Reflections on maritime delimitation in the cameroon/nigeria case

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 369-406

  Tanaka, Yoshifumi ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND   (Ireland)

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EID: 34248047704     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/iclq/53.2.369     Document Type: Article

References (247)

1. Many writers emphasized the importance of case law in this field. P Weil Perspective du droit de la délimitation maritime (Paris Pedone 1988) 13.
2. See also P Cahier ‘Les sources du droit relatif á la délimitation du plateau continental’, in Le droit international au service de la paix, de la justice et du développement, Mélanges Michel Virally (Paris Pedone 1991) 175–182
3. R.Y. Jennings ‘What Is International Law and How Do We Tell It When We See It?’ (1981) 37 ASDI 68
4. L. Lucchini and M Vœlckel Droit de la mer, t. 2, Délimitation (Paris Pedone 1996) 200
5. R.R. Churchill and AV Lowe The Law of the Sea (3rd edn Manchester MUP 1999) 185.
6. Yet this does not mean that State practice is meaningless in the field of maritime delimitations. There is a rich State practice on this domain, and the analysis of that practice is highly important. For State practice relating to maritime delimitations, see JI Charney et al International Maritime Boundaries 4 vols (Nijhoff 1993, 1998, 2002).
7. With respect to a comparative analysis between the case law and State practice, see Y Tanaka Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation, Thesis (Geneva IUHEI 2002).
8. Case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), 10 Oct 2002. The text of the decision is available on the Court's website Memorial, Counter-Memorial, Reply and Verbatim Records are available at the above internet address. This analysis is based on the electronic version of the text. Regarding an overview of this decision
9. see JG Merrills ‘Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening, Merits, Judgment of 10 October 2002)’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 788–797.
10. All five States ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In addition, according to the data presented by Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea of the United Nations, all those States claimed 12-mile territorial seas and 200-mile EEZs. United Nations (1999) 39 Law of the Sea Bulletin 40–50. Yet Nigeria indicated that Cameroon has not formally proclaimed an EEZ and has no EEZ legislation. Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, 562, para 20.9.
11. Case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Request for the indication of provisional measures, ICJ Reports, 1996, p 24, para 49.
12. Regarding the summary and comments on this order, see JG Merrills ‘The Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order of 15 March 1996’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 676–681
13. P.H.F. Bekker ‘Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening)’ (2003) 97 AJIL 387–398.
14. In its judgment, the Court rejected seven of the preliminary objections arisen by Nigeria and declared that the eighth did not have an exclusively preliminary character. ICJ Reports (1998) 325–7, paras 118.
15. For the analysis of this decision, see JG Merrills ‘The Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v Nigeria), Preliminary Objections’ (1999) 48 ICLQ 651–658
16. H. Barati ‘Frontière terrestre et maritime (Cameroun v Nigéria), exceptions préliminaires, interprétation, intervention’ (1999) 45 AFDI 371–412
17. P.H.F. Bekker ‘Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment’ (1998) 92 AJIL 751–5.
18. (2000) 38 ILM 112–116.
19. The text is also available on the Court's website. For a general commentary on this judgment, see JG Merrills ‘The Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v. Nigeria)—The Intervention by Equatorial Guinea’ (2000) 49 ICLQ 720–723
20. Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes ‘The Pending Maritime Delimitation in the Cameroon v Nigeria Case: A Piece in the Jigsaw Puzzle of the Gulf of Guinea’ (2000) 15 IJMCL 163–192.
21. Judgment, IJMCL, 115, para 12.
22. IJMCL 116, para 18.
23. See also OO Sholanke ‘Delimiting the Territorial Sea between Nigeria and Cameroon: A Rational Approach’ (1993) 42 ICLQ 398–411.
24. Judgment ICLQ, 126, para 268.
25. The Marouna Declaration was reproduced in Sholanke, ICLQ, 410–411.
26. Judgment ICLQ, 133, para 285. Nigeria has claimed 30 nautical miles territorial sea while Cameroon claimed that of 50 nautical miles. According to Cameroon, however, these claims were withdrawn when the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea entered into force. Cameroon stated that the two States have accepted territorial seas of 12 nautical miles since 1975.
27. Memorial of Cameroon, 535, paras 5.79–5.80.
28. Furthermore, Professor Pellet, Counsel of Cameroon, indicated the fact that the ‘assemblée nationale’ of Cameroon adopted law No 2000/2 in 17 Apr 2000, and Art 4 of the law fixed the breath of its territorial sea at 12 nautical miles.
