Learning payoff functions in infinite games

Machine Learning

Volumn 67, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 145-168

  Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy ^a   Wellman, Michael P ^a   Singh, Satinder ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Learning in games; Nash equilibrium approximation

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; DATA REDUCTION; FUNCTION EVALUATION; LEARNING SYSTEMS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

NASH EQUILIBRIUM APPROXIMATION; PAYOFF FUNCTIONS; SCHEDULING GAME;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 34147115582     PISSN: 08856125     EISSN: 15730565     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10994-007-0715-8     Document Type: Article

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