by exposure of the self to the view of others. But it triggers further exposure of the self to the self, maintaining and amplifying shame, creating shame-filled moments or even shame-dominated moods."
18. A.N. Wilson, Incline Our Hearts (London: Penguin Books, 1988/1990), pp. 143-144. Although Wilson speaks here of guilt, I shall later argue that shame must also be an important part of what is being felt here. I recalled the Wilson passage when I read this from psychologist Donald L. Nathanson's book Shame and Pride: "Whatever portion of us is revealed during a shame experience causes the unfolding of a process that brings from their hiding places a host of other hidden memories. Our ability to group memories, to order our experience so that it may be handled in some intelligent manner, this very facility that allows us to organize our internal world becomes the source of the very images we would most like to forget. Shame can be triggered by exposure of the self to the view of others. But it triggers further exposure of the self to the self, maintaining and amplifying shame, creating shame-filled moments or even shame-dominated moods."
19. Donald L. Nathanson, Shame and Pride (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), pp. 254- 255.
20. I can claim no expert knowledge of any of these writers and am depending heavily on what John Deigh says about them in his essay.
21. Morris, "Nonmoral Guilt," p. 221.
22. Supra, note 3.
23. Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), esp. pp. 219-223.
24. Donald L. Nathanson, a psychologist who has authored several influential studies on shame and guilt, sees that harm plays a role at least equal to rule violation in understanding guilt. He writes: "Guilt is the painful emotion triggered when we become aware that we have acted in a way to bring harm to another person or to violate some important code" (Shame and Pride, p. 19). Nathanson suggests here that the harm in guilt does not even have to be from wrongful conduct. Even if I have sufficient reason to subject a child whom I love to a painful medical procedure, I might well - in spite of my realizing that I have done the right thing - experience guilt. Is such guilt pathological or irrational? I am inclined to think not.
25. My thinking about the Ibsen play has been greatly influenced by Peter Winch's essay "Moral Integrity" in his collection Ethics and Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972).
26. John Deigh's, "Shame and Self-Esteem," Ethics 93 (1983)
27. and reprinted in Ethics and Personality, ed. John Deigh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
28. Annie Ernaux, Shame, translated by Tanya Leslie (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998), p. 95.
29. For a defense of shaming punishments, see Dan Kahan's "What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?" University of Chicago Law Review 63 (1996), pp. 591-653. For a critique of shaming punishments, see Toni Massaro's "Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law" Michigan Law Review 89 (1991), pp. 1880-1944 and "The Meanings of Shame - Implications for Legal Reform" Psychology, Public Policy and Law 3 (1997), pp. 645-704.
30. For a defense of shaming punishments, see Dan Kahan's "What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?" University of Chicago Law Review 63 (1996), pp. 591- 653. For a critique of shaming punishments, see Toni Massaro's "Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law" Michigan Law Review 89 (1991), pp. 1880-1944 and "The Meanings of Shame - Implications for Legal Reform" Psychology, Public Policy and Law 3 (1997), pp. 645-704.
31. For a defense of shaming punishments, see Dan Kahan's "What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?" University of Chicago Law Review 63 (1996), pp. 591- 653. For a critique of shaming punishments, see Toni Massaro's "Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law" Michigan Law Review 89 (1991), pp. 1880-1944 and "The Meanings of Shame - Implications for Legal Reform" Psychology, Public Policy and Law 3 (1997), pp. 645-704.
32. Donald Barthelme, Paradise (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1986), p. 19.
33. For another similar story, see William Maxwell's novel So Long, See You Tomorrow (New York: Knopf, 1980).
34. Not all moral failures raise this worry about the self. Moral wrongs that are out of character, for example, may be occasions for guilt (and desires to make restitution, etc.) but not moral shame. Motives - and particularly settled dispositions - matter greatly here. In On Guilt and Innocence (p. 63), Morris notes that a shame morality essentially involves, in a way that a guilt morality does not, "concern with motives, with purity of heart, grandeur of soul."
35. "We have no right to let go of so much that shaped us; we shouldn't be allowed to forget." Sue Miller, While I Was Gone (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 98. My colleague Peter de Marneffe has put the point this way: "If being a morally inadequate person is a good reason to feel ashamed, why isn't having been a morally inadequate person also a good reason, since one is, in many important respects, the same person?"
36. "Reflections on Feeling Guilty," supra note 10, p. 191.
37. In the Trevor story, this claim is made about Mrs. Iveson, one of the central characters. She learns of the unspeakable horrors contained in the childhoods of those damaged people who stole but then returned her grandchild, and - in the sudden loss of an undesirable kind of innocence - she is struck by an image of herself as a shallow person who has lived in the smug illusions of privilege and wealth and isolation from the sufferings of ordinary people. Like Lear, she sees that she has "ta'en too little care of this." I have used the phrase "narcissistic wound" to describe the pain of moral shame, and this may strike some of my readers as odd since I clearly want to regard such shame as legitimate and, in ordinary language, we tend to use the word "narcissism" to describe pathological vanity. For my own usage, I am drawing on Heinz Kohut, one of the leading psychoanalytic writers on narcissism. Kohut regards some level of narcissism as healthy - even necessary: "Since the self is, in general, cathected with narcissistic libido, the term 'narcissistic self' may with some justification be looked upon as a tautology." Heinz Kohut, The Analysis of the Self (Madison, Connecticut: International Universities Press, 1971), p. 26). When such narcissism reaches a pathological level, Kohut uses the terms "grandiosity" or "grandiose self."
