Why Eberl is wrong. Reflections on the beginning of personhood

Bioethics

Volumn 21, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 270-282

  Deckers, Jan ^a,b  

^a NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Aquinas; Embryo; Personhood; Status

Indexed keywords

BIOETHICS; CONCEPTION; EMBRYO DEVELOPMENT; EMBRYO RESEARCH; GENETIC IDENTIFICATION; GENETIC TRAIT; ONTOGENY; PERSONHOOD; PROBABILITY; PUBLICATION; REVIEW;

BEGINNING OF HUMAN LIFE; BIOETHICS; HUMANS; PERSONHOOD; PHILOSOPHY; RESEARCH EMBRYO CREATION;

EID: 34247497614     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00553.x     Document Type: Review

References (75)

1. J. Eberl. The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis. Bioethics 2000 14 : 134 157
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid: 135.
4. Ibid: 153; See N. Ford. 1988. When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy, and Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; E. Olson. 1997. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. 1997.
5. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, p. 152; M. Tooley. 1983. Abortion and Infanticide. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 166-168.
6. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, p. 152, 151; Aquinas. 1963-1975. Summa Theologiae. Cambridge: Blackfriars edition with translation. Ia, q.118, a.2, ad2.
7. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 148.
8. Ibid: 148.
9. Ibid: 148.
10. Ibid: 152, 140.
11. Ibid: 137-138.
12. Ibid: 150, 134-135.
13. Ibid: 140.
14. Ibid: 135.
15. Ibid: 154.
16. Ibid: 154.
17. Ibid: 156.
18. The term 'embryo' will be used here to refer to the 'human embryo' and to refer to early life from conception until the eighth week.
19. The possibility of parthenogenesis does not undermine this view as a transformation must take place before the gamete obtains an active potentiality to develop into a more developed human being. Such transformation depends on interaction with another entity.
20. An elaborate account of the difference between passive and active potentiality is M. Reichlin. The Argument From Potential: A Reappraisal. Bioethics 1997; 11: 1-23. However, Reichlin fails to conceptualise accurately the transition from passive to active potentiality by claiming that a gamete 'depends. on external causes' (13). Since two causes cannot bring about one transition, the correct view is that the transition is brought about by one cause. While Reichlin points out rightly that the right circumstances (for example 'a sexual act or an in vitro procedure') are required, these circumstances do not cause the emergence of the embryo.
21. Eberl may contradict himself, however, if the point he is making in the following text implies that the presence of an ovum is sufficient for the transition from passive to active potentiality: 'In the case of the sperm, its potential for actualizing a new human person depends upon the presence of an ovum to act upon it' (Eberl. op. cit. note 1, p. 152).
22. Ibid: 156.
23. Aquinas. op. cit. note 6, Ia. q. 3, a. 1 and q. 9 a. 1-2 and q. 105. a. 6-7.
24. Aquinas. Commentary on III Sentences, dist. 3, q. 5, a. 2., resp; Aristotle. History of Animals, VII, ch. 3.
25. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 137.
26. Aquinas. op. cit. note 6, Ia. q. 118. a. 1, resp. 3 and 4.
27. Ibid: Ia. q. 118. a. 1, resp. 4 and a. 2, resp.
28. J. Haldane & P. Lee. Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion, and the Value of Life. Philosophy 2003; 78: 255-278: 271.
29. Eberl refers to Ford who, indeed, concludes that the soul 'arises through the creative power of God' at this time. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 147; Ford. op. cit. note 4, 171-172.
30. Incidentally, Eberl contradicts his position that the early embryo is not ensouled by positing that 'life begins at the moment when the genetic information contained in the sperm and ovum combine' (Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 135). This is so because he defines the soul as 'the organizing principle of all physical aspects of living beings' (Ibid: 138; italics mine). This excludes the possibility that any physical aspects of the early embryo might not be directed by the soul.