29. Argument of Professor Pellet, Counsel of Cameroon, CR 2002/5, 42, para 12.
30. Argument of Professor Pellet, Counsel of Cameroon, CR 2002/1, 42, para 6.
31. Rejoinder of Nigeria, Jan 2001, para 10.7.
32. Reply of Cameroon, 389–92, para 9.08–9.19.
33. Yet Cameroon has not formally proclaimed an EEZ. Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, vol. I, May 1999, 562, para 20.9.
34. Judgment Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, 134, para 286.
35. Judgment Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, 134, para 285.
36. See also Memorial of Cameroon, 533–4, paras 5.75–5.78
37. argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/22, 43, para 24.
38. Memorial of Cameroon 533–4, paras 5.76–5.77
39. reply of Cameroon 409, para 9.63.
40. See also argument of Professor Pellet, CR 2002/5, 43–6, paras 15–25.
41. The Judgment CR, 127, para 271. Cameroon used the words ‘equidistance principle’. Generally, this is not considered a principle but a method for delimitation.
42. CR 131, para 280
43. argument by Professor Crawford, Verbatim Record CR 2002/13, 53–9, paras 6–30.
44. In the Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber of the ICJ ruled that the delimitation of a single maritime boundary could ‘only be carried out by the application of a criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give preferential treatment to one of [the zones] to the detriment of the other, and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable to the division of either of them’. The Gulf of Maine case, ICJ Reports 1984, p 327, para 194.
45. The Judgment ICJ Reports, 135, para 288.
46. ICJ Reports 135, para 290.
47. ICJ Reports 127, para 272
48. argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/17, 50–60, paras 20–48.
49. The Judgment ICJ Reports, 129, para 278
50. argument by Professor Georges Abi-Saab, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/20, 40–5, paras 4–28 (in particular, pp 43–4, paras 18–20.)
51. See also argument by Professor Crawford, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record 53, para 15.
52. The Judgment Verbatim Record, 136, para 291.
53. Verbatim Record 136, para 292.
54. Verbatim Record 138, para 294.
55. Verbatim Record 138, para 296.
56. Memorial of Cameroon, 545, para 5.98; 549, para 5.110
57. reply of Cameroon, 403–9, paras 9.54–9.60
58. argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record CR 2002/6, 39–41, paras 41–5
59. argument by Professor Mendelson, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record CR 2002/6, 46–9, paras 5–10
60. argument by Professor Cot, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record CR 2002/22, 28–9, paras 5–9
61. argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/17, 56–8, paras 37–9.
62. Judgment Verbatim Record, 138, para 296
63. Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, 575–81, paras 21.14–21.23.
64. Judgment Verbatim Record, 138, para 297.
65. Verbatim Record 138–9, para 297.
66. Verbatim Record 128, para 274.
67. Memorial of Cameroon, p 550, para 5.114
68. reply of Cameroon, p 409, paras 9.61–9.62
69. argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record CR 2002/6, 41–2, paras 48–51.
70. Judgment Verbatim Record CR, 130, para 279
71. argument by Professor Georges Abi-Saab, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/13, 36, paras 33–4
72. Verbatim Record Verbatim Record, CR 2002/20, 42, paras 13–14.
73. Judgment Verbatim Record, 139, para 299.
74. Verbatim Record 139, para 300
75. Memorial of Cameroon, 549–50, paras 5.111–5.113.
76. In the second sector, the broken part of the construction line corresponding to the Equatorial Guinea coastline was not taken into account. In the third sector, the broken part of the construction line corresponding to Gabon's coastline was not considered. For the method of drawing Cameroon's line, see Memorial of Cameroon, 553–5, paras 5.119–5.128
77. reply of Cameroon, 421–6, paras 9.81–9.95
78. argument by Professor Mendelson, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/6, 51–5, paras 16–28
79. argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/7, 28–31, paras 31–42.
80. Later, however, Cameroon explained that this line was an equidistance line adjusted to take into account the relevant circumstances so as to produce an equitable solution. Argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/17, 50–60, paras 20–48
81. judgment, Verbatim Record, 127, para 272. Yet it is hard to understand how these totally different reasons could be compatible.
82. On this issue, see argument by Professor Crawford, counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/20, 53–54, para 15; 58–64, paras 29–48.
