Reflections on maritime delimitation in the qatar/bahrain case

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 53-80

  Tanaka, Yoshifumi ^a  

^a GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES   (Switzerland)

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EID: 34248044430     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/iclq/52.1.53     Document Type: Article

References (189)

1. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits),
2. (2001) 40 ILM, 847–99.
3. The analysis in this paper is based on the electronic version of the judgment. Memorial, Counter-Memorial, Reply and Verbatim Records are available at the above internet address. Regarding an overview of this decision, see MD Evans, ‘Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain)’, (2002) 51 ICLQ, 709–722.
4. The Dubai/Sharjah Boundary Arbitration of 1989, the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute case of 1992, the Eritrea/Yemen arbitrations of 1998 and 1999 and the Land and Maritime Boundary case between Cameroon and Nigeria (Pending) provide instances of such composite disputes. In the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute case of 1992 case, however, the Chamber of the ICJ decided that the Parties had not conferred upon the Chamber jurisdiction to effect any delimitation of maritime spaces, whether within or outside the Gulf of Fonseca; accordingly, no maritime delimitation was effected. ICJ Reports, 1992, 617, para 430 (2).
5. In any case, the interrelation between territorial disputes and maritime delimitation might be an issue that has not been sufficiently studied in international law.
6. Regarding this subject, there are only a few articles, for instance: D Bardonnnet, ‘Frontières terrestres et frontières maritime,’ (1989) 35 AFDI, 1–64
7. P. Weil, ‘Délimitation maritime et délimitation terrestre’, Ecrits de droit international, Paris, PUF (2000), 249–54
8. L. Caflisch, ‘Essai d'une typologie des frontières’ (1990) 63 Relations internationales, 265–93.
9. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1994, 144, para 3.
10. ICJ Reports, 126–7, para 41.
11. Yet Judge Oda was opposed to each and every item in the operative part of the judgment. Dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, 133–49, paras 1–36.
12. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports, 1995, 11, para 14.
13. ICJ Reports, 26, para 50.
14. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), ICJ Reports, n 1, para 33.
15. ICJ Reports.
16. When Qatar submitted the dispute to the Court in 1991, the breadth of the territorial seas of both Qatar and Bahrain was 3 nautical miles. Thus, at the time of the application, the issue brought before the Court concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf. In 16 April 1992, however, Qatar extended the breadth of its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles, and, on 20 April 1993, Bahrain did likewise. ICJ Reports, para 172.
17. ICJ Reports, paras 169–70. The distinction between the southern and northern sectors is not altogether clear. In fact, while the Parties agreed that there were two sectors, their views differed regarding the location of the line dividing the two sectors. Bahrain proposed the line connecting Fasht-ad-Dibal with Fa's Rakan, while Qatar suggested a line drawn from Muharraq to Ra's Rakan, namely, the line MQ/RK marked as a ‘closing line’. Counter-Memorial submitted by Bahrain, paras 593–5. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, Maps 6, 7, and 8.
18. The Court understood a ‘single maritime boundary’ as ‘one uninterrupted boundary line delimiting the various—partially coincident—ones of maritime jurisdiction appertaining to them’. ICJ Reports, para 173. As Judge Oda indicated, however, that the term ‘single maritime boundary’ usually means a single line for the two different spaces, ie, the continental shelf and the FZ/EEZ. Separate opinion of Judge Oda, para 12.
19. Judgment, ICJ Reports, n 1, para 167.
20. It should be noted that both Parties agreed that most provisions of the 1982 Convention which were relevant for the present case reflected customary law. ICJ Reports.
21. ICJ Reports, para 176.
22. The Libya/Malta case, ICJ Reports, 1985, 33, para, 33.
23. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), ICJ Reports, n 1, para 230.
24. ICJ Reports.
25. ICJ Reports, para 170.
26. H.W.A. Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice Part Five’ (1994) 64 BYBIL, 41.
27. In an article published in 1981, Jennings said that: ‘[T]he law of continental shelf boundaries outside the parties to the 1958 Convention, is pure judge-made law. The supposition that the principles emerged from practice is a pure fiction.’ RY Jennings, ‘What Is International Law and How Do We Tell It When We See It?’ (1981) 37 ASDI, 68.
