Counterproliferation, conventional counterforce and nuclear war

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 5-24

  Wirtz, James J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 9744230787     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390008437776     Document Type: Article

References (96)

1. Statement by Dr Ashton B. Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 28 April 1994, pp. 12-27; and William C. Potter, 'Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States', in Barry R. Schneider and William L. Dowdy (eds.) Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 1998) pp.107-19.
2. James J. Wirtz, 'Nuclear Weapons in Asia: A Report from ISA-JAIR', International Studies Notes 23/2 (Spring 1998) pp. 11-16; Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid', Foreign Affairs (Sept./Oct. 1998) pp.41-52.
3. James J. Wirtz, 'Nuclear Weapons in Asia: A Report from ISA-JAIR', International Studies Notes 23/2 (Spring 1998) pp. 11-16; Jaswant Singh, 'Against Nuclear Apartheid', Foreign Affairs (Sept./Oct. 1998) pp.41-52.
4. For a list and description of the 'Eight Ds' see Memo for Robert Gallucci, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, Dept. of State and Ashton Carter, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation, Department of Defense SUBJECT: Agreed Definitions, 18 Feb. 1994, National Security Council.
5. For a discussion of these traditional appraoches to non-proliferation see Barry R. Schneider, 'Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: Policy Issues and Debates', Mershon International Studies Review 38/2 (Oct. 1994) pp.216-25.
6. Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs May 1994, p.27. As former Secretary of Defense William Perry explained, the administration has established three lines of defense against proliferation: 'The first line is to prevent or reduce the proliferation threat. The second line, if prevention fails, is to deter the threat, And the third line, if deterrence fails, is to defend against the threat.' William J. Perry, 'US Counterproliferation Efforts: Prevent, Deter, Defend', in Schneider and Dowdy Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink (note 1) p.270.
7. Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs May 1994, p.27. As former Secretary of Defense William Perry explained, the administration has established three lines of defense against proliferation: 'The first line is to prevent or reduce the proliferation threat. The second line, if prevention fails, is to deter the threat, And the third line, if deterrence fails, is to defend against the threat.' William J. Perry, 'US Counterproliferation Efforts: Prevent, Deter, Defend', in Schneider and Dowdy Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink (note 1) p.270.
8. David C. Hendrickson, 'The Recovery of Internationalism', Foreign Affairs 73/5 (Sept./Oct. 1994) p.34-8. Until recently, few proliferation experts acknowledged that, in the words of Steve Fetter, 'preventive war represent[s] the dark side of nonproliferation policy', see idem, 'Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction', International Security 16/1 (Summer 1991)p.36.
9. David C. Hendrickson, 'The Recovery of Internationalism', Foreign Affairs 73/5 (Sept./Oct. 1994) p.34-8. Until recently, few proliferation experts acknowledged that, in the words of Steve Fetter, 'preventive war represent[s] the dark side of nonproliferation policy', see idem, 'Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction', International Security 16/1 (Summer 1991)p.36.
10. Leonard S. Spector, 'Neo-Nonproliferation', Survival 37/1 (Spring 1995) pp.66-85.
11. As Bernard Brodie wrote in the late 1950s, 'Preventative war seems today no longer a live issue, though it was that only a few years ago among a small but important minority of American citizens. The pressure in favor of it diminished as the Soviets developed a nuclear capability, and especially as Americans became acclimated to living with those nuclear bombs that had provoked the idea in the first place', Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1959) pp.227-8. On the issue of preventative war in US strategy see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton UP 1991) pp.21, 103-7; David Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960', International Security 7/4 (Spring 1983) p.33; and, Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington DC: Brookings 1987) pp. 161-4.
12. As Bernard Brodie wrote in the late 1950s, 'Preventative war seems today no longer a live issue, though it was that only a few years ago among a small but important minority of American citizens. The pressure in favor of it diminished as the Soviets developed a nuclear capability, and especially as Americans became acclimated to living with those nuclear bombs that had provoked the idea in the first place', Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1959) pp.227-8. On the issue of preventative war in US strategy see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton UP 1991) pp.21, 103-7; David Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960', International Security 7/4 (Spring 1983) p.33; and, Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington DC: Brookings 1987) pp. 161-4.
13. As Bernard Brodie wrote in the late 1950s, 'Preventative war seems today no longer a live issue, though it was that only a few years ago among a small but important minority of American citizens. The pressure in favor of it diminished as the Soviets developed a nuclear capability, and especially as Americans became acclimated to living with those nuclear bombs that had provoked the idea in the first place', Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1959) pp.227-8. On the issue of preventative war in US strategy see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton UP 1991) pp.21, 103-7; David Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960', International Security 7/4 (Spring 1983) p.33; and, Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington DC: Brookings 1987) pp. 161-4.
14. As Bernard Brodie wrote in the late 1950s, 'Preventative war seems today no longer a live issue, though it was that only a few years ago among a small but important minority of American citizens. The pressure in favor of it diminished as the Soviets developed a nuclear capability, and especially as Americans became acclimated to living with those nuclear bombs that had provoked the idea in the first place', Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton UP 1959) pp.227-8. On the issue of preventative war in US strategy see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton UP 1991) pp.21, 103-7; David Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960', International Security 7/4 (Spring 1983) p.33; and, Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington DC: Brookings 1987) pp. 161-4.
15. Fred Ikle has expressed a similar thought: '... it can happen that military men, while skillfully planning their intricate operations and coordinating complicated maneuvers, remain curiously blind in failing to perceive that it is the outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it, that determines how well their plans serve the nation's interests. At the same time, the senior statesmen may hesitate to insist that these beautifully planned campaigns be linked to some clear ideas for ending the war, while expending their authority and energy to oversee some tactical details of the fighting', see Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (NY: Columbia UP 1991) p.2.
16. Leonard Spector also offers a compelling bureaucratic explanation for the rapidity with which counterproliferation (DoD) efforts have replaced more traditional (State Dept., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) approaches to non-proliferation see Spector, 'Neo-Nonproliferation' (note 7) pp.77-80.
17. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989) pp.1-45. For a debate on the behavioral consequences of the Nuclear Revolution see John Mueller, 'The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability', International Security 13/2 (Fall 1988) pp.55-79; and Robert Jervis, 'The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment, International Security 13/2 (Fall 1988)pp.80-90.
18. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989) pp.1-45. For a debate on the behavioral consequences of the Nuclear Revolution see John Mueller, 'The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability', International Security 13/2 (Fall 1988) pp.55-79; and Robert Jervis, 'The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment, International Security 13/2 (Fall 1988)pp.80-90.
19. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989) pp.1-45. For a debate on the behavioral consequences of the Nuclear Revolution see John Mueller, 'The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability', International Security 13/2 (Fall 1988) pp.55-79; and Robert Jervis, 'The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment, International Security 13/2 (Fall 1988)pp.80-90.
20. This option has rarely been exercised in the nuclear age and attacks have never been conducted deliberately against an opponent's nuclear weapons. According to Schneider, 'Preemptive counter-proliferation attacks have been launched in at least six instances in the past. During World War II, the Allies bombed the Nazi heavy-water plant in Norway and the US bombed Japanese nuclear laboratories. During the first week of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian Air Force unsuccessfully bombed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor. Nine months later, on 7 June 1981, the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed the Osirak reactor in Iraq on order from Menachim Begin. At the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1987, the Iraqi Air force bombed and destroyed the Iranian Bushehr reactor. The last time nuclear facilities came under military attack was in Jan. 1991 when the American-led coalition's air offensive struck but only partially destroyed Iraq's nuclear, biological, chemical and SCUD missile assets in the Desert Storm operation', see Schneider, 'Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation' (note 4) p.226.
21. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton UP 1993) p.319
22. Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs. This is the classic prescription for damage-limitation strategies see Charles Glaser, 'Why do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence', in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller (eds.) Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989) p.135.
23. Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs. This is the classic prescription for damage-limitation strategies see Charles Glaser, 'Why do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence', in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller (eds.) Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989) p.135.
24. Ashton Carter makes a similar argument about the US attitude towards these proliferants: 'It seems likely that the United States will pass through a period in the future with most non-Soviet nuclear powers when it has the capability to mount an entirely or nearly disarming strike against them... Since some of these nations might be quite hostile to the United States, and might have populations that relish their capability to do nuclear damage to this wealthy superpower, America will not willingly relinquish its first-strike advantage', see Ashton Carter, 'Emerging Themes in Nuclear Arms Control', in Emanuel Adler (ed.) The International Practice of Arms Control (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1992) p.256.
25. Jack S. Levy, 'Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War', World Politics 11/1 (Oct. 1987) p.97.
26. Levy's observation is supported by James H. Schampel's finding that high-speed change in the ratio of material capability between potential combatants is perceived by policymaker's as threatening see James H. Schampel, 'Change in Material Capabilities and the Onset of War: A Dyadic Approach', International Studies Quarterly 37/4 (Dec. 1993) pp.395-408.
27. Levy, 'Declining Power' (note 16) p.98.
28. Prior to President Carter's visit to Pyongyang, there was widespread concern over the brewing crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, including Pyongyang's threat that sanctions would be interpreted as a casus belli see David Ottaway, 'N. Korea Forbids Inspections', Washington Post, 8 June 1994, p.25; and Stewart Stogel and Paul Bedard, 'US Proposes Arms Embargo on North Korea', Washington Times 16 June 1994, p.1. Following Carter's visit observers became hopeful that the crisis would end in a negotiated settlement see Jeffrey Smith and Ruth Marcus, 'White House Hails Carter for Efforts', Washington Post, 20 June 1994, p.1; and Merrill Goazner, 'North Korea Neighbors Hoping Crisis with US is Really Over', Chicago Tribune, 20 June 1994, p.6. Fear of an impending crisis was revived following the death of Kim II Sung see Thomas Ricks and Steve Glain, 'Death of Kim May Be Beginning of End for North Korea's Communist Regime', Wall Street Journal, 11 July 1994, p.1; and Mark Matthews and Gilbert Lewthwaite, 'Kim's Passing Could Affect World Scene', Baltimore Sun, 10 July 1994, p.1.
29. Prior to President Carter's visit to Pyongyang, there was widespread concern over the brewing crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, including Pyongyang's threat that sanctions would be interpreted as a casus belli see David Ottaway, 'N. Korea Forbids Inspections', Washington Post, 8 June 1994, p.25; and Stewart Stogel and Paul Bedard, 'US Proposes Arms Embargo on North Korea', Washington Times 16 June 1994, p.1. Following Carter's visit observers became hopeful that the crisis would end in a negotiated settlement see Jeffrey Smith and Ruth Marcus, 'White House Hails Carter for Efforts', Washington Post, 20 June 1994, p.1; and Merrill Goazner, 'North Korea Neighbors Hoping Crisis with US is Really Over', Chicago Tribune, 20 June 1994, p.6. Fear of an impending crisis was revived following the death of Kim II Sung see Thomas Ricks and Steve Glain, 'Death of Kim May Be Beginning of End for North Korea's Communist Regime', Wall Street Journal, 11 July 1994, p.1; and Mark Matthews and Gilbert Lewthwaite, 'Kim's Passing Could Affect World Scene', Baltimore Sun, 10 July 1994, p.1.
30. Prior to President Carter's visit to Pyongyang, there was widespread concern over the brewing crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, including Pyongyang's threat that sanctions would be interpreted as a casus belli see David Ottaway, 'N. Korea Forbids Inspections', Washington Post, 8 June 1994, p.25; and Stewart Stogel and Paul Bedard, 'US Proposes Arms Embargo on North Korea', Washington Times 16 June 1994, p.1. Following Carter's visit observers became hopeful that the crisis would end in a negotiated settlement see Jeffrey Smith and Ruth Marcus, 'White House Hails Carter for Efforts', Washington Post, 20 June 1994, p.1; and Merrill Goazner, 'North Korea Neighbors Hoping Crisis with US is Really Over', Chicago Tribune, 20 June 1994, p.6. Fear of an impending crisis was revived following the death of Kim II Sung see Thomas Ricks and Steve Glain, 'Death of Kim May Be Beginning of End for North Korea's Communist Regime', Wall Street Journal, 11 July 1994, p.1; and Mark Matthews and Gilbert Lewthwaite, 'Kim's Passing Could Affect World Scene', Baltimore Sun, 10 July 1994, p.1.
31. Prior to President Carter's visit to Pyongyang, there was widespread concern over the brewing crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, including Pyongyang's threat that sanctions would be interpreted as a casus belli see David Ottaway, 'N. Korea Forbids Inspections', Washington Post, 8 June 1994, p.25; and Stewart Stogel and Paul Bedard, 'US Proposes Arms Embargo on North Korea', Washington Times 16 June 1994, p.1. Following Carter's visit observers became hopeful that the crisis would end in a negotiated settlement see Jeffrey Smith and Ruth Marcus, 'White House Hails Carter for Efforts', Washington Post, 20 June 1994, p.1; and Merrill Goazner, 'North Korea Neighbors Hoping Crisis with US is Really Over', Chicago Tribune, 20 June 1994, p.6. Fear of an impending crisis was revived following the death of Kim II Sung see Thomas Ricks and Steve Glain, 'Death of Kim May Be Beginning of End for North Korea's Communist Regime', Wall Street Journal, 11 July 1994, p.1; and Mark Matthews and Gilbert Lewthwaite, 'Kim's Passing Could Affect World Scene', Baltimore Sun, 10 July 1994, p.1.