83. Rejoinder of Nigeria, Part IV, Chapter 13, para 13.13
84. para 13.41; Judgment Rejoinder of Nigeria, 129, para 278.
85. Rejoinder of Nigeria 140, para 301.
86. With respect to the concept of proportionality in the law of maritime delimitation, see Tanaka ‘Reflections on the Concept of Proportionality in the Law of Maritime Delimitation’ (2001) 16 IJMCL 433–463.
87. Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, 581–7, paras 21.24–21.31
88. argument by Professor Crawford, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/20, 56–58, paras 23–8.
89. Rejoinder of Nigeria, Part IV, Chapter 10, para 10.19.
90. Reply of Cameroon, 427–40, paras 9.96–9.117
91. argument by Professor Pellet, Counsel of Cameroon, 18–31, paras 3–42.
92. Judgment Counsel of Cameroon, 132, para 283.
93. See also Reply of Cameroon 427–40, paras 9.96–9.117
94. argument by Professor Kamto, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/7, 18–26, paras 3–24 and 32, para 45.
95. Judgment Verbatim Record, 140–1, para 304.
96. Verbatim Record.
97. Verbatim Record 141, para 307.
98. Obviously, that dilemma arises in international law as well. In this connection, Charles de Visscher states that: ‘L’évolution du droit international contemporain est marquée par deux orientations opposées. Un besoin de certitude du droit et de sécurité travaille, depuis un siècle, á un développment technique très poussé des règles du droit positif. Un besoin, plus récemment ressenti, d'assouplissement de la règle, face á des situations nouvelles et de plus en plus individ-ualisées, porte á rechercher dans les voies de l'équité une justice adaptée au cas concret, aux particularités de l'espèce.’ It appears that this view also points to a similar dilemma between the predictability and flexibility. C de Visscher De l'équité dans le règlement arbitral ou judiciaire des litiges de droit international public (Paris Pedone 1972) preface, i.
99. H. Thirlway ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, Part Six’ (1995) 65 BYIL 78.
100. This question has been considered in Tanaka, BYIL.
101. ICJ Reports (1969) 53, para 101. See also 49, para 90.
102. ICJ Reports 50, para 92.
103. ICJ Reports (1982), 59, para 70.
104. ICJ Reports 79, para 110.
105. ICJ Reports (1985) 38–9, para 45. As will be explained later, however, the Court adopted, at the operational stage, the corrective-equity approach for the delimitation of opposite coasts. In this sense, the Libya/Malta case has a hybrid character since two approaches were used.
106. ICJ Reports (1984) 299–300, para 112.
107. ICJ Reports (1984) 312, para 157.
108. ICJ Reports 313, para 158.
109. The Chamber stated that ‘there is no single method which intrinsically brings greater justice or is of greater practical usefulness’. ICJ Reports 315, para 162.
110. ‘Nor is there any method of which it can be said that it must receive priority.’ ICJ Reports para 163.
111. 89 RGDIP (1985) 521, para 89; 525, para 102.
112. 31 ILM (1992) 1163, para 38.
113. 18 Reports of International Arbitral Awards (New York United Nations) 45, para 70.
114. Reports of International Arbitral Awards p 116, para 249.
115. Reports of International Arbitral Awards pp 114–16, paras 245–9.
116. ICJ Reports (1993) 58, para 46.
117. ICJ Reports 61, para 51.
118. ICJ Reports 62, para 53.
119. ICJ Reports para 56.
120. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), para 230. The text of the decision is available on the Court's website .
121. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), para 170.
122. With respect to an analysis on this decision, see Tanaka ‘Reflections on Maritime Delimitation in the Qatar/Bahrain case’ (2002) 52 ICLQ 53–80.
123. Some consider the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969 as an expression of corrective equity. See, for instance, the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Evensen in the Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ Reports, 1982, 292, para 12
124. M. Bedjaoui ‘L’“énigme” des “principes équitables” dans le droit des délimitations maritimes' (1990) 62 Revista Española de derecho internacional 370 and 378
125. Weil, Revista Española de derecho internacional, 205–6. In contrast, Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga rejected such an interpretation of the 1969 judgment.
126. Separate Opinion of Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga in the Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ Reports (1982) 104, para 15.