28. See also P Weil, Perspectives du droit de la délimitation maritime (Paris: Pedone, 1988), 13
29. P. Cahier, ‘Les sources du droit relatif à la délimitation du plateau continental’, in Le droit international au service de la paix, de la justice et du développement, Mélanges Michel Virally (Paris: Pedone, 1991), 175–82. In a recently published book, Churchill and Lowe took a similar view.
30. R.R. Churchill and AV Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 185.
31. The Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), The Law of the Sea, n 1, para 177.
32. The Law of the Sea, para 178.
33. The Law of the Sea, 223, para, 7.9.
34. The Law of the Sea, 232, para 7.30. See also 235, para 7.38.
35. Reply submitted by Bahrain, paras 287–305. See also argument by Professor Weil, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/15, paras 12 et seq
36. judgment, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, n 1, paras 210–11.
37. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, para 184.
38. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, para 187. For territorial questions concerning those islands, see paras 98–165.
39. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, para 189.
40. See also argument by Professor Quéneudec, Counsel of Qatar, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/9, paras 24–6.
41. Argument by Professor Reisman, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/14, paras 12–25
42. Judgment, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record n 1, para 189.
43. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, para 190.
44. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, para 192
45. Argument by Professor Reisman, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/14, paras 26–31.
46. Judgment, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, n 1, para 193
47. Argument by Professor Quéneudec, Counsel of Qatar, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/9, paras 32–9.
48. Judgment, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, n 1, para 195.
49. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, para 197.
50. At high tide, its length and breadth are about 12 by 4 metres, and its altitude is approximately 0.4 metres. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record.
51. Memorial submitted by Bahrain, 270, para 626
52. Argument by Professor Weil, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/15, para 41
53. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 238, para 10.54, 239, para 10.58. and 245, para 10.73
54. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, 267, para 8.43.
55. Judgment, Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, n 1, para 202. See also para 215.
56. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, para 209.
57. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, para 212.
58. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, para 213.
59. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, paras 213–15.
60. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, para 215.
61. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, para 185.
62. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, para 218.
63. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, para 219.
64. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, 230–1.
65. Reply submitted by Bahrain, para 305; Argument by Professor Weil, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/15, paras 42–5.
66. Judgment, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, n 1, para 218.
67. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, paras 221–2. See also para 250.
68. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, para 222.
69. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, para 223.
70. Memorial submitted by Bahrain, 257
71. Argument by Professor Reisman, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/15, paras 55–8
72. judgment, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, n 1, para 235.
73. Memorial submitted by Bahrain, 274. See also 283–4.
74. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, 282–8.
75. Counter-Memorial submitted by Qatar, 277–8
76. Argument by Professor Salmon, Counsel of Qatar, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/10, paras 2–4
77. judgment, Counsel of Qatar, Verbatim Record, n 1, para 235.
78. Counsel of Qatar, Verbatim Record, para 236.
79. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 215.
80. Regarding the background and contents of the British decision, see Memorial submitted by Qatar, 218–24.
81. According to Qatar's explanation, the 1947 line was not a strict or true median line, but a line drawn in accordance with equitable principles. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 224. Furthermore, according to Qatar, the 1947 line also concerns the territorial sea delimitation in the southern sector, although the Court discussed this issue in the context of a single maritime boundary.
82. In fact, Qatar argued that the 1947 line constituted special circumstances of the territorial sea delimitation. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 258–61, paras 11.35–11.39.
83. Judgment, Memorial submitted by Qatar, n 1, para 31.
84. See also argument by Professor Quéneudec, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/10, para 43.
85. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 247.
86. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 261. See also 261–2.
87. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 253–8. The 1947 line began at point M, which was near the Dawhat Salwah. That point was plotted at latitude 25°30′00”N, longitude 50°33′55”E.
88. According to Qatar, point M is clearly situated within the maritime zone pertaining to Saudi Arabia and cannot be regarded as a dividing point between Qatar and Bahrain. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 256.
89. For the location of the 1947 line, see Map No 6 of Counter-Memorial of Qatar.
90. Counter-Memorial submitted by Bahrain, paras 552–86; Argument by Professor Weil, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/16, paras 125–62.