32. Prior to President Carter's visit to Pyongyang, there was widespread concern over the brewing crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, including Pyongyang's threat that sanctions would be interpreted as a casus belli see David Ottaway, 'N. Korea Forbids Inspections', Washington Post, 8 June 1994, p.25; and Stewart Stogel and Paul Bedard, 'US Proposes Arms Embargo on North Korea', Washington Times 16 June 1994, p.1. Following Carter's visit observers became hopeful that the crisis would end in a negotiated settlement see Jeffrey Smith and Ruth Marcus, 'White House Hails Carter for Efforts', Washington Post, 20 June 1994, p.1; and Merrill Goazner, 'North Korea Neighbors Hoping Crisis with US is Really Over', Chicago Tribune, 20 June 1994, p.6. Fear of an impending crisis was revived following the death of Kim II Sung see Thomas Ricks and Steve Glain, 'Death of Kim May Be Beginning of End for North Korea's Communist Regime', Wall Street Journal, 11 July 1994, p.1; and Mark Matthews and Gilbert Lewthwaite, 'Kim's Passing Could Affect World Scene', Baltimore Sun, 10 July 1994, p.1.
33. Prior to President Carter's visit to Pyongyang, there was widespread concern over the brewing crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, including Pyongyang's threat that sanctions would be interpreted as a casus belli see David Ottaway, 'N. Korea Forbids Inspections', Washington Post, 8 June 1994, p.25; and Stewart Stogel and Paul Bedard, 'US Proposes Arms Embargo on North Korea', Washington Times 16 June 1994, p.1. Following Carter's visit observers became hopeful that the crisis would end in a negotiated settlement see Jeffrey Smith and Ruth Marcus, 'White House Hails Carter for Efforts', Washington Post, 20 June 1994, p.1; and Merrill Goazner, 'North Korea Neighbors Hoping Crisis with US is Really Over', Chicago Tribune, 20 June 1994, p.6. Fear of an impending crisis was revived following the death of Kim II Sung see Thomas Ricks and Steve Glain, 'Death of Kim May Be Beginning of End for North Korea's Communist Regime', Wall Street Journal, 11 July 1994, p.1; and Mark Matthews and Gilbert Lewthwaite, 'Kim's Passing Could Affect World Scene', Baltimore Sun, 10 July 1994, p.1.
34. On miscalculated escalation see Richard Ned Lebow, 'Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War', in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.) Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1985); and James Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991) p.5.
35. On miscalculated escalation see Richard Ned Lebow, 'Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War', in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.) Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1985); and James Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991) p.5.
36. From the American perspective, both of these conditions began to fade in the Soviet-American strategic relationship in the 1950s see Warner Schilling, 'US Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s', in Steve Miller (ed.) Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton UP 1984) pp.212-14.
37. According to Thomas Schelling, 'nuclear weapons are in a class apart from conventional weapons. They are under a curse, a taboo, despite the awe in which they are held and the prestige that may go with them, Thomas Schelling, 'From an Airport Bench', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 1989) p.30. Also see TV. Paul, 'Power, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: A Reassessment', in idem, Richard Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.) The Absolute Weapon Revisited (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press 1998) pp. 19-45.
38. According to Thomas Schelling, 'nuclear weapons are in a class apart from conventional weapons. They are under a curse, a taboo, despite the awe in which they are held and the prestige that may go with them, Thomas Schelling, 'From an Airport Bench', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 1989) p.30. Also see TV. Paul, 'Power, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: A Reassessment', in idem, Richard Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.) The Absolute Weapon Revisited (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press 1998) pp. 19-45.
39. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (NY: OUP 1963) p.265.
40. Brodie, Strategy (note 8) p.233.
41. Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Future (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1983) pp.21-2.
42. Ashton B. Carter, 'Sources of Error and Uncertainty', in idem, John Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket (eds.) Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington DC: Brookings 1987) p.616.
