The dynamics of voter decision making among minor-party supporters: The 2000 presidential election in the United States

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 225-244

  Sunshine Hillygus, D ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947697754     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123407000117     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. Barry C. Burden, 'Minor Parties and Strategic Voting in Recent U.S. Presidential Elections', Electoral Studies, 24 (2005), 603-18.
2. Notable exceptions include Steven Rosenstone, Roy Behr and Edward Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure, 2nd edn (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1996);
3. Burden, 'Minor Parties and Strategic Voting in Recent U.S. Presidential Elections' ; and Walter Stone, 'It's Perot, Stupid! The Legacy of the 1992 Perot Movement in the Major-Party System, 1992-2000', PS: Political Science and Politics, 34 (2001), 49-58.
4. Paul Herrnson and John Green, Multiparty Politics in America, 2nd edn (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
5. The Republicans displaced the Whigs in the mid-1850s but due almost entirely to the slavery issue (Paul Abramson, John Aldrich, Phil Paolino and David Rohde, 'Sophisticated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 55-69).
6. See www.ballot-access.org for a discussion of the various ballot access restrictions in each state.
7. Steve Fisher, 'Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting: The Role of Rational Choice', British Journal of Political Science, 34 (2004), 152-66.
8. Richard Johnston and C. J. Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987: An Alternative Approach', British Journal of Political Science, 21 (1991), 95-108;
9. Abramson et al., 'Sophisticated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries'; Richard G. Niemi, Guy Whitten and Mark Franklin, 'Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 229-40.
10. William Riker, 'The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science', American Political Science Review, 76 (1982), 753-66.
11. For instance, John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
12. Andrew Gelman and Gary King, 'Why Are American Presidential Election Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?' British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 409-51.
13. Larry Bartels, 'Specification Uncertainty and Model Averaging', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 641-74;
14. James E. Campbell, The American Campaign: U.S. Presidential Campaigns and the National Vote (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2000).
15. John Zaller, 'Floating Voters in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1948-1996', in Willem Saris and Paul Sniderman, eds, Studies in Public Opinion: Gauging Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error and Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004);
16. Philip E. Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-61.
17. Barry C. Burden, 'Minor Parties in the 2000 Presidential Election', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Clyde Wilcox, eds, Models of Voting in Presidential Elections: The 2000 U.S. Election (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003).
18. Raymond M. Duch and Harvey D. Palmer, 'Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?' British Journal of Political Science, 32 (2002), 63-91.
19. The data were collected as part or all of approximately seventy-five randomly-assigned surveys (with widely varying sample sizes) sampled from the Knowledge Networks panel. The modal number of interviews per respondent is three, and the average number is about five interviews. The dataset is a two-way unbalanced panel in that the number of observations are not the same for every respondent and the intervals between observations are not equal. Post-stratification weights are calculated for frequency estimates using age, gender, race, region of resident and metropolitan statistical area from the 2000 Current Population Survey.
20. All telephone numbers have an equal probability of selection, and sampling is done without replacement. More detailed information on the Knowledge Networks methodology can be found on their website, http://www. knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/reviewer-info.html.
21. For instance, my sample comes very close to matching the actual election results, deviating from the actual proportion of the vote for Bush, Nader, Gore and Buchanan by 1 percentage point or less - easily within the margin of error.
22. Jon A. Krosnick and Lin Chiat Chang, 'A Comparison of the Random Digit Dialing Telephone Survey Methodology with Internet Survey Methodology as Implemented by Knowledge Networks and Harris Interactive' (unpublished paper, Ohio State University, 2001).
23. Percentages calculated for respondents included in a post-election survey - roughly 12,000 panel members. Support categories are not mutually exclusive. For instance, an individual who supported both Nader and Gore at some point in the campaign would be counted in both rows.
24. Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 2nd edn; Abramson et al., 'Sophisticated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries'.
25. Steven Rosenstone, Roy Behr and Edward Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure, 1st edn (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1984).
