Assistance with Fewer Strings Attached

Ethics and International Affairs

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 55-67

  Collingwood, Vivien ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 34248049681     PISSN: 08926794     EISSN: 17477093     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.2003.tb00418.x     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. For a more detailed discussion of conditionality, see Olav Stokke, “Core Issues and State of the Art,” in Olav Stokke, ed., Aid and Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 1–87.
2. See John H. Johnson and Sulaiman S. Wasty, “Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs and the Political Economy of Reform” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1993), which argues that ownership is vital for providing credibility to policies, safeguarding against policy reversals, and ensuring sustainability of benefits.
3. See, e.g., Tony Killick, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 16.
4. Martin Feldstein, “Refocusing the IMF,” Foreign Affairs 77 (March/April 1998), p. 27.
5. Quoted in Roger Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered (London: James Currey, 1987), p. 62.
6. Killick, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change, p.12.
7. See Adrian Hewitt and Tony Killick, “Bilateral Aid Conditionality and Policy Leverage,” in Olav Stokke, ed., Foreign Aid towards the Year 2000: Experiences and Challenges (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 130–167.
8. On the expansion of conditionality, see Devesh Kapur and Richard Webb, “Governance-related Conditionali-ties of the International Financial Institutions” (New York: G-24 Discussion Paper Series, 2000).
9. Christopher S. Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 3.
10. See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 44.
11. Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in Charles R. Beitz et al., eds., International Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 247–262.
12. International Ethics., p. 249.
13. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 105–113.
14. Peter Singer, quoted in Andrew Kuper, “More than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the ‘Singer Solution,’” Ethics & International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2002), p. 115.
15. See Ethics & International Affairs, pp. 107–120.
16. On the problems of giving aid in conflict-ridden countries, see, e.g., James K. Boyce, “Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars, ” Adelphi Paper 351 (2002)
17. Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace…or War (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999)
18. Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1998)
19. Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (London: Cornell University Press, 2002).
20. Dudley Seers and G. Myrdal,“The Withering of Aid,” Guardian, July 2, 1982
21. quoted in Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered, p. 53.
22. Dudley Seers, “What Types of Government Should Be Refused What Types of Aid?” IDS Bulletin 4 (1972), pp. 14–15.
23. IDS Bulletin, p. 7.
24. John Rawls's The Law of Peoples, e.g., distinguishes between rules governing relations between liberal states and rules governing relations between liberal and non-liberal states.
25. Thomas W. Pogge, “The Moral Demands of Global Justice,” Dissent (Fall 2000), p. 42.
26. See Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 173–180.
27. Paul Collier, “Learning from Failure: The International Financial Institutions as Agencies of Restraint in Africa,” in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 319. It should be stressed that the international financial institutions have recognized that the logistical burdens of conditionality have contributed to its ineffectiveness, and are in the process of reviewing their use of conditionality.
28. See, e.g., International Development Association and IMF, “Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Main Findings,” March 15, 2002; available at www.imf.org/external/np/prspgen/review/ 2002/031502a.htm. See also related documents at poverty. worldbank.org/prsp.
29. See, e.g., the criticisms in EURODAD, “Many Dollars, Any Change? Part I: The Changing Nature of Development Co-operation: Buildling Ownership” (Belgium: Eurodad, 2001); available at www.eurodad.org/upload store/cms/docs/eurodad_manydollarsanychange_ part1.pdf.
30. See Carlos Santiso, “Governance Conditionality and the Reform of Multilateral Development Finance: The Role of the Group of Eight,” p. 11; available at www.wtowatch.org/ library/admin/uploadedfiles/Governance_Conditionality _and_the_Reform_of_Mu.pdf.
31. Feldstein, “Refocusing the IMF,” p. 27.
32. Tony Killick, “The ‘Streamlining’ of IMF Conditionality: Aspirations, Reality and Repercussions. A Report for the Department for International Development” (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002); available at www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/ adjustment/condikillick.pdf.
33. Killick, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change.
34. For example, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa in 2001 was $17 billion, but most of this was concentrated in Morocco and South Africa. By contrast, FDI in Asia was about $100 billion, and figures for the EU exceeded $300 billion. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2002 (New York: United Nations, 2002).
35. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. x.
36. See, e.g., F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
37. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 54.
38. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, p. 68.
39. Walzer, Thick and Thin, especially ch. 1.
40. Michael Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9, no. 3 (1980), pp. 209–229.
41. Michael Walzer, “Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention,” in Nicolaus Mills and Kira Brunner, eds., The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 21.
42. Recent research suggests that fostering “ownership” is more likely to lead to better implementation of reforms than coercive conditionality. See Killick, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change.
43. This is Feldstein's argument with respect to the IMF and South Korea. Feldstein, “Refocusing the IMF.”
44. See Hans Singer, quoted in Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered, pp. 37–38.
45. Thomas W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
46. Thomas W. Pogge, “Rawls on International Justice,” Philosophical Quarterly 51, no. 203 (April 2001), p. 253.
47. See Shue, Basic Rights.
48. See also Andrew Hurrell, “Global Inequality and International Institutions,” Metaphilosophy 32, no. 1–2 (2001), p. 49.
49. See David L. Miller, “Justice and Inequality,” in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, eds., Inequality, Globalization and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 202–203.
50. Michael Walzer, “Governing the Globe,” Dissent (Fall 2000), pp. 44–52.
51. See Ngaire Woods, “Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable,” International Affairs 77, no. 1 (2001), pp. 83–100.