91. Judgment, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, n 1, paras 239–40.
92. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 301. See also 279–83
93. Argument by Professor, Quéneudec, Counsel of Qatar, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/10, para 17 and paras 38–9.
94. Judgment, Counsel of Qatar, Verbatim Record, n 1, para 241.
95. Memorial submitted by Qatar, 304–5.
96. Judgment, Memorial submitted by Qatar, n 1, para 242
97. Counter-Memorial submitted by Bahrain, paras 647–9.
98. Counter-Memorial submitted by Bahrain, para 647
99. Argument by Professor Reisman, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/16, para 17.
100. Judgment, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, n 1, para 243.
101. Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Torres Bernárdez in the Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits) judgment, Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, n 1, para 521.
102. Counsel of Bahrain, Verbatim Record, para 246.
103. The Libya/Malta case, ICJ Reports 1985, 48, para 64.
104. Judgment, ICJ Reports, n 1, paras 247–8.
105. ICJ Reports, para 248.
106. ICJ Reports, para 249.
107. ICJ Reports, para 252.
108. See also Evans, ICJ Reports, n 1, 710–713.
109. Counter-Memorial submitted by Bahrain, 298–9, paras 690–4.
110. Judgment, Counter-Memorial submitted by Bahrain, n 1, paras 191–8.
111. Separate opinion of Judge Oda, Counter-Memorial submitted by Bahrain, para 5.
112. Judgment, Counter-Memorial submitted by Bahrain n 1, paras 33–4.
113. Memorial submitted by Bahrain, 253–8, paras 580–92, 268–9, paras 622–4
114. Counter-Memorial submitted by Bahrain, paras 511–20.
115. Reply of Qatar, para 7.40.
116. Argument by Professor Quéneudec, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/9, para 45.
117. Verbatim Record, CR 2000/10, para 64.
118. Counter-Memorial of Bahrain, para 524.
119. Argument by Professor Weil, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/15, para 76.
120. Verbatim Record, para 77.
121. Verbatim Record, para 54.
122. See also Verbatim Record, CR 2000/25, para 2
123. Counter-Memorial of Bahrain, para 529.
124. Counter-Memorial of Bahrain, para 532
125. Reply of Bahrain, para 302
126. Verbatim Record, CR 2000/25, para 31.
127. Reply of Bahrain, paras 358–9.
128. Reply of Bahrain, para 345.
129. Judgment, Reply of Bahrain, n 1, para 204.
130. Reply of Bahrain, para 205.
131. Art 13 (2) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to the Court, the relevant provisions on low-tide elevations reflected customary law, Reply of Bahrain, para 201. Yet Judge Oda doubted the customary-law character of the provisions relating to the limits of the territorial sea of the 1982 Convention, including these concerning low-tide elevations, since the latter copied relevant provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone without any careful consideration of the radical change resulting from the extension of the breadth of the territorial sea to 12 nautical miles. In his view, low-tide elevations located in the narrow 3-mile belt off the coast would not have had much effect on the extent or the boundary of the territorial sea. But the situation is different for the contemporary 12-mile territorial sea.
132. Separate opinion of Judge Oda in the Qatar/Bahrain case (Merits), in Reply of Bahrain, paras 7 and 20.
133. Judgment, Reply of Bahrain, para 206.
134. Reply of Bahrain, para 208.
135. Reply of Bahrain, para 209.
136. Reply of Bahrain, para 220.
137. For a historical analysis regarding the effect to be given to low-tide elevations, see H Dipla, Le régime juridique des îles dans le droit international de la mer (Paris: PUF, 1984), 57–74.
138. ICJ Reports, 1953, 53.
139. Professor Quéneudec, Counsel of Qatar, referred to this judgment, see Verbatim Record, CR 2000/9, para 44.
140. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, vol I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 287.
141. The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 286–7.
142. ICJ Reports, 1992, 570, para 356.
143. Argument by Professor Quéneudec, Verbatim Record, CR 2000/9, para 44.
144. For the text of the Treaty, see JI Charney, and LM Alxender (eds), International Maritime Boundaries, vol I (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), 1937 et seq.
145. ICJ Reports, 1969, 53, para 101. See also 49, para 90.
146. ICJ Reports, 50, para 92.
147. ICJ Reports, 1982, 59, para 70.
148. See also separate opinion of Judge Jiménez de Aréchaga, ICJ Reports, 106, para 24.
149. Judgment, ICJ Reports, 79, para 110.
150. ICJ Reports, 1984, 312–13, paras 157–8. See also 315, paras 162–3.
151. ICJ Reports, 1985, 38–9, paras 44–5.
152. The Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case (1985) 89 RGDIP, 521, para 89; 525, para 102.
153. The St Pierre and Miquelon case (1992) 31 ILM, 1163, para 38.
154. United Nations, 18 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 45, para 70. This view was also expressed in the Dubai/Sharjah Border arbitral award rendered on 19 Oct 1981. Applying equitable principles of customary law, the Court of Arbitration considered the island of Abu Musa as a ‘special circumstance’.
155. At the same time, it held that the equidistance method was thought generally appropriate for the delimitation of the maritime boundary where that boundary was unaffected by the presence of Abu Musa (1993) 91 International Law Reports, 672–3, para 256.
156. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, International Law Reports, n 113, 114–16, paras 245–9.
157. ICJ Reports, 1993, 61–2, paras 53–6.
158. The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Second Stage: Maritime Delimitation), (2001) 40 ILM, 1005, paras 131–2.
159. Legault and Hankey confirm this view. L Legault, and B Hankey, ‘Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation’, in Charney and Alexander, ILM, n 104, 203. While the result-oriented equity approach emphasises maximum flexibility, the corrective-equity approach stresses predictability. In this sense, it could be contended that the history of the law of maritime delimitation was that of the dilemma between predictability and flexibility of the law. In fact, on the one hand, in effecting maritime delimitations, flexible consideration of geographical and non-geographical factors is required in order to achieve equitable solution. On the other hand, as with all types of law, that which relates to maritime delimitation should have a certain degree of predictability. How, then, is it possible to ensure predictability while taking into account a diversity of factors in order to achieve an equitable result? In the present writer's view, thus, the quest for a legal framework that would reconcile the predictability and flexibility is at the heart of the law of maritime delimitation.
160. See Y Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation, thesis, Geneva, IUHEI (2002).
161. In addition, even in the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment, which denied the customary law character of the equidistance method, the Court had accepted the validity of the latter in the case of opposite coasts from the viewpoint of natural prolongation: ‘The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. These prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a median line’, ICJ Reports, 1969, 36, para 57.
162. The Libya/Malta case, ICJ Reports, 1985, 51, para 70.
163. See also the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, 37, para 58. In reality, however, there is no practical difficulty in applying the corrective-equity approach to delimitations between States with adjacent coasts; even when the application of the equidistance method at the first stage produces inequitable results owing to geographical configurations such as concavity or convexity, these results can be corrected at the second stage by considering relevant circumstances. Indeed, to cite a precedent, the Court of Arbitration, in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf dispute, used the equidistance method in the Atlantic sector where the coasts were in a relation of adjacency.
164. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports, n 113, 116, para 249.
165. Cf G Guillaume, ‘Les accords de délimitation maritime passé par la France’, in Colloque de Rouen, Perspectives du droit de la mer à l'issue de la 3e Conférence des Nations Unies (Paris: Pedone, 1984), 282.
166. Dissenting opinion of Judge Sørensen, ICJ Reports, 1969, 256.
167. Bedjaoui expressly states that: ‘Ils [les principes équitables] ne constituent pas une forme d'équité autonome, indépendante de la règle de droit et substituable à celle-ci, mais bien une équité correctrice intervenant de manière endogène pour éviter que la règle de droit n'aboutisse à un résultat inéquitable dans son application à un cas concret’, Bedjaoui, M., ‘L’ “énigme” des “principes équitables” dans le droit des délimitations maritimes' (1990) 17 Revista española de derecho international, 384.
168. More generally, Charles De Visscher considered the function of equity as corrective and supplementary. He mentioned that: ‘La fonction de l'équité appraît tantôt comme correctrice, tantôt comme supplétive de la règle de droit. Correctrice, elle peut se limiter à une attitude générale d'application du droit positif dans un esprit libéral. Supplétive, elle remplit dans des cas individuels la fonction de compléter la réglementation positive’, Charles De Visscher, De l'équité dans le règlement arbitral ou judiciaire des litiges de droit international public (Paris: Pedone, 1972), 5–6.
169. ICJ Reports, 1969, 32, para 46.
170. ICJ Reports, 1985, 35, para 39. See further 33, para 34.
171. ICJ Reports, 46–7, para 61. See also 34, para 34.
172. Weil is the principal writer advancing this view: ‘La délimitation ne peut pas être comprise en dehors du titre; elle est fille du titre’, Weil, ICJ Reports, n 20, 53.
173. He concludes that: ‘tous les chemins convergent en définitive vers l'équidistance’, ICJ Reports, 86.
174. Lucchini and Voelckel take the same view by saying that: ‘Le titre est, en effet, l'élément fondamental de base. La délimitation ne peut avoir lieu qu'à partir de lui et en s'appuyant sur lui’, L Lucchini, and M Vælckel, Droit de la mer, tome 2, Volume 1: délimitation (Paris: Pedone, 1996), 211.
175. Judgment, délimitation, n 1, para 219.
176. délimitation, para 219.
177. In another part of the judgment, the Court found that Qit'at Jaradah is an island which should be taken into consideration for the drawing of the equidistance line, délimitation, para 195.
178. Although the legal nature of Fasht al Jarim was not specified, the Court held that, given its location, the low-water line might be used as the baseline from which the breadth not only of the territorial sea, but also of the continental shelf and the EEZ, is measured, délimitation, para 245. It appears thus that the Court indirectly regarded it as an island, not a low-tide elevation, by referring to the breadth of the territorial sea as well as to the continental shelf/EEZ. If Fasht al Jarim were a low-tide elevation, it would have no continental shelf or EEZ. In addition, the Court observed that at most a minute part of Fasht al Jarim is above water at high tide.
179. In this respect, Judge Oda stated that: ‘I fail to understand how it is possible for the reasoning given by the Court in its Judgment (which is not set out with mathematical precision) to be translated into the precise line determined by reference to the indicated co-ordinates.’ Separate opinion of Judge Oda, délimitation, para 28.
180. Evans also said that: ‘the Court is, once again, better at conveying the impression of fidelity to a methodology than at demonstrating how that methodology translates over into the actual line on the map, which in this case is barely less mysterious than has by now become habitual’, Evans, délimitation, n 1, 718.
181. In this connection, it should be recalled that, in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case, Judge Oda took the following view: ‘Accordingly, and on the premise that there are in fact no rules of law for effecting a maritime delimitation in the presence of overlapping titles (not overlapping claims), it follows that if the Court is requested by the parties to decide on a maritime delimitation in accordance with Art 36, para 1, of the Statute, it will not be expected to apply rules of international law but will simply “decide a case ex aequo et bono.” ’ Separate opinion of Judge Oda in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case, ICJ Reports, 1993, 113, para 85.
182. See also ICJ Reports, p 114, para 88
183. by the same author, ‘The International Court of Justice Viewed from the Bench (1976–1993)’ (1993) 244 RCADI, 151–4. Although Judge Oda's opinion is an extreme one, it is undeniable that the law of maritime delimitation does include a subjective aspect.
184. It is easy enough to agree with the view of Jennings: ‘A structured and predictable system of equitable procedures is an essential framework for the only kind of equity that a court of law that has not been given competence to decide ex aequo et bono, may properly contemplate’, RY Jennings, ‘Equity and Equitable Principles’ (1986) 42 ASDI, 38.
185. Judge Gros expressed a similar view in the Gulf of Maine case: ‘Controlled equity as a procedure for applying the law would contribute to the proper functioning of international justice; equity left, without any objective elements of control, to the wisdom of the judge reminds us that equity was once measured by “the Chancellor's foot”’, ICJ Reports 1984, 386, para 41.
186. See also P Weil, ‘Le droit international en quête de son identité, Cours général de droit international public’ (1992-VI) 237 RCADI, 254–60.
187. In this lecture, Weil considered the notion of equity in recent ICJ judgments as changing process from ‘une juridisation sauvage de l'équité’ to ‘une juridisation sage de l'équité’, RCADI, 245–60.
188. For an analysis of the principal factors taken into account in the case law and State practice, see Tanaka, RCADI, n 117, 177–379.
189. See also MD Evans, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).