An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 302-324

  Schaumburg, Ernst ^a   Tambalotti, Andrea ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Commitment; Credibility; Discretion; Welfare

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847622134     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.08.018     Document Type: Article

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