La gouvernance d'entreprise au service de la valeur actionnariale ou de l' enrichissement des dirigeants ?

Contrario

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 83-115

  Erturk, Ismail ^a   Froud, Julie ^a   Johal, Sukhdev ^a   Williams, Karel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247668558     PISSN: 16607880     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3917/aco.022.0083     Document Type: Article

References (61)

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8. Cf. par exemple Michael C. Jensen et Kevin J. Murphy, « Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives », Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No 2, 1990, pp. 225-264;
9. John E. Core, Wayne Guay et David F. Larcker, « Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives : a Survey», FRBNY E cono mic Policy Review, avril 2003, pp. 27-50.
10. Lucien A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried et David I. Walker, « Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation», The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, No 3, 2002, pp. 751-847.
11. Par exemple Harry G. Barkema et Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, « Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance : a General Research Framework», Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41, No 2, 1998, pp. 135-146.
12. Adolph A. Berle et Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1932, p. 312.
13. Adolph A. Berle, Power without Property, London: Sidgwick & jackson, 1960, p. 157.
14. C. WrightMills, ThePower Elite, New York: OUP, 1956;
15. Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology, London : Allen & Unwin, 1969.
16. Ibid., p. 150.
17. Michael C. Jensen et Kevin J. Murphy, « Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives », art. cit.
18. John E. Core, Wayne Guay et David F. Larcker, « Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: a Survey», art. cit., p. 35.
19. Henry L. Tosi, Steve Werner, Jeffrey P. Katz et Luis R. Gomez- Mejia, «How Much Does Performance Matter ? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies »Journal of Management, Vol. 26, No 2, 2000, pp. 301-339.
20. Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors, London : Department for Trade and Industry, 2003.
21. Alan Greenspan, « Corporate governance », Lecture at the Stern School of Business, New York University, 26 mars 2002. Disponible à l'adresse suivante : www.federalreserve.gov /boarddocs/speeches/2002.
22. Julie Froud, Colin Haslam, Sukhdev johal et Karel Williams, « Shareholder Value and Financialization Consultancy Promises, Management Moves », Economy and Society, Vol. 29, No 1, 2000, pp. 80-120.
23. Heng Yi Feng, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal et Karel Williams, « A New Business Model ? The Capital Market and the New Economy», Economy and Society, Vol. 30, No 4, 2001, pp. 467-503.
24. Juhe Froud, Cohn Haslam, Sukhdev Johal et Karel Williams, «Shareholder Value...», art. cit.
25. 22Business Week, 17 avril 2000.
26. Rakesh Khurana, Searching for a Corporate Savior. The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
27. Martin J. Conyon et Kevin J. Murphy, « The Prince and the Pauper ? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom», The Economic Journal, Vol. no, No 467, Novembre 2000, pp. 640-671.
28. Henry L. Tosi et al., « How- Much Does Performance Matter?...», art. cit.
29. Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology, op. cit.
30. Martin J. Conyon et Kevin J. Murphy, « The Prince and the Pauper?...», art.cit.
31. à propos du Royaume-Uni, voir Mahmoud Ezzamel et Robert Watson, « Market Comparison Earnings and the Bidding-up of Executive Cash Compensation : Evidence from the United Kingdom», Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41, No 2, 1998, pp. 221-231;
32. Ruth Bender, « How Executive Directors' Remuneration is Determined in Two FTSE 350 Utilities», Corporate Governance, Vol. 11, ? 3, pp. 206-217.
33. Richard Greenbury, Directors' Remuneration:Report by a Study Group chaired by Sir Richard, op. cit.
34. Fortune, 28 avril 2003.
35. Martin J. Conyon et Kevin J. Murphy, « The Prince and the Pauper?...», art.cit.
36. Ibid., p. 646.
37. Financial Times, 21 mai 2003.
38. Financial Times, 31 juillet 2002.
39. Guardian, 19 avril 2003.
40. Peter C. Fusaro et Ross M. Miller, What Went Wrong at Enron ?, Haboken NJ : John Wiley, 2002.
41. Business Week, 21 avril2oo3.
42. The Guardian, 31 juillet 2003.
43. MORI, « Trust in Business, MORI Survey 2003 », 2003. Disponible à l'adresse suivante www. Mori.com/pubinfo/rmw-trust-in- business/
44. Financial Times, 24 avril 2003.
45. Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Viken Papazian et Karel Williams, « The Temptation of Houston », Critical Perspectives on Accounting (à paraître).
46. Par exemple Michael C. Jensen et Joseph Fuller, «Just Say No to Wall Street »Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 14, No 4, 2002, pp. 41-46.
47. Pour plus de details, voir : Ismail Erturk, Juhe Froud, Sukhdev Johal et Karel Williams, « Pay for Corporate Performance or Pay as Social Division : Re-thinking the Problem of Top Management Pay in Giant Corporations ». Papier présenté au workshop Rewarding and Controlling Managers, Manchester, 14 mai 2004. Disponible à l'adresse suivante : http//www.ipeg.org.uk/clusters/corporate-workshop. htm
48. Ibid.
49. George Orwell, The Collected Essays, Journalism andLetters, Volume II, 1940-1943, London : Secker & Warburg, p. 98.
50. 46 Business Week, 6 mai 2002.
51. Adolph A. Berle, Power without Property, op. cit., p. 4.
52. Martin J. Conyon et Kevin J. Murphy, «The Prince and the Pauper?...», art.cit., p. 646.
53. Sarah Anderson, John Cavanagh, Chris Hartman et Scott Klinger, Executive Excess 2003. CEOs Win, Workers and Taxpayers Lose, Boston : Institute for Policy Studies & United for a Fair Economy, 2003.
54. 20 mai 2003.
55. Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal et Karel Williams, «Accumulation under Conditions of lnequality», Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2001, pp. 66-95.
56. Thomas J. Stanley et William D. Danko, The Millionaire Next Door, New York: Pocket Books, 2002.
57. cnn. com, 12 mars 2002.
58. Morgan Stanley, High Net Worth Industry Overview, November 2001.
59. Wright C. Milk, The Power Elite, op. cit., p. 131.
60. Charles A. R. Crosland, The ConservativeEnemy, London: Cape, 1962, p. 69.
61. Theo Nichols, Ownership, Control and ldeology, op. cit., p. 141.