31. Ibid: 151.
32. Ibid: 151.
33. Ibid: 142.
34. Ibid: 142.
35. Ibid: 148.
36. Other aspects of Eberl's embryology are controversial, for example his view that implantation is not complete before the 14th day and that twinning can no longer occur beyond this point. Implantation can be regarded as complete around eight days after conception (J. McLachlan. 1994. Medical Embryology. Wokingham: Addison-Wesley: 33) and twinning can occur after the formation of the primitive streak (R. O'Rahilly & F. Müller, 1994. Human Embryology and Teratology. New York: Wiley-Liss: 32).
37. E. Barnea et al. Embryo-Maternal Signaling Prior to Implantation. Early Pregnancy 2000 4 : 166 175
38. A. Holland. A Fortnight of My Life Is Missing: A Discussion of the Status of the Human 'Pre-embryo'. J Appl Philos 1990 7 : 25 37
39. C. Tollefsen. Embryos, Individuals, and Persons: An Argument Against Embryo Creation and Research. J Appl Philos 2001 18 : 65 77
40. Tollefsen. op. cit. note 39: 72.
41. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 148 (footnote 39).
42. Ibid: 148.
43. Ibid: 151.
44. Ibid: 151 (italics mine).
45. Ibid: 137.
46. Ibid: 152.
47. Ibid: 152.
48. J. Eberl. A Thomistic Understanding of Human Death. Bioethics. 2005 19 : 29 48
49. Aquinas. op. cit. note 6, Ia, q. 118 a.2, resp; To be sure, Aquinas thought that things that were created naturally (by means of 'secondary causes') also had a supernatural cause. However, for the character ('what-ness') of most events he believed no reference to the supernatural cause must be made, provided the question were not asked of why they exist at all. Direct reference to a supernatural cause only had to be made for those actions where God intervened directly in the natural process by performing miracles (Ibid: Ia, q. 105 a. 6-7). Given Aquinas' view that the natural order had received its 'autonomy' from God, the sufficient cause of everything, the question must be asked, however, how the 'secondary causes' can really be autonomous, sufficient causes of natural events. Two different causes, x and y, cannot both be sufficient causes of one effect.
50. The view that the soul can operate without the body is also incompatible with Eberl's view that the soul 'cannot exist separate from matter' (Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 138).
51. Aquinas. op. cit. note 6, Ia q. 118 a.2, ad 5.
52. Ibid: Ia q. 118 a.2, resp 5; Aquinas deals with the same issue in Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles. II. 89.
53. Aquinas. op. cit. 6, IIa IIae q. 154 a.2.
54. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 149.
55. Ibid: 153.
56. Ibid: 143.
57. I. Persson. Two Claims About Potential Human Beings. Bioethics 2003 17 : 503 516
58. H. Skott Brill. The Future-Like-Ours Argument, Personal Identity, and the Twinning Dilemma. Soc Theory Pract 2003 29 : 419 430
59. House of Lords. 2002. Stem Cell Research. Report from the Select Committee. London: The Stationery Office: section 4.11: The claim is made that there may not be sufficient continuity of identity between early embryos and adults. This is contrasted with an adult who may say 'that was me as a baby' when presented with an old photograph.
60. S. Clark. The Status of Zygotes. The Philosophers' Magazine Online 2001 13
61. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 146.
62. Ibid: 146.
63. Ibid: 146.
64. C.M. Munthe. Divisibility and the Moral Status of Embryos. Bioethics 2001 15 : 382 397
65. Haldane & Lee. op. cit. note 28, 268.
66. B. Ashley A. Moraczewski. Cloning, Aquinas, and the Embryonic Person. Natl Cathol Bioeth Q 2001 1 : 189 201
67. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 138.
68. Ibid: 142, 152.
69. Haldane & Lee. op. cit. note 28, 274.
70. Eberl. op. cit. note 1, 153.
71. Ibid: 156.
72. Ibid: 134.
73. A similar suggestion is made in A. Campbell, G. Gillett, & G. Jones. 2001. Medical Ethics. 3rd edition. Oxford. University Press: 102.
74. J. Deckers. Why Two Arguments from Probability Fail and One Argument from Thomson's Violinist Succeeds in Justifying Embryo Destruction in Some Situations. J Med Ethics 2007 33 : 160 164
75. I like to thank Phil Diggle and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft.