Democracy assistance to domestic election monitoring organizations: Conditions for success

Democratization

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 289-312

  Lean, Sharon F ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Civil society; Democracy assistance; Election monitoring; Latin America; Social capital

Indexed keywords

CIVIL SOCIETY; DEMOCRACY; DEMOCRATIZATION; ELECTION; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; MONITORING SYSTEM; SOCIAL CAPITAL;

LATIN AMERICA;

EID: 34247572874     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: 1743890X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340701245835     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. Thomas Carothers, 'Struggling with Semi-authoritarians', in Peter J. Burnell (ed.), Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (London: Cass, 2000), p.225.
2. Peter J. Burnell, 'Democracy Assistance: The State of the Discourse', in ibid, pp. 3-33
3. Larry Diamond,'Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation', Journal of Democracy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1994), pp. 4-17.
4. James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, 'Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators? The Nature and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990-1999', Democratization, Vol.12, No.4 (2005), p.448.
5. I use the terms election monitoring and election observation interchangeably here. Some distinguish between technical election-day monitoring and the broader practice of observation throughout the campaign; others consider monitoring to be proactive and observation passive. I do not make these distinctions here.
6. Eric C. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), pp. 212-15.
7. DMOs have been active in 11 countries in Asia, 18 countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 22 countries in Africa and the Middle East and 15 in Latin America and the Caribbean. See NDI and NAMFREL, Making Every Vote Count: Domestic Election Monitoring in Asia (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1996)
8. Bjornlund (note 5), pp.224-30
9. Larry Garber and Lisa McLean, 'Memorandum to Workshop Participants: Civic Organizations in Transitional Societies', (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1993),
10. Sharon F. Lean, 'The Transnational Politics of Democracy Promotion: Election Monitoring in Latin America', Unpublished dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 2004.
11. AHPEL(Haiti) andVia Cívica(Nicaragua) are defunct. Participa (Chile) and Poder Ciudadano (Argentina) are still in existence but nowfocus their activities in areas of democratic accountability other than elections.
12. For an interesting analysis of NED democracy assistance programmes, see Scott and Steele (note 3).
13. Personal communication, Tom Melia, former NDI official, New York, 16 April 2005.
14. This money was not provided by USAID directly, but rather channelled through two prominent international non-governmental organizations, the Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion (CAPEL), a branch of the International Institution for Human Rights (IIDH) in Costa Rica and NDI. See WOLA, 'Chile's Transition to Democracy ' (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 1989), p. 28.
15. Public lecture by Sergio Aguayo Q., 'El Financiamiento extranjero y la transición democrática mexicana,' 31 August 2001, Casa Lamm, Mexico City, Mexico.
16. Canadian International Development Agency, 'Voting for Democracy in Peru', in CIDA Update (Canadian International Development Agency, 2001), available online at: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/archives-e.htm
17. GAO, Foreign Assistance: Peru on Track for Free and Fair Elections (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, 2001), available online at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01496t.pdf
18. USAID, 'Haiti Activity Data Sheet, Program: Haiti, Genuinely Inclusive Democratic Governance Attained, document number 521-005,' (Washington, DC: USAID, 2002), pp.1-2, available oHline at: http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ cbj2002/lac/ht/521-500.html
19. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.167.
20. Ibid., p.173.
21. Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce, Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001), p. 49.
22. Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, 'The Paradox of Civil Society', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), pp. 38-52
23. Goran Hyden, 'Civil Society, Social Capital and Development: Dissection of a Complex Discourse', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 32, No.1 (1997), pp. 3-31.
24. Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), pp. 23-24.
25. Omar Encarnación, The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Brazil (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 6.
26. Ibid., p.117.
27. Abraham F. Lowenthal, 'The United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History', in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.), Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America: Themes and Issues (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 260.
28. A civility pact calls on candidates, parties and sometimes the media, international organizations and civil society organizations to publicly affirm their commitment to abide by all applicable election rules, avoid negative campaigning and generally conduct themselves in a civil way.
29. The quick count conducted by NAMFREL in 1986 was instrumental in the eventual victory of Corazon Aquino, by providing evidence that official results giving the victory to the authoritarian incumbent Marcos were flawed. In Latin America, quick counts conducted by international monitors were used as a proxy in Haiti in 1990 when official tabulation failed, and the quick count conducted by Nicaraguan DMO Ética y Transparencia provided important confirmation of early official returns in the highly competitive presidential race of 2001.
30. These are: Panama 1989, Dominican Republic 1994, Haiti 2000 and Peru 2000.
31. N. Canton and S.A. Nevitte, 'The Role of Domestic Observers', Journal of Democracy, Vol.8, No.3 (1997), p. 49.
32. Alison Brysk, 'Democratizing Civil Society in Latin America', Journal of Democracy Vol. 11, No. 3 (2000), pp. 151-65
33. Kathryn Sikkink, 'Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Power', in S. Khagram, J.V. Riker, and K. Sikkink (eds), Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), pp. 301-18.