127. In the same vein, B Kwiatkowska ‘The I.C.J. Doctrine of Equitable Principles Applicable to Maritime Boundary Delimitation and Its Impact on the International Law of the Sea’, in A Bloed and P van Dijk (eds) Forty Years International Court of Justice: Jurisdiction, Equity and Equality (Utrecht Europa Institute 1988) 134–5. It is difficult to assert that the ICJ, in that case, adopted the corrective equity approach, since the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment accepted neither the mandatory character of the equidistance method nor its application in specific cases.
128. In addition, even in the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment, which rejected the customary law character of the equidistance method, the Court had accepted the validity of the latter in the case of opposite coasts from the viewpoints of natural prolongation: ‘The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. These prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a median line’, ICJ Reports (1969) 36, para 57.
129. In the St Pierre and Miquelon case, it was debatable whether the relationship of relevant coasts was opposite or adjacent. On this point, the Court of Arbitration held that the overall relationship was one of adjacency: the St Pierre and Miquelon case ICJ Reports, 1162, para 35.
130. In particular, this confrontation was clearly demonstrated by the two contrasting proposals made in Negotiating Group 7 (NG7) during the seventh session in 1978. One was based on equidistance as a general rule, and was presented by twenty States: ‘1. The delimitation of the exclusive Economic Zone/Continental Shelf between adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement employing, as a general principle, the median or equidistance line, taking into account any special circumstance where this is justified’, UN Doc NG 7/2, 20 Apr 1978, R Platzöder Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents, vol IX (New York Oceana 1986) 392–3.
131. The other proposal relied on agreements concluded in accordance with equitable principles, and it was supported by twenty-seven States: ‘1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between adjacent or/and opposite States shall be effected by agreement, in accordance with equitable principles taking into account all relevant circumstances and employing any methods, where appropriate, to lead to an equitable solution’, UN Doc NG 7/10, 1 May 1978, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Documents 402.
132. For the analysis of the legislative history of these provisions, see in particular, SN Nandan and S Rosenne (eds) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, A Commentary (Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law), vol II (Dordrecht Nijhoff 1993) 796–816; 948–85
133. L. Caflisch ‘Les zones maritimes sous juridiction nationale, leurs limites et leur délimitation’, in D Bardonnet and M Virally (eds) Le nouveau droit international de la mer (Paris Pedone 1983) 92–96.
134. On this point, it should be noted that the confrontation between two groups was linked to another hard-core issue of peaceful settlement of disputes. The supporters of ‘equidistance’ were, as part of the package, in favour of establishing a compulsory, third-party system for the settlement of delimitation disputes. By contrast, the supporters of ‘equitable principles’ have generally rejected the idea of a compulsory judicial procedures. AO Adede The System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Dordrecht Nijhoff 1987) 182
135. P.C. Irwin ‘Settlement of Maritime Boundary Dispute: An Analysis of the Law of the Sea Negotiations’ (1980) 8 ODIL 110.
136. A/CONF.62/WP.11, Platzöder ODIL, vol IX, 474.
137. UNCLOS III, 17 Official Records 5.
138. In fact, Judge Gros, in the Gulf of Maine case, called these provisions ‘an empty formula.’ Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gros, ICJ Reports (1984) 365, para 8. Furthermore, the Court of Arbitration in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration stated that Arts 74 and 83 ‘were consciously designed to decide as little as possible.’ , para 116.
139. See also Caflisch ‘The Delimitation of Marine Spaces between States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts’, in R-J Dupuy and D Vignes (eds) A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea (Dordrecht Nijhoff 1991) 480.
140. It should be noted that the Arbitral Tribunal, in the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration (second phase), ruled that: ‘It is generally accepted view, as is evidenced in both the writings of commentators and in the jurisprudence, that between coasts that are opposite to each other the median or equidistance line normally provides an equitable boundary in accordance with the requirements of the Convention, and in particular those of its Arts 74 and 83 which respectively provide for the equitable delimitation of the EEZ and of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.’ The Eritrea/Yemen case (second phase) , para 131. It is suggested that the Tribunal of Arbitration considered that, so far as the maritime delimitation between States with opposite coasts is concerned, an equidistance line would provide an equitable maritime boundary under Arts 74 and 83 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
141. Tanaka ‘Reflections on the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration of 17 Dec 1999 (Second Phase: Maritime Delimitation)’ (2001) 48 NILR 200–1.
142. Tanaka, NILR, 74–78.
143. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits) NILR, para 231.
