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Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 83-91

The strategic use of managerial incentives in a non-profit firm mixed duopoly

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EID: 33947676317     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/mde.1307     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (90)

References (27)
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