26. Other research has also found that Gore and Nader were 'near substitutes' ideologically (Burden, 'Minor Parties in the 2000 Presidential Election').
27. Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, Democracy and Decision (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 23.
28. Howard Gold, 'Third-party Voting in Presidential Elections: A Study of Perot, Anderson, and Wallace', Political Research Quarterly, 44 (1995), 751-73;
29. Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, Third Parties in America, 2nd edn.
30. Gold, 'Third-party Voting in Presidential Elections'.
31. Analysis is limited to the post-nomination period.
32. For more on Markov chain transition models, see Peter Diggle, Kung-Yee Liang and Scott Zeger, Analysis of Longitudinal Data (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
33. A common concern with multinomial logit models is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. Essentially, IIA assumes that the ratio of the probability of choosing one candidate to the probability of selecting another does not change if more candidates enter the campaign, perhaps a tenuous assumption for some voters. Theoretically, one alternative would be to estimate a multinomial probit (MNP), which does not require the IIA assumption. However, MNP has its own set of limitations, including numeric instability and identification problems. With MNP, some elements of the covariance matrix must be constrained in order for the model to be identified - in practice, this leads to limitations on possible dependence between some of the alternatives anyway. Finally, research has found it does not make a difference. See Jay Dow and James Endersby, 'Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Comparison of Choice Models in Voting Research', Electoral Studies, 23 (2004), 107-22;
34. Guy D. Whitten and Harvey D. Palmer, 'Heightening Comparativists' Concern for Model Choice: Voting Behavior in Great Britain and the Netherlands', American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 231-60; in this article, Whitten and Palmer argue, p. 225, that 'the IIA assumption ... does not cast doubt over the reliability of parameter estimates for assessing the determinants of voting behavior in any particular election'.
35. Specific issue questions differed slightly by survey, and included: (1) 'How about government spending on ... [Environment] Do you think the government is spending too much, about right, or too little?' (2) 'Please select 2 or 3 things that have the most to do with deciding who you would like to see become President [Environment].' (3) 'Using this one to seven scale, how high a priority would you personally want the next president to give each of these issues? [Protecting the environment].' (4) 'How well does each phrase describe you? [An environmentalist].' Coding was based on the averaged response for those individuals answering more than one question.
36. There has been considerable debate about how to operationalize political awareness, with Vincent Price and John Zaller, 'Who Gets the News? Alternative Measures of News Reception and Their Implications for Research', Public Opinion Quarterly, 57 (1993), 133-64, recommending political knowledge as the best proxy. Unfortunately, no political knowledge questions were available in the survey. A general interest in politics (notably different from interest in the campaign, which can vary with campaign events) has been found to correlate highly with political knowledge and has often been used in previous research. Finally, I re-estimate the model using instead a measure of newspaper readership frequency and similarly find that the most 'aware' Nader supporters are more likely to switch support to Gore in the next interview and less likely to remain loyal, although the sample size declines and results are not statistically significant at traditional levels.
37. A number of other temporal measures, including weekly/daily counts and period indicator variables, were attempted, but the effects were not statistically significant.
38. Although the sample size is reduced, the conclusions do not change if the sample is restricted to just two interviews per respondent (actual vote and last interview before the election). A variable measuring the length of time between interviews was included but was never statistically significant so was omitted from final models.
39. Among those dissatisfied with the leadership skills of both Bush and Gore, 35 per cent were also strongly unfavourable (and 16 per cent somewhat unfavourable) towards Clinton. The correlation between the two variables is just 0.082.
40. Probabilities are calculated with all other variables set to mean. Confidence intervals have been calculated using CLARIFY software. The predicted probabilities for the baseline: 66.6 per cent chance of remaining loyal to Nader, a 8.5 per cent chance of switching from Nader to Bush, and a 24.9 per cent chance of switching from Nader to Gore.