144. The delimitation of the contiguous zone was not at issue in the case law regarding maritime delimitations. Nor was it mentioned in the UN Convention text and, consequently, the rule applicable to the contiguous zone remains unclear. According to Caflisch, the possible solutions are: (1) to apply, by analogy, either Art 15 or Arts 74/83 of the UN Convention; (2) to resort to the equidistance method of Art 24 (3) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; (3) allow for the joint exercise of the attributions provided for in Art 33 by the State concerned. Caflisch NILR, 442–5.
145. In the light of the close link between the contiguous zone and the territorial sea, Vukas favours the application of rule of territorial sea delimitation prescribed in Art 15 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. B Vukas ‘The LOS Convention and Sea Boundary Delimitation’, in B Vukas (ed) Essays on the New Law of the Sea (Zagreb Sveucilisna naklada Liber 1985) 163–4. On the other hand, Symonides advocates the application of Art 74 of the UN Convention where the economic zone and the contiguous zone are to be delimited.
146. J. Symonides ‘Delimitation of Maritime Areas between the States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts’ (1984) 13 PYIL 25. Considering the assimilation between the law applicable to territorial sea delimitation and that applicable to the delimitation of continental shelf/EEZ, the same rule based on the corrective-equity approach will be applied to the delimitation of the contiguous zone where the States are not the parties to the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
147. Tanaka PYIL, 74–78.
148. See the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports (1969) 49, para 88
149. the Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ Reports (1982), 60, para 71
150. the Gulf of Maine case, ICJ Reports (1984) 278, para 59.
151. R. Jennings ‘Equity and Equitable Principles’ (1986) 42 ASDI 29.
152. See also id ‘The Principles Governing Marine Boundaries’, in Staat und Volkerrechtsordnung, Festschrift für Karl Doehring, (Berlin Springer 1989) 401
153. R. Higgins Problem and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford Clarendon Press 1994) 228
154. M. Miyoshi Considerations of Equity in the Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Disputes (Dordrecht Nijhoff 1993) 192.
155. On this point, the argument of Malta in the Libya/Malta case is worth noting. In its Counter-Memorial, Malta mentioned that ‘an excessive individualisation of the rule of law, which changes from one case to another, would be incompatible with the very concept of law. Every legal rule presupposes a minimum of generality. A rule which is elaborated on a case by case basis rests on the discretionary power of the judge, on conciliation, on distributive justice—in brief, on ex aequo et bono.’ The Libya/Malta case, Pleadings, vol II, p 293, para 111.
156. Furthermore, in the article published in 1976, Akehurst stated that: ‘Although it is desirable that rules of law should be just, it is perhaps even more desirable that they should be certain, clear and predictable’, Akehurst ‘Equity and General Principles of Law’ (1976) 25 ICLQ 809.
157. The Libya/Malta case, ICJ Reports (1985) 39, para 45.
158. Bedjaoui expressly states that: ‘Ils [les principes équitables] ne constituent pas une forme d’équité autonome, indépendante de la règle de droit et substituable á celle-ci, mais bien une équité correctrice intervenant de manière endogène pour éviter que la règle de droit n'aboutisse á un résultat inéquitable dans son application á un cas concret’, Bedjaoui ICJ Reports, n 78, 384.
159. More generally, Charles De Visscher considered the function of equity as corrective and supplementary. He mentioned that: ‘[l]a fonction de l’équité appraît tantôt comme correctrice, tantôt comme supplétive de la règle de droit. Correctrice, elle peut se limiter á une attitude générale d'applica-tion du droit positif dans un esprit libéral. Supplétive, elle remplit dans des cas individuels la fonction de compléter la réglementation positive’, De Visscher ICJ Reports, 5–6.
160. ICJ Reports (1985) 35, para 39.
161. ICJ Reports, pp 46–7, para 61.
162. ICJ Reports, p 34, para 34.
163. Weil is the principal writer advancing this view: ‘[l]a délimitation ne peut pas être comprise en dehors du titre; elle est fille du titre.’ ICJ Reports, 53.
164. Weil concludes that: ‘tous les chemins convergent en définitive vers l’équidistance.’ ICJ Reports p 86.
165. Lucchini and Voelckel take the same view by saying that: ‘[l]e titre est, en effet, l’élément fondamental de base. La délimitation ne peut avoir lieu qu'á partir de lui et en s'appuyant sur lui.’ ICJ Reports, 211.