43. John Hersey, Hiroshima (NY: Knopf 1946); and Tatsuichiro Akizuki, 'A Doctor at Nagasaki, August 1945', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.) War (NY: OUP 1994) pp.41-3. An image of mutual annihilation has long dominated American views of nuclear war, even before the arrival of MAD. According to Herman Kahn, 'The usual image of war today held by many experts as well as most laymen can be summed up in the phrase "orgiastic spasm of destruction", or "spasm war". Many believe that if one single button is pressed all the buttons will be pressed ...'see Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (NY: Horizon Press 1962) p.59.
44. John Hersey, Hiroshima (NY: Knopf 1946); and Tatsuichiro Akizuki, 'A Doctor at Nagasaki, August 1945', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.) War (NY: OUP 1994) pp.41-3. An image of mutual annihilation has long dominated American views of nuclear war, even before the arrival of MAD. According to Herman Kahn, 'The usual image of war today held by many experts as well as most laymen can be summed up in the phrase "orgiastic spasm of destruction", or "spasm war". Many believe that if one single button is pressed all the buttons will be pressed ...'see Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (NY: Horizon Press 1962) p.59.
45. John Hersey, Hiroshima (NY: Knopf 1946); and Tatsuichiro Akizuki, 'A Doctor at Nagasaki, August 1945', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.) War (NY: OUP 1994) pp.41-3. An image of mutual annihilation has long dominated American views of nuclear war, even before the arrival of MAD. According to Herman Kahn, 'The usual image of war today held by many experts as well as most laymen can be summed up in the phrase "orgiastic spasm of destruction", or "spasm war". Many believe that if one single button is pressed all the buttons will be pressed ...'see Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (NY: Horizon Press 1962) p.59.
46. Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1987). For a more specific discussion of how war is unpredictable because of the the interaction of adversaries see Alan Beyerchen, 'Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War', International Security 17/3 (Winter 1992/93) pp.72-5.
47. Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1987). For a more specific discussion of how war is unpredictable because of the the interaction of adversaries see Alan Beyerchen, 'Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War', International Security 17/3 (Winter 1992/93) pp.72-5.
48. Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness (NY: Columbia UP 1989); and Jerrold M. Post, 'The Impact of Crisis Induced Stress on Policy Makers', in Alexander George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview 1991) pp.471-94. For a critique of the notion of inadvertent escalation, based on the notion that SOPs can be designed to either increase and decrease the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Lewis Madden, 'Irrationality-Based Deterrence Reconsidered', Defense Analysis 8/3 (Dec. 1992). Jeffrey Legro makes a similar point about the impact of organizational culture on the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Jeffrey Legro, 'Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.108-42.
49. Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness (NY: Columbia UP 1989); and Jerrold M. Post, 'The Impact of Crisis Induced Stress on Policy Makers', in Alexander George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview 1991) pp.471-94. For a critique of the notion of inadvertent escalation, based on the notion that SOPs can be designed to either increase and decrease the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Lewis Madden, 'Irrationality-Based Deterrence Reconsidered', Defense Analysis 8/3 (Dec. 1992). Jeffrey Legro makes a similar point about the impact of organizational culture on the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Jeffrey Legro, 'Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.108-42.
50. Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness (NY: Columbia UP 1989); and Jerrold M. Post, 'The Impact of Crisis Induced Stress on Policy Makers', in Alexander George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview 1991) pp.471-94. For a critique of the notion of inadvertent escalation, based on the notion that SOPs can be designed to either increase and decrease the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Lewis Madden, 'Irrationality-Based Deterrence Reconsidered', Defense Analysis 8/3 (Dec. 1992). Jeffrey Legro makes a similar point about the impact of organizational culture on the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Jeffrey Legro, 'Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.108-42.
51. Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness (NY: Columbia UP 1989); and Jerrold M. Post, 'The Impact of Crisis Induced Stress on Policy Makers', in Alexander George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview 1991) pp.471-94. For a critique of the notion of inadvertent escalation, based on the notion that SOPs can be designed to either increase and decrease the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Lewis Madden, 'Irrationality-Based Deterrence Reconsidered', Defense Analysis 8/3 (Dec. 1992). Jeffrey Legro makes a similar point about the impact of organizational culture on the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Jeffrey Legro, 'Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.108-42.
52. Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness (NY: Columbia UP 1989); and Jerrold M. Post, 'The Impact of Crisis Induced Stress on Policy Makers', in Alexander George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview 1991) pp.471-94. For a critique of the notion of inadvertent escalation, based on the notion that SOPs can be designed to either increase and decrease the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Lewis Madden, 'Irrationality-Based Deterrence Reconsidered', Defense Analysis 8/3 (Dec. 1992). Jeffrey Legro makes a similar point about the impact of organizational culture on the likelihood of inadvertent escalation see Jeffrey Legro, 'Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.108-42.
