Look again: Phenomenology and mental imagery

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 6, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 137-170

  Thompson, Evan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Heterophenomenology; Mental imagery; Neurophenomenology; Phenomenology

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847625061     PISSN: 15687759     EISSN: 15728676     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9031-1     Document Type: Article

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