166. Speech by HE Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice, to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 31 Oct 2001, 10.
167. Argument by Mr N'Fube, Agent and counsel of Equatorial Guinea, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/21, 19, para 5
168. argument by Professor P-M. Dupuy, counsel of Equatorial Guinea, Verbatim Record 52, para 4
169. argument by Colson, counsel of Equatorial Guinea, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/24, 38, para 30.
170. Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 4 Apr 2001, 10, para 25.
171. See also argument by Mr N'Fube, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/21, 26–8, paras 27–32.
172. Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 4 April 2001, 2, para 6.
173. Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 5–8, para 15–19.
174. Argument by P-M Dupuy, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/21, 59, para 16.
175. See also Verbatim Record 61, para 22
176. Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 4 Apr 2001, 16–17, paras 38–40.
177. Verbatim Record 18, paras 44–5.
178. According to P-M Dupuy, Counsel of Equatorial Guinea, ‘il n'y a pas plusieurs façon mais un seul moyen de ne pas obérer les droits du tiers, c'est de ne pas se prononcer sur des conclusions qui les remittent directement en cause’
179. argument by Professor P-M Dupuy, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/24, 30, para 27.
180. Observations écrites de la république du Cameroun, 4 juillet 2001, 8, paras 17–18;13, para 38.
181. The overlapped zone is an area fixed with the points H”-I-I'-vi. See juillet carte No 2. (In other parts, Cameroon said that the area was 34 square kilometres.) On this point, however, Equatorial Guinea considered that this was not an area of overlap of anything relating to Cameroon since this area would belong to Nigeria in Cameroon's scheme.
182. Argument by Mr Colson, Counsel for Equatorial Guinea, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/21, 34–6, paras 15–22
183. argument by P-M Dupuy, Counsel of Equatorial Guinea, 52, para 2.
184. Later, Cameroon accepted the argument of Equatorial Guinea on this matter. Argument by Professor Mendelson, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/22, 51, para 14.
185. Observations écrites de la république du Cameroun, 4 juillet 2001, 9, para 21; 27, para 85
186. argument of Professor Pellet, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/25, 26, para 26.
187. Observations écrites de la république du Cameroun, 4 juillet 2001, 11, para 29.
188. Memorial of Cameroon, 546, para 5.100.
189. Observations écrites de la république du Cameroun, 4 juillet 2001, 16–17, para 50; 30, para
190. See also argument by Professor Pellet, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/22, 18–27, paras 1–27
191. argument by Professor Pellet, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/25, 19–28, paras 1–32
192. argument by Professor Kamto, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/25, 28–34, paras 1–26 (in particular, 34, paras 24–5.)
193. argument by Professor Kamto, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/7, 33, para 48
194. Replique de la République du Cameroun, Livre I, 4 avril 2000, 440–53, paras 9.118–9.153.
195. Observations of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, July 2001, 4–5, paras 8–9.
196. Observations of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.
197. Judgment Observations of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, n 2, 114, para 229
198. argument by Professor George Abi-Saab, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/23, 22–3, paras 21–3.
199. Judgment Observations of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the Written Statement of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 117, para 238.
200. The Court's view is not necessarily a new one. Some members of the Court had already expressed the similar opinion. For instance, Judge Jennings stated in the Libya/Malta case of 1984 that: ‘[T]he slightest acquaintance with the jurisprudence of this Court shows that Art 59 does by no manner of means exclude the force of persuasive precedent. So the idea that Art 59 is protective of third States’ interests in this sense at least is illusory’, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings, ICJ Reports (1984) 157, para 27.
201. See also 158–60, paras 28–34. In the same case, Judge Oda also stated that: ‘I would simply say that what the Court states regarding Art 59 does not lessen the concern of the third State, particularly where a right erga omnes is at issue between the original litigants’, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, ICJ Reports 94, para 9. See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, 134, paras 9–10
202. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara, ICJ Reports 87, para 81.
203. ICJ Reports (1984) 26, para 42.
204. ICJ Reports 26, para 42.
205. ICJ Reports (1986) 577, para 46.
206. ICJ Reports (1986) 576–80, paras 44–50. The Court confirmed this view in the case concerning the territorial disputes between Libya and Chad.
