The challenge of closely fought elections

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 14-28

  Whitehead, Laurence ^a  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248331768     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2007.0038     Document Type: Review

References (19)

1. Elections can be classified by their outcomes or as dynamic processes. A numerically very close election outcome is theoretically possible even when the campaign is not closely fought, and some closely fought elections may display the polarizing characteristics described here, even though the numerical results are not that close. This article focuses on electoral processes in which the contending parties convince their followers that: a) much is at stake, and b) there is well-founded and usually mounting uncertainty over the outcome. The uncertainty could be due to fear of fraud or manipulation, rather than to a statistical dead heat.
2. Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 58.
3. William H. Riker provided an early steer to this topic: "[T]he losers provide the values of the future. The dynamics of politics is in the hands of the losers, It is they who decide when and how and whether to fight on. . . . Losers have nothing and gain nothing unless they continue to try to bring about new political situations. This provides the motivation for change." See "Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics," in Ada W. Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983), 62.
4. Christopher J. Anderson and Silvia M. Mendes, "Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential," British Journal of Political Science 36 (January 2006): 91-111.
5. See John G. Geer, "Critical Realignments and the Public Opinion Poll," Journal of Politics 53 (May 1991): 434-53.
6. A speech by Ignacio González to the Madrid Assembly and the editorial, both in El Pats (Madrid), 13 January 2007, 20. Author's translation, phrases in parentheses from the original.
7. See Ignacio Lago and José Ramón Montero, "The 2004 Election in Spain: Terrorism, Accountability and Voting," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2 (July 2006): 13-36.
8. Italy's supreme court confirmed that Prodi's coalition won the lower house by a margin of some 24,000 votes, and in the Senate he secured 158 seats versus 156 for Berlusconi's alliance and one independent. This was the closest margin in the history of the Italian republic. But as Berlusconi wrote to Spain's defeated premier José María Aznar, "The coalition that I led wound up in the majority overall in the number of votes, but in the minority in terms of parliamentary representation. . . . As opposition leader I represent 50.2 percent of the country. . . . I hope to return to government soon after more than 1.1 million annulled ballots have been checked." See BBC News, "Berlusconi Reveals Hope of Return," 25 May 2006, at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/5017582.stm.
9. See Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan's Year of Stress," Journal of Democracy 16 (April 2005): 43-57.
10. For a detailed account, see Tun-jen Cheng and Da-chi Liao, "Testing the Immune System of a Newly Born Democracy: The 2004 Election in Taiwan," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2 (July 2006): 81-102. They conclude (on p. 86) that "the shooting probably had the effect of further mobilizing supporters, but whether it changed the direction of the vote is more difficult to ascertain."
11. The Latin American practice is summarized in Jesús Orozco Henríquez, "The Mexican System of Electoral Conflict Resolution in Comparative Perspective," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2 (July 2006): esp. 52-54.
12. Andreas Schedler's careful and balanced discussion of the role of the IFE and the TEPJF acknowledges some flaws and mistakes. But however hard these institutions might have tried, the losing PRD candidate was sure to condemn them if the result was not what he required. See Andreas Schedler, "The Mexican Stand-off: The Mobilization of Distrust," Journal of Democracy 18 (January 2007): 88-102.
13. Christopher J. Andersen, Andre Biais, and Shaun Bowler, et al., Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratization Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 184-86. But according to their model, Mexican federalism arguably might have softened the disaffection of the PRD, which did retain control of Mexico City.
14. For some interesting suggestions on how Mexico's political system might now be reformed to cope with the stresses that have been uncovered, see Jorge G. Castaneda and Marco A. Morales, "The Mexican Standoff: Looking to the Future," Journal of Democracy 18 (January 2007): 103-12.
15. Quoted in Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Vintage, 1998), 210.
16. See David Hackett Fischer and James M. McPherson, editors' note introducing John Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), xi.
17. Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, 188.
18. The use of lower-case initial letters in the names of the two parties was Jefferson's deliberate choice. Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson, 205.
19. For a concise assessment of the procedural complexities of December 2000, see George C. Edwards III, "The 2000 U.S. Presidential Election," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2 (July 2006): 37-50.