(Non-)existence and scope of Nash networks

Economic Theory

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 597-604

  Haller, Hans ^a   Kamphorst, Jurjen ^b   Sarangi, Sudipta ^c  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Network formation; Non cooperative games

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947515855     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0105-7     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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