38. "Reflections on Feeling Guilty," supra note 10, p. 189. For a rich exploration of the relationship between guilt, shame, and self-esteem see John Deigh's "Shame and Self-Esteem." For reasons I noted earlier, I would not emphasize the ideas of disobedience and command to quite the extent that Morris does in this passage.
39. "Reflections on Feeling Guilty," supra note 10, p. 189. For a rich exploration of the relationship between guilt, shame, and self-esteem see John Deigh's "Shame and Self-Esteem." For reasons I noted earlier, I would not emphasize the ideas of disobedience and command to quite the extent that Morris does in this passage.
40. On Guilt and Innocence, p. 61.
41. On Guilt and Innocence, pp. 134-135. In this passage Morris also claims that ascribing shame seems appropriate in these cases to the degree that the asking of forgiveness seems inappropriate. I think that this claim is mistaken, and I think that Morris corrects this mistake elsewhere. In "Reflections on Feeling Guilty" (supra note 10, pp. 189-192), Morris sees that forgiveness from others might allow one to attain the kind of humility that allows one to overcome the excessive self-centeredness that is an obstacle to the development of a proper sense of self. Thus one might ask for forgiveness partly in the hope that, if granted, one obstacle has been removed that may stand in the way of moving closer to one's ideal self and thereby overcoming shame. "It seems we need someone to know us as we are - with all we have done - and forgive us. We need to tell. We need to be whole in someone's sight: Know this about me, and yet love me. Please." (Sue Miller, While I Was Gone, supra note 25, p. 261) I am not even sure that Morris is correct when he says that receiving punishment is inappropriate as a way of alleviating shame. This may depend on the purpose of the punishment. If the purpose is purely retributive - to administer the suffering that is properly proportional to one's desert - then Morris is probably right in claiming its inappropriateness to shame. But what if its purpose is reformative - designed, say, to mortify the flesh and humble the will in the hope that a new and better self may emerge from the punitive process? This could, I think, be appropriate as a means of alleviating shame. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Repentance, Punishment and Mercy" in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), Repentance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 143-170, reprinted in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Character, Liberty and Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).
42. On Guilt and Innocence, pp. 134-135. In this passage Morris also claims that ascribing shame seems appropriate in these cases to the degree that the asking of forgiveness seems inappropriate. I think that this claim is mistaken, and I think that Morris corrects this mistake elsewhere. In "Reflections on Feeling Guilty" (supra note 10, pp. 189-192), Morris sees that forgiveness from others might allow one to attain the kind of humility that allows one to overcome the excessive self-centeredness that is an obstacle to the development of a proper sense of self. Thus one might ask for forgiveness partly in the hope that, if granted, one obstacle has been removed that may stand in the way of moving closer to one's ideal self and thereby overcoming shame. "It seems we need someone to know us as we are - with all we have done - and forgive us. We need to tell. We need to be whole in someone's sight: Know this about me, and yet love me. Please." (Sue Miller, While I Was Gone, supra note 25, p. 261) I am not even sure that Morris is correct when he says that receiving punishment is inappropriate as a way of alleviating shame. This may depend on the purpose of the punishment. If the purpose is purely retributive - to administer the suffering that is properly proportional to one's desert - then Morris is probably right in claiming its inappropriateness to shame. But what if its purpose is reformative - designed, say, to mortify the flesh and humble the will in the hope that a new and better self may emerge from the punitive process? This could, I think, be appropriate as a means of alleviating shame. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Repentance, Punishment and Mercy" in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), Repentance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 143-170, reprinted in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Character, Liberty and Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).
43. On Guilt and Innocence, pp. 134-135. In this passage Morris also claims that ascribing shame seems appropriate in these cases to the degree that the asking of forgiveness seems inappropriate. I think that this claim is mistaken, and I think that Morris corrects this mistake elsewhere. In "Reflections on Feeling Guilty" (supra note 10, pp. 189-192), Morris sees that forgiveness from others might allow one to attain the kind of humility that allows one to overcome the excessive self-centeredness that is an obstacle to the development of a proper sense of self. Thus one might ask for forgiveness partly in the hope that, if granted, one obstacle has been removed that may stand in the way of moving closer to one's ideal self and thereby overcoming shame. "It seems we need someone to know us as we are - with all we have done - and forgive us. We need to tell. We need to be whole in someone's sight: Know this about me, and yet love me. Please." (Sue Miller, While I Was Gone, supra note 25, p. 261) I am not even sure that Morris is correct when he says that receiving punishment is inappropriate as a way of alleviating shame. This may depend on the purpose of the punishment. If the purpose is purely retributive - to administer the suffering that is properly proportional to one's desert - then Morris is probably right in claiming its inappropriateness to shame. But what if its purpose is reformative - designed, say, to mortify the flesh and humble the will in the hope that a new and better self may emerge from the punitive process? This could, I think, be appropriate as a means of alleviating shame. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Repentance, Punishment and Mercy" in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), Repentance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 143-170, reprinted in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Character, Liberty and Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).
