Nonlinear pricing, redistribution, and optimal tax policy

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 4, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 139-161

  Cremer, Helmuth ^a   Gahvari, Firouz ^b  

^a INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247211915     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00092     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. ARMSTRONG, M., S. COWAN, and J. VICKERS (1995) Nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation, Journal of Public Economics 58, 33-35.
2. ATKINSON, A. B., and J. E. STIGLITZ (1976) The design of tax structure: direct versus indirect taxation, Journal of Public Economics 6, 55-75.
3. BöS, D. (1984) Income taxation, public sector pricing and redistribution, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 86, 166-183.
4. BöS, D. (1986) Public Enterprise Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
5. BRITO, D. L., J. H. HAMILTON, S. M. SLUTSKY, and J. E. STIGLITZ (1990) Pareto efficient tax structures, Oxford Economic Papers 42, 61-77.
6. BROWN, S., and D. SIBLEY (1986) The Theory of Public Utility Pricing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. CREMER, H., and F. GAHVARI (1997) In-kind transfers, self-selection and optimal tax policy, European Economic Review 41, 97-114.
8. CREMER, H., F. GAHVARI, and N. LADOUX (1998) Externalities and optimal taxation, Journal of Public Economics 70, 343-364.
9. DIAMOND, P. A. (1975) A many-person Ramsey tax rule, Journal of Public Economics 4, 335-342.
10. FCC (Federal Communications Commission) (1996) "Recommended Decision on Universal Service," November issue, CC Docket no. 96-45.
11. GUESNERIE, R., and J. SEADE (1982) Nonlinear pricing in a finite economy, Journal of Public Economics 17, 157-179.
12. LAFFONT, J.-J., and J. TIROLE (1993) The Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
13. McAFEE, R. P., AND J. McMILLAN (1988) Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design, Journal of Economic Theory 46, 335-354.
14. MIRRLEES, J. A. (1971) An exploration in the theory of optimal income taxation, Review of Economic Studies 38, 175-208.
15. MIRRLEES, J. A. (1975) Optimal commodity taxation in a two-class economy, Journal of Public Economics 4, 27-33.
16. MIRRLEES, J. A. (1976) Optimal tax theory: a synthesis, Journal of Public Economics 6, 327-358.
17. MITCHELL, B., and I. VOGELSANG (1991) Telecommunications Pricing: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18. NEWBERY, D. M. (1995) The distributional impact of price changes in Hungary and the United Kingdom, Economic Journal 105, 847-863.
19. OFTEL (Office of Telecommunications) (1997) "Universal Telecommunication Services: Proposed Arrangements for Universal Service in the UK from 1997," February issue, Consultative Document.
20. PHLIPS, L. (1983) The Economics of Price Discrimination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21. RIORDAN, M. H. (1984) On delegating price authority to a regulated firm, RAND Journal of Economics 15, 108-115.
22. ROCHET, J.-C., and P. CHONé (1998) Ironing sweeping and multidimensional screening, Econometrica 66, 783-826.
23. SEADE, J. (1977) On the shape of optimal tax schedules, Journal of Public Economics 7, 203-236.
24. SHARKEY, W., and D. SIBLEY (1993) Optimal non-linear pricing with regulatory preference over consumer type, Journal of Public Economics 50, 197-229.
25. SPULBER, D. (1989) Regulation and Markets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
26. STIGLITZ, J. E. (1982) Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation, Journal of Public Economics 17, 213-240.
27. STIGLITZ, J. E. (1987) "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds., Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 991-1042.
28. WILSON, R. (1993) Nonlinear Pricing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
29. WORLD BANK (1995) "Meeting the Infrastructure Challenge in Latin America and the Caribbean." Washington, DC: World Bank.