53. In other words, if someone shot themselves in the head playing Russian roulette, the outcome would be inadvertent, but not accidental.
54. Here I am invoking Thomas Schelling's notion of the 'threat that leaves something to chance', see Schelling, Strategy (note 23) pp. 187-203.
55. Despite the fact that nuclear weapons were not used during the Korean War, for example, they were used by American statesmen to manage the politics and diplomacy of the war, see Roger Dingman, 'Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War', International Security 13/3 (Winter 1988/89) pp.50-91.
56. Glenn Snyder, 'The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror', in Paul Seabury (ed.) The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler 1965) pp.184-201.
57. John English, On Infantry (NY: Praeger 1984) p. 176 and fn 84.
58. Christopher C.S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine (Westport, CT: Praeger 1944) pp.61-1.
59. Richard Betts, 'A Nuclear Golden Age? The Balance Before Parity', International Security 11/3 (Winter 1986-87) pp.3-32.
60. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (note 8) pp. 115-32; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict. 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1985) pp. 113-30. On the Truman administration's effort to increase the size and capability of the US nuclear arsenal see Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill'(note 8) pp.22-4.
61. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (note 8) pp. 115-32; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict. 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1985) pp. 113-30. On the Truman administration's effort to increase the size and capability of the US nuclear arsenal see Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill'(note 8) pp.22-4.
62. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (note 8) pp. 115-32; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict. 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1985) pp. 113-30. On the Truman administration's effort to increase the size and capability of the US nuclear arsenal see Rosenberg, 'The Origins of Overkill'(note 8) pp.22-4.
63. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (NY: Columbia UP, 1988). On the siege see Bernard Fall, Hell in a very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu [1967] (NY: Da Capo 1985). Ronald Spector describes two plans for using nuclear weapons to defend Dien Bien Phu, one calling for the use of six 31-kiloton devices. According Spector, 'The authors of the two studies recognized that employment of atomic weapons risked retaliatory military action by the Soviet Union or China but argued that this risk could be minimized by disguising the US role, for example by using aircraft with French markings', see Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years of the US Army in Vietnam 1941-1960 (NY: Free Press 1985) p.200.
64. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (NY: Columbia UP, 1988). On the siege see Bernard Fall, Hell in a very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu [1967] (NY: Da Capo 1985). Ronald Spector describes two plans for using nuclear weapons to defend Dien Bien Phu, one calling for the use of six 31-kiloton devices. According Spector, 'The authors of the two studies recognized that employment of atomic weapons risked retaliatory military action by the Soviet Union or China but argued that this risk could be minimized by disguising the US role, for example by using aircraft with French markings', see Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years of the US Army in Vietnam 1941-1960 (NY: Free Press 1985) p.200.
65. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (NY: Columbia UP, 1988). On the siege see Bernard Fall, Hell in a very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu [1967] (NY: Da Capo 1985). Ronald Spector describes two plans for using nuclear weapons to defend Dien Bien Phu, one calling for the use of six 31-kiloton devices. According Spector, 'The authors of the two studies recognized that employment of atomic weapons risked retaliatory military action by the Soviet Union or China but argued that this risk could be minimized by disguising the US role, for example by using aircraft with French markings', see Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years of the US Army in Vietnam 1941-1960 (NY: Free Press 1985) p.200.
66. On Massive Retaliation and the New Look see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (NY: St Martin's 1981) pp.81-90.
67. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (NY:.Harper 1959) pp.5-6.
68. In Taylor's view, 'the New Look was little more than the old air power dogma set forth in Madison Avenue trappings ... Its implementation assumed the preponderant use of airpower and avoidance of the bloody, exhausting battle on the ground', see ibid., p. 17.
69. Leslie H. Gelb with Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington DC: Brookings 1979) pp.70-1; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1985) p.29.
70. Leslie H. Gelb with Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington DC: Brookings 1979) pp.70-1; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1985) p.29.
71. W.W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History (NY: Harper 1960) p.309.
72. Certain practical considerations are likely to become important in limited wars fought for limited political objectives. As Martin van Creveld notes: 'an Arab Bomb dropping on Tel Aviv would almost certainly inflict grievous damage on precisely the Palestinian people ... whereas exploding such a weapon on the Golan Heights, only 50 kilometers (30 miles) from Damascus and with the prevailing winds blowing from the west, is an even less attractive proposition', see Martin van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (NY: Free Press 1993) p.123.
73. Robert Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (U. of Chicago Press 1957) pp.9, 249. After surveying various arguments about the utility of employing nuclear weapons on the battlefield Morton Halperin concluded 'the question of who would gain from the use of tactical nuclear weapons can only be answered by saying that it depends on a host of variables including who uses them first, the geographic area, the terrain, the sympathies of the indigenous population, and the state of technology and production at the time', see Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (NY: John Wiley 1963) pp.68-9.
74. Robert Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (U. of Chicago Press 1957) pp.9, 249. After surveying various arguments about the utility of employing nuclear weapons on the battlefield Morton Halperin concluded 'the question of who would gain from the use of tactical nuclear weapons can only be answered by saying that it depends on a host of variables including who uses them first, the geographic area, the terrain, the sympathies of the indigenous population, and the state of technology and production at the time', see Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (NY: John Wiley 1963) pp.68-9.
75. Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (NY: Harper 1957) p.140.
76. For example, Osgood, noted that some sort of agreement was needed between combatants to keep limited war limited: 'A feasible strategy of limited war must be based upon a conception of limitation that is acceptable to Americans and to Communist leaders; for unless the major adversaries of the cold war observe the conditions for limiting war, an American strategy of limited war will not be feasible regardless of what the objective interests of the adversaries my require', Osgood, Limited War (note 45) p.10. Thomas Schelling's work on tacit bargaining, however, would suggest that Osgood's concerns were not as daunting as they first appear. Nuclear non-use is an extremely salient point of convergence between parties to a conflict; states will probably begin to limit conflict by taking steps to avoid using nuclear weapons or provoking others into using them see Schelling, Strategy (note 23) pp.53-80.
77. For example, Osgood, noted that some sort of agreement was needed between combatants to keep limited war limited: 'A feasible strategy of limited war must be based upon a conception of limitation that is acceptable to Americans and to Communist leaders; for unless the major adversaries of the cold war observe the conditions for limiting war, an American strategy of limited war will not be feasible regardless of what the objective interests of the adversaries my require', Osgood, Limited War (note 45) p.10. Thomas Schelling's work on tacit bargaining, however, would suggest that Osgood's concerns were not as daunting as they first appear. Nuclear non-use is an extremely salient point of convergence between parties to a conflict; states will probably begin to limit conflict by taking steps to avoid using nuclear weapons or provoking others into using them see Schelling, Strategy (note 23) pp.53-80.
78. According to Kissinger, 'It is clear that war cannot be limited unless both sides wish to keep it limited. The argument in favor of the possibility of limited war is that both sides have a common and overwhelming interest in preventing it from spreading. The fear that an all-out thermonuclear war might lead to the disintegration of the social structure offers an opportunity to set limits to both war and diplomacy', see Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons (note 46) p.144.
79. Of course, the clear exceptions to these generalizations are the US attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
80. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976) pp. 143-55.
81. For an elaboration of this logic see Robert Pape, 'Why Japan Surrendered', International Security 18/2(Fall 1993) pp. 154-201.
82. Osgood recommended that during a limited war, policymakers should make 'every effort to maintain an active diplomatic intercourse toward the end of terminating the war by a negotiated settlement on the basis of limited objectives ... This consideration becomes especially important in light of the fact that even a small nation that possessed an arsenal of nuclear weapons might, in desperation, inflict devastating destruction upon a larger power rather than accept humiliating terms', Osgood, Limited War (note 45) p.24.
83. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966) p.173.
84. This would obviously reduce the possibility of communicating all but one message (we want you dead) to the opposing leadership. For a discussion of the role of maintaining communication between combatants and the means to communicate with their respective forces in war termination see Paul Braken, 'War Termination', in Ashton B. Carter, John Steinbruner and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations (note 26) pp.197-214.
85. In the late 1980s, Ashton Carter identified 1577 targets (Command Centers, communication nodes, warning and assessment sensors) associated with the US nuclear command and control network. But, proliferants' command and control networks might actually be larger. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, the allies struck 32 'leadership targets'. Carter's list, however, only contained about 20 similar targets (11 major US command centers and 7 airborne command posts and alert bases) in the US infrastrucutre see Ashton B. Carter, 'Assessing Command System Vulnerability', in idem, Steinbruner and Zraket (note 26) pp.560-72; and Freedman and Karsh, Gulf Conflict (note 13) pp.323-4.
86. In the late 1980s, Ashton Carter identified 1577 targets (Command Centers, communication nodes, warning and assessment sensors) associated with the US nuclear command and control network. But, proliferants' command and control networks might actually be larger. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, the allies struck 32 'leadership targets'. Carter's list, however, only contained about 20 similar targets (11 major US command centers and 7 airborne command posts and alert bases) in the US infrastrucutre see Ashton B. Carter, 'Assessing Command System Vulnerability', in idem, Steinbruner and Zraket (note 26) pp.560-72; and Freedman and Karsh, Gulf Conflict (note 13) pp.323-4.
87. The 'air-strike' options discussed by the Ex Comm during the Cuban Missile Crisis also called for an invasion to 'ensure no reconstitution of a military threat to the United States - also, of course, disposing of Castro once and for all', see Raymond Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings 1989) p.53; and Richard Betts, 'Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993/94) p.66.
88. The 'air-strike' options discussed by the Ex Comm during the Cuban Missile Crisis also called for an invasion to 'ensure no reconstitution of a military threat to the United States - also, of course, disposing of Castro once and for all', see Raymond Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings 1989) p.53; and Richard Betts, 'Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War', International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993/94) p.66.
89. Purely, 'technical' assessments of the military balance or imbalance between states are not sufficient to produce instability in strategic relationships. The United States possess a splendid first-strike capability against most nations, yet people do not worry, for example, about what this implies about the future of US-Canadian relations. For an elaboration of this logic see Colin Gray, Weapons Don't Make War (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 1993).
90. According to Robert Jervis, policymakers tend to see the behavior of others as more coherent, purposive and centrally directed than it is. Policymakers also have a tendency to ignore the ways that they contribute to international problems; instead they tend to blame the policies of others as the source of international conflict see Robert Jervis, 'Hypotheses on Misperception', World Politics 20/3 (April 1968) pp.454-79.
91. Representative of those who acknowledge the potential positive impact of nuclear proliferation are Kenneth Waltz, 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', American Political Science Review 84/3 (Sept. 1990) pp.731-45; John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; John Mearsheimer, 'The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.50-66; and Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/3 (Winter 1990/91) pp.7-57. For critics of this strategy see Steven Miller, 'The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.67-80; and Scott D. Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107.
92. Representative of those who acknowledge the potential positive impact of nuclear proliferation are Kenneth Waltz, 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', American Political Science Review 84/3 (Sept. 1990) pp.731-45; John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; John Mearsheimer, 'The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.50-66; and Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/3 (Winter 1990/91) pp.7-57. For critics of this strategy see Steven Miller, 'The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.67-80; and Scott D. Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107.
93. Representative of those who acknowledge the potential positive impact of nuclear proliferation are Kenneth Waltz, 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', American Political Science Review 84/3 (Sept. 1990) pp.731-45; John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; John Mearsheimer, 'The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.50-66; and Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/3 (Winter 1990/91) pp.7-57. For critics of this strategy see Steven Miller, 'The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.67-80; and Scott D. Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107.
94. Representative of those who acknowledge the potential positive impact of nuclear proliferation are Kenneth Waltz, 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', American Political Science Review 84/3 (Sept. 1990) pp.731-45; John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; John Mearsheimer, 'The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.50-66; and Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/3 (Winter 1990/91) pp.7-57. For critics of this strategy see Steven Miller, 'The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.67-80; and Scott D. Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107.
95. Representative of those who acknowledge the potential positive impact of nuclear proliferation are Kenneth Waltz, 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', American Political Science Review 84/3 (Sept. 1990) pp.731-45; John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; John Mearsheimer, 'The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.50-66; and Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/3 (Winter 1990/91) pp.7-57. For critics of this strategy see Steven Miller, 'The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.67-80; and Scott D. Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107.
96. Representative of those who acknowledge the potential positive impact of nuclear proliferation are Kenneth Waltz, 'Nuclear Myths and Political Realities', American Political Science Review 84/3 (Sept. 1990) pp.731-45; John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56; John Mearsheimer, 'The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.50-66; and Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War', International Security 15/3 (Winter 1990/91) pp.7-57. For critics of this strategy see Steven Miller, 'The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent', Foreign Affairs 72/3 (Summer 1993) pp.67-80; and Scott D. Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', International Security 18/4 (Spring 1994) pp.66-107.