Democracy, visibility and public good provision

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 506-529

  Mani, Anandi ^a,b   Mukand, Sharun ^c  

^a WILLIAMS COLLEGE   (United States)

^b Boston University   (United States)

^c TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democracy; Famines; Government responsiveness; Public goods; Visibility; Voter expectations

Indexed keywords

CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR; DEMOCRACY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PUBLIC GOODS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; STATE ROLE;

EID: 33947241769     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.06.008     Document Type: Article

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