44. On Guilt and Innocence, pp. 134-135. In this passage Morris also claims that ascribing shame seems appropriate in these cases to the degree that the asking of forgiveness seems inappropriate. I think that this claim is mistaken, and I think that Morris corrects this mistake elsewhere. In "Reflections on Feeling Guilty" (supra note 10, pp. 189-192), Morris sees that forgiveness from others might allow one to attain the kind of humility that allows one to overcome the excessive self-centeredness that is an obstacle to the development of a proper sense of self. Thus one might ask for forgiveness partly in the hope that, if granted, one obstacle has been removed that may stand in the way of moving closer to one's ideal self and thereby overcoming shame. "It seems we need someone to know us as we are - with all we have done - and forgive us. We need to tell. We need to be whole in someone's sight: Know this about me, and yet love me. Please." (Sue Miller, While I Was Gone, supra note 25, p. 261) I am not even sure that Morris is correct when he says that receiving punishment is inappropriate as a way of alleviating shame. This may depend on the purpose of the punishment. If the purpose is purely retributive - to administer the suffering that is properly proportional to one's desert - then Morris is probably right in claiming its inappropriateness to shame. But what if its purpose is reformative - designed, say, to mortify the flesh and humble the will in the hope that a new and better self may emerge from the punitive process? This could, I think, be appropriate as a means of alleviating shame. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Repentance, Punishment and Mercy" in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), Repentance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 143-170, reprinted in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Character, Liberty and Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).
45. On Guilt and Innocence, pp. 134-135. In this passage Morris also claims that ascribing shame seems appropriate in these cases to the degree that the asking of forgiveness seems inappropriate. I think that this claim is mistaken, and I think that Morris corrects this mistake elsewhere. In "Reflections on Feeling Guilty" (supra note 10, pp. 189-192), Morris sees that forgiveness from others might allow one to attain the kind of humility that allows one to overcome the excessive self-centeredness that is an obstacle to the development of a proper sense of self. Thus one might ask for forgiveness partly in the hope that, if granted, one obstacle has been removed that may stand in the way of moving closer to one's ideal self and thereby overcoming shame. "It seems we need someone to know us as we are - with all we have done - and forgive us. We need to tell. We need to be whole in someone's sight: Know this about me, and yet love me. Please." (Sue Miller, While I Was Gone, supra note 25, p. 261) am not even sure that Morris is correct when he says that receiving punishment is inappropriate as a way of alleviating shame. This may depend on the purpose of the punishment. If the purpose is purely retributive - to administer the suffering that is properly proportional to one's desert - then Morris is probably right in claiming its inappropriateness to shame. But what if its purpose is reformative - designed, say, to mortify the flesh and humble the will in the hope that a new and better self may emerge from the punitive process? This could, I think, be appropriate as a means of alleviating shame. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Repentance, Punishment and Mercy" in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), Repentance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 143-170, reprinted in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Character, Liberty and Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).
46. On Guilt and Innocence, pp. 134-135. In this passage Morris also claims that ascribing shame seems appropriate in these cases to the degree that the asking of forgiveness seems inappropriate. I think that this claim is mistaken, and I think that Morris corrects this mistake elsewhere. In "Reflections on Feeling Guilty" (supra note 10, pp. 189-192), Morris sees that forgiveness from others might allow one to attain the kind of humility that allows one to overcome the excessive self-centeredness that is an obstacle to the development of a proper sense of self. Thus one might ask for forgiveness partly in the hope that, if granted, one obstacle has been removed that may stand in the way of moving closer to one's ideal self and thereby overcoming shame. "It seems we need someone to know us as we are - with all we have done - and forgive us. We need to tell. We need to be whole in someone's sight: Know this about me, and yet love me. Please." (Sue Miller, While I Was Gone, supra note 25, p. 261) I am not even sure that Morris is correct when he says that receiving punishment is inappropriate as a way of alleviating shame. This may depend on the purpose of the punishment. If the purpose is purely retributive - to administer the suffering that is properly proportional to one's desert - then Morris is probably right in claiming its inappropriateness to shame. But what if its purpose is reformative - designed, say, to mortify the flesh and humble the will in the hope that a new and better self may emerge from the punitive process? This could, I think, be appropriate as a means of alleviating shame. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Repentance, Punishment and Mercy" in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), Repentance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 143-170, reprinted in Jeffrie G. Murphy, Character, Liberty and Law (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998).