Asymmetric conflict: Weakest link against best shot

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 457-469

  Clark, Derek J ^a   Konrad, Kai A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ   (Norway)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Asymmetric conflict; Best shot; Contest; Multiple fronts; Weakest link

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248574143     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002707300320     Document Type: Article

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