Terrorist innovations and anti-terrorist policies

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 47-56

  Faria, João Ricardo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS PAN AMERICAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 32144438316     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/095465591009377     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. For a list of anti-terrorist policies, see Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression Intervention Analysis," American Political Science Review 87 (1993): 829-44.
2. H. Lapan and T. Sandler, "To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That Is The Question," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 78 (1988): 16-21.
3. Deterrent threats are a specific type of proactive antiterrorist policy. For instance, according to James J. Wirtz, "Antiterrorism via Counterproliferation," (N.A.) http://atlas.usafa.af.mil/inss/terrchp8.htm, Counterproliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (in general, weapons of mass destruction - WMD) is effective to combat terrorism since it allows U.S. forces to retaliate after military units or civilian targets suffer a WMD attack. Therefore, American policymakers can make credible deterrent threats to discourage state-sponsored terrorism.
4. See Todd Sandler, John T. Tschirhart, and Jon Cauley, "A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism," American Political Science Review 77 (1983): 36-54.
5. E.g., Jon Cauley and Eric I. Im, "Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjacking and Other Terrorist Incidents," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 78 (1988): 27-31;
6. Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, and Jon Cauley, "U.N. Conventions, Technology and Retaliation in the Fight Against Terrorism: An Economic Evaluation," Terrorism and Political Violence 2 (1990): 83-105;
7. and Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, and Jon Cauley, "Assessing the Impact of Terrorist-Thwarting Policies: An Intervention Time Series Approach," Defence Economics 2 (1990): 1-18.
8. William Landes, "An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijackings, 1961-1976," Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1978): 1-31.
9. Enders and Sandler, "Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies."
10. For an overview on the evolution of the economic literature on terrorism, see Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "What Do We Know About the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?" (2004) in Researching Terrorism: Trends, Achievements, Failures (forth-coming), eds. A. Silke and G. Ilardi (London: Frank Cass)
11. and Todd Sandler, "Fighting Terrorism: What Economics Can Tell Us," interview by Jeff Madrick, Challenge 45 (2002): 5-18.
12. See also Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Terrorism: Theory and Applications," in Handbook of Defense Economics, eds. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandier (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995), 213-49.
13. An intertemporal allocation of resources is an allocation that occurs during a period of time.
14. Bryan Brophy-Baermann and John Conybeare, "Retaliating Against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules Versus Discretion," American Journal of Political Science 38 (1994): 196-210.
15. Enders and Sandler, "Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies."
16. E.g., Eric I. Im, Jon Cauley, and Todd Sandler, "Cycles and Substitutions in Terrorist Activities: A Spectral Approach," Kyklos 40 (1987): 238-55;
17. Walter Enders, G. F. Parise, and Todd Sandler, "A Time-Series Analysis of Transnational Terrorism: Trends and Cycles," Defence Economics 3 (1992): 305-20;
18. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism, 1968-2000: Thresholds, Persistence and Forecasts" Southern Economic Journal 71 (2005): 467-82;
19. and Claude Berrebi (Rand Labor and Population) and Esteban Klor (Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem), "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" (2004, unpublished manuscript).
20. See João R. Faria and Daniel Arce, "Terrorism Support and Recruitment" (2005) Defence and Peace Economics (forthcoming).
21. For an interesting discussion of alternative policies, see Bruno Frey and Simon Luechinger, "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," Defence and Peace Economics 14 (2003): 237-49.
22. Due to its success, Al Qaeda has been seen by government law enforcement agencies as a strategic innovator of Clausewitzian skill (see John Upton, "In the Streets of Londonistan," London Review of Books 26, no. 2 (2004), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n02/print/upto01-.html).
23. Todd Sandler suggested this term.
24. Daniel Arce and Todd Sandler, "Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis" (2004, unpublished manuscript).
25. In Todd Sandier (Department of International Relations, University of Southern California) and Kevin Siqueira (Department of Economics, Clarkson University), "Global Terrorism: Deterrence Versus Preemption" (2003, unpublished manuscript), preemption is always undersupplied in a model in which a nation's people and property are in jeopardy at home and abroad.
26. In Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Preemption Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004): 657-71. The authors analyze a two-player preemption game in which preemption has a downside by increasing grievances and terrorist recruitment.
27. Terrorist resources involve financial resources, personnel, and infrastructure.
28. João R. Faria, "Terror Cycles," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics 7, no. 1 (2003).
29. See Knut Sydsaeter and Peter Hammond, Essential Mathematics for Economic Analysis (New York: Prence Hall, 2002), 344-45.
30. The other equilibrium (0, 0) generates a singular Jacobian. See Alpha C. Chiang, Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), 643.
31. An anonymous referee pointed out that there has been some discussion recently of deterring Al Qaeda by threatening to destroy Mecca using nuclear weapons. In this model deterrence will not prevent, at least in the steady state since dA*/dE = 0, this Al Qaeda attack, nor any other terrorist attack. However, a deterrent threat, here defined as a preemptive antiterrorist policy (see endnote 3), is effective in reducing the steady-state level of terrorist attacks.
32. A caveat must apply here. According to Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (Department of Political Science, Washington University) "Politics and the Suboptimal Proviser of Counterterror" (2005), publicly observable counterterrorist policies become ineffective because terrorists can substitute tactics to evade observable counterterror.