Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners

Theoretical Computer Science

Volumn 379, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 317-328

  Bansal, Vipul ^a   Agrawal, Aseem ^b   Malhotra, Varun S ^c  

^a ADOBE Systems India Private Limited   (India)

^b Citigroup Global Markets   (Singapore)

^c ORACLE CORPORATION   (United States)

Author keywords

Dis satisfaction score; meta rotation; Multiple partners; Optimal assignment; Stable marriage; Substitutes

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; OPTIMAL SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

METAROTATION; MULTIPLE PARTNERS; OPTIMAL STABLE ASSIGNMENT; POLYNOMIAL TIME ALGORITHM; STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM; SUBSTITUTES; TOTAL DISSATISFACTION;

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EID: 34248573299     PISSN: 03043975     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2007.02.050     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Alkan A. A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure. Economic Theory 19 4 (2002) 737-746
2. Alkan A. On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings. Review of Economic Design 6 (2001) 99-111
3. Baiou M., and Balinski M. Many-to-many matching: Stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry). Discrete Applied Mathematics 101 (2000) 1-12
4. Gale D., and Shapley L.S. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69 (1962) 9-15
5. Gale D., and Sotomayor M. Some remarks on the stable matching problem. Discrete Applied Mathematics 11 (1985) 223-232
6. Gusfield D., and Irving R.W. The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms (1989), The MIT Press, Cambridge
7. Polya G., Tarjan R.E., and Woods D.R. Notes on Introductory Combinatorics (1983), Birkhauser Verlag, Boston, Massachussets
8. Irving R.W., and Leather P. The complexity of counting stable marriages. SIAM Journal of Computing 15 3 (1986) 655-667
9. Irving R.W., Leather P., and Gusfield D. An efficient algorithm for the "optimal" stable marriage. Journal of the ACM 34 3 (1987) 532-543
10. Iwama K., Manlove D., Miyazaki S., and Morita Y. Stable marriage with incomplete lists and ties. Proceedings of ICALP (1999) 443-452
11. Knuth D.E. Mariages Stables (1976), Les Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, Montreal
12. R. Martinez, J. Masso, A. Neme, J. Oviedo, An Algorithm to Compute the Set of Many-to-many Stable Matchings, UAB.IAE Working papers 436, 2001
13. McVitie D., and Wilson L.B. The stable marriage problem. Commucations of the ACM 114 (1971) 486-492
14. Picard J. Maximum closure of a graph and applications to combinatorial problems. Management Science 22 (1976) 1268-1272
15. Picard J., and Queyranne M. Selected applications of minimum cuts in networks. INFOR - Canadian Journal of Operations Research and Information Processing 20 (1982) 394-422
16. Rhys J. A selection problem of shared fixed costs and network flows. Management Science 17 (1970) 200-207
17. Roth A. Stability and polarization of interests in job matching. Econometrica 52 (1984) 47-57
18. Roth A., and Sotomayor M. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometrica Society Monographs vol. 18 (1990), Cambridge University Press
19. Sotomayor M. The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game. International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999) 567-583
20. Valiant L.G. The complexity of computing the permanent. Theoretical Computer Science 8 (1979) 189-201
21. Valiant L.G. The complexity of enumeration and reliability problems. SIAM Journal of Computing 8 (1979) 410-421