41. Roughly 15 per cent of Nader supporters identified themselves as either 'conservative' or 'very conservative'.
42. Fisher, 'Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting'.
43. If the model is estimated with separate variables for Bush's leadership skills and Gore's leadership skills as well as an interaction of the two, I again find that the joint effect is to increase the probability of remaining loyal to Nader. The single combined measure, however, allows us to compare the effect of those who think poorly of both Bush and Gore relative to those who might think poorly of just one or the other.
44. Duch and Palmer, 'Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?'
45. Gelman and King, 'Why Are American Presidential Election Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?'; Campbell, The American Campaign.
46. James Dao, 'Democrats ask Nader to back Gore in swing states', New York Times, 31 October 2000.
47. For overview, see Fisher, 'Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting'; R. Michael Alvarez, Jonathan Nagler and Shaun Bowler, 'Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections: The British 1987 General Election', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 131-49.
48. Johnston and Pattie, 'Tactical Voting in Great Britain in 1983 and 1987'.
49. Abramson et al., 'Sophisticated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries'; Bruce E. Cain, 'Strategic Voting in Britain', American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1978), 639-55.
50. André Blais and Richard Nadeau, 'Measuring Strategic Voting: A Two-step Procedure', Electoral Studies, 15 (1996), 39-52;
51. Alvarez, Nagler and Bowler, 'Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections'.
52. Fisher, 'Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting'.
53. See, for instance, Anthony Heath and Roger Jowell, Understanding Political Change: The British Voter, 1964-1987 (Oxford: Pergamon, 1991);
54. Geoffrey Evans and Anthony Heath, 'A Tactical Error in the Analysis of Tactical Voting: A Response to Niemi, Whitten and Franklin', British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 131-7.
55. Alvarez, Nagler and Bowler, 'Issues, Economics, and the Dynamics of Multiparty Elections'.
56. Biais and Nadeau, 'Measuring Strategic Voting'; Duch and Palmer, 'Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?'
57. Before shutting themselves down in response to lawsuit threats by California's Secretary of State, www.nadertrader.org and www.voteswap2000.org matched the email addresses of Nader supporters in competitive states with Gore supporters in safe states, so they could co-ordinate switching votes. It was anattempt to help Nader make 5 per cent of the vote in order to receive federal funding, while helping Gore supporters have their vote cast where it matters most, the swing states.
58. States were coded safe if the state was never designated a battleground state in 2000 (as categorized bycnn.com) and the winner's margin of victory in 1996 exceeded 5 per cent. By this standard, the following states were deemed uncompetitive: Alaska, Alabama, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Maryland, Mississippi, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, Wyoming.
59. Results do not change if robust standard errors are instead clustered on state of respondent.
60. Asterisk indicates effects that changes in predicted probabilities are statistically different from zero (90 per cent confidence interval calculated using CLARIFY software).
61. Although not reported in the table, an additional interaction between political awareness and party identification finds that the most politically aware partisans were particularly likely to switch support to their party's candidate. Politically aware Democrats were 6.8 percentage points more likely than unaware Democrats to switch support to Gore, and politically aware Republicans were a whopping 39 percentage points more likely than unaware Republicans to switch support to Bush.
62. Duch and Palmer, 'Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?'
63. D. Sunshine Hillygus and Simon Jackman, 'Voter Decision Making in Election 2000: Campaign Effects, Partisan Activation, and the Clinton Legacy', American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003), 583-96.
64. Other response categories were party identification, issues, qualifications, vice-presidential candidate and other. It should be noted that a respondent could have selected 'issues' as a motivation for voting for Bush or Gore, and still behaved strategically.
65. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility.
66. Burden, 'Minor Parties and Strategic Voting in Recent U.S. Presidential Elections'.
67. Nader did not campaign in twenty-four states. Thanks to Barry Burden for sharing data on Nader campaign appearances.
68. Fisher, 'Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting'.
69. Mark Franklin, Richard G. Niemi and Guy Whitten, 'The Two Faces of Tactical Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 24 (1994), 549-57.