Disarmament, deterrence, and denial

Comparative Strategy

Volumn 24, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 383-395

  Wirtz, James J ^a  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248031653     PISSN: 01495933     EISSN: 15210448     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01495930500448830     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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