34. Bjornlund (note 5), p. 253.
35. McClintock compares Sendero Luminoso, the revolutionary organization active in Peru in the 1980s, to the Khmer Rouge in that both embraced political violence and systematically terrorized both military and civilian opponents. See Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 63.
36. Aristide has claimed he was forced to leave against his will. See Peter Slevin and Scott Wilson, 'Aristide's Departure: The US Account', The Washington Post, 3 March 2004.
37. They received support for these endeavors from NED and other international non-governmental sources.
38. In Mexico, international election observers are accredited as 'international visitors' rather than the conventional term 'international observers' in a semantic assertion of national sovereignty.
39. Aguayo (note 11).
40. Sergio Aguayo Q., founder and member of the Board of Directors of Alianza Cívica, interviewed in Mexico City, Mexico, 19 March 2003.
41. Aguayo (note 11).
42. Silvia Alonso, Executive Director of Alianza Cívica, interviewed by the author in Mexico City, Mexico, 19 March 2003.
43. Alianza Cívica, 'Transparencia Institutional' available online at: http://www.alianzacivica.org.mx/transparencia.html, accessed 2 January 2007.
44. NDI, 'Media Objectivity in Mexico and Media Monitoring Activities of the Mexican Academy of Human Rights: An NDI Delegation Report', (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1997).
45. Marcia Birnbaum, Transparencia: Civil Society Observes Peru's Controversial 2000 Election, Civic Mobilization Case Study (Lima, Peru: Asociación Civil Transparencia, 2001), p.13.
46. Patrick Merloe, Senior Associate and Director of Programmes on Election and Political Processes, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, interviewed by the author in New Haven, CT, 27 February 2003.
47. Peru's 2000 elections were controversial from the start of the campaign. Prior to the 2000 elections, President Fujimori had reinterpreted election law to allow himself to run for a third term in office, then dismissed members of the Supreme Court who seemed inclined to rule this reinterpretation of election law unconstitutional.
48. Emmy Decker, International Relations Representative for Transparencia, interviewed by the author in Lima, Peru, 21 May 2002.
49. A 'red spiderweb'; Percy Medina, Acting Secretary General, Transparencia, interviewed by the author in Lima, Peru, 10 June 2002.
50. See the Acuerdo de Lima website at http://www.acuerdodelima.org for more details on the network.
51. William I. Robinson, A Faustian Bargain: US Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 231.
52. Caesar Sereseres, consultant to the US State Department and NED, international election observer for the International Republican Institute, interviewed by the author in Irvine, California, 11 February 2003.
53. The results of the quick count were not allowed to be publicly released before the official results per a provision of Nicaraguan electoral law, but they were leaked to the parties in the early hours of the morning.
54. The United States' contribution amounted to just under one-fourth of its total observation budget of $823,000. See USAID, 'Nicaragua - Election Update #6 (01-096)' (US Agency for International Development, Press Office, 2001), available online at: http://www.usaid.gov/press/ releases/2001/fs011010_1.html
55. In 2005-6, Etica y Transparencia received $64,000 and $110,000 donations from Finland and Germany, respectively.
56. See Sergio Aguirre, 'Alemania financia observación electoral a través de Etica y Transparencia', El Nuevo Diario, 20 June 2006,
57. Sergio Aguirre, 'Finlandia aporta a observación electoral: 64 mil dólares para elecciones de la Costa Caribe', El Nuevo Diario, 18 October 2005.
58. Etica y Transparencia, 'Informe 1996-2004,' (Managua: Ética y Transparencia, 2004), available online at: http://www.eyt.org.ni
59. The 1987 election was cancelled in progress due to violence at the polls. After various postponements, the process culminated in the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to his first term in 1990. 51. AHPEL, Guide du Volontaire d'AHPEL (Association Haitienne pour des Elections Libres, 1990).
60. AHPEL, Guide du Volontaire d'AHPEL (Association Haitienne pour des Elections Libres, 1990).
61. Ibid.
62. GAO, 'Haiti: US Assistance for the Electoral Process, Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives' (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, 1996).
63. Melinda Miles, 'Elections 2000: Participatory Democracy in Haiti' (Haiti Reborn/Quixote Center 2001), p. 7.
64. According to Haitian electoral law, to win a seat in the first round, a candidate has to achieve an absolute majority of votes. The Provisional Election Council calculated the absolute majority in many districts based only on votes for the top four or five candidates, instead of the total number of votes cast (in some races there were dozens of candidates). According to the OAS, 'by these calculations, 17 senatorial races were decided in the first round, of which 16 winners were from the Lavalas Party. If the calculations for an absolute majority were based on the total number of valid votes cast, 10 of these senatorial races would have had to go to a second round.' It is unclear whether Lavalas would have gained as many seats if the second round vote in these districts had moved forward. See OAS, 'The OAS Electoral Observation Mission in Haiti: Chief of Mission Report to the OAS Permanent Council', available online at: http://www.upd.oas.org/EOM/Haiti/ haitichief%20of%20mission %20report.htm
65. 'Haiti stands firm against international threats', Haïti Progrès, 28 June-4 July 2000.
66. Kozepep, 'Statement to the Press 4 December 2000' (included as appendix 13 in Miles (note 54), p. 69).
67. These elections were halted in progress due to extreme violence at the polls; ultimately Haiti was not able to successfully hold elections until 1990. Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, 'Briefing Book, Visit to Haiti, 23-27 October 1987', The Carter Center, 1987.
68. 'Elections, and violence, now seem certain for Sunday', Haïti Progrès, 17-23 May 2000
69. 'Haiti stands firm against international threats', Haïti Progrès, 28 June-4 July 2000.
70. Conseil National d'Observation des Elections, 'Bulletin nümero 4: Evaluaccion du processus électoral et recommandations du CNO', Port-au-Prince, 2005.
71. Walt Bogdanich and Jenny Nordberg, 'Mixed US Signals Helped Tilt Haiti Towards Chaos', The New York Times, 29 January 2006.