207. ICJ Reports (1994) 33, para 63.
208. ICJ Reports (1986) 578, para 47.
209. ICJ Reports, at 117, para 238.
210. The Court of Arbitration held that: ‘The Court's decision, it scarcely needs to be said, will be binding only as between the Parties to the present arbitration and will neither be binding upon nor create any rights or obligations for any third State, and in particular for the Republic of Ireland, for which the Decision will be res inter alios acta’. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, United Nations ICJ Reports, 27, para 28.
211. ICJ Reports (1982) 42, para 33.
212. ICJ Reports (1985) 26, paras 21–2.
213. ICJ Reports, para 22.
214. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits) ICJ Reports, paras 221 and 249.
215. In addition, the Court of Arbitration in the Eritrea/Yemen dispute (second phase) of 1999 simply cut off the line so as not to involve the rights of third States , paras 136, 164, and 46. See also Merrills ICJ Reports, 796.
216. Argument by Professor George Abi-Saab, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/23, 18, paras 3–4.
217. Dupuy Counsel of Equatorial Guinea, used the words ‘l'effet indirect de chose jugée’.
218. Argument by Professor P-M Dupuy, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/24, 19, para 2.
219. Argument by Mr Colson, Counsel of Equatorial Guinea, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/24, 37, para 26.
220. ICJ Reports (1969) 22, para 19.
221. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, ICJ Reports (1985) 177.
222. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mosler, ICJ Reports 117.
223. Argument by Professor George Abi-Saab, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record CR 2002/23, 22–3, para 21.
224. D. Bowett ‘Islands, Rocks, Reefs and Low-Tide Elevations’, in JI Charney and LM Alexander International Maritime Boundaries, vol 1 (The Hague Nijhoff 1993) 150
225. Lucchini and Vœlckel International Maritime Boundaries, 170.
226. On this point, see in particular, D Bardonnet ‘Frontière terrestres et frontiers maritimes’ (1989) 35 AFDI 6–22.
227. See also the Tunisia/Libya case, ICJ Reports (1982) 64, para 81.
228. Judgment ICJ Reports, 21, para 26, (c).
229. ICJ Reports, p 122, para 255.
230. ICJ Reports, p 124, para 261.
231. Regarding a summary of the judgment relating to land disputes, see Merrills ICJ Report, n 2, 789–792.
232. Argument by Professor Crawford, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/12, 62, para 13.
233. Verbatim Record pp 62–4, paras 14–19.
234. Crawford stated: ‘There was a clear acceptance by the two Parties that there was a de facto maritime border in the area, even though there was a dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula itself.’ Argument by Professor Crawford, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/13, 26, para 31.
235. See also Counter-Memorial of Nigeria, vol I, 613, para 23.18
236. Rejoinder of Nigeria, para 9.15.
237. The Court briefly stated that: ‘Since the Court has already found that sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula lies with Cameroon and not with Nigeria […], it is unnecessary to deal any further with this argument of Nigeria’, Judgment Rejoinder of Nigeria, n 2, 122, para 255.
238. See also argument by Professor Kamto, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/5, 66, para 43
239. argument by Sir Ian Sinclair, Counsel of Cameroon, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/17, 41–3, paras 23–8.
240. Judgment Verbatim Record, 148, para 325, III (B).
241. Verbatim Record 149–50, para 325, IV (B) (C). 149 Judge Ajibola explained that ‘I considered the Court's decision to effect delimitation in the area beyond point ‘G’ to be just and valid, hence I voted in favour of the Court's decision’, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ajibola, para 172. Yet it is arguable that the location of maritime boundary would be different if the Bakassi Peninsula were Nigeria's territory.
242. Judgment Verbatim Record, 105, para 210
243. Memorial of Cameroon, 502, para 5.14.
244. Reply of Cameroon, 350, para 7.23.
245. Yet Nigeria disagrees on this point. Argument by Professor Brownlie, Counsel of Nigeria, Verbatim Record, CR 2002/9, 37, para 101
246. rejoinder of Nigeria, Part I ch 3, para 3.20.
247. Judgment rejoinder of Nigeria, 112, para 223. In the authentic text of the judgment in French, the same paragraph stated that: ‘Le Cameroun et le Nigéria ont participé aux négociations qui, entre 1971 et 1975, devaient déboucher sur les déclarations de Yaoundé, Kano et Maroua, et qui portaient sur une ligne maritime dont’ il était clair qu'elle supposait l'existence d'un titre camerounais sur Bakassi’ (emphasis added).