Erratum to "Microeconomic uncertainties facilitate cooperative alliances and social welfare" [Economics Letters 95 (2007) 104-109] (DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.031);Microeconomic uncertainties facilitate cooperative alliances and social welfare

Economics Letters

Volumn 95, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 104-109

  Perc, Matjaž ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARIBOR   (Slovenia)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Game theory; Microeconomic chaos; Social welfare

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947190907     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.003     Document Type: Erratum

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