The perils of profiling: Civil war spoilers and the collapse of intrastate peace accords

International Security

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 7-40

  Greenhill, Kelly M ^a,b   Major, Solomon ^c  

^a WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847356604     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.7     Document Type: Article

References (181)

1. Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), p. 5.
2. Ibid.
3. See, for instance, Bruce D. Jones, "Military Intervention in Rwanda's Two Wars: Partisanship and Indifference," in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil War, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000);
4. John Darby, The. Effects of Violence on Peace. Processes (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001);
5. and Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, eds., Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006).
6. Other scholars have used the spoiler model as a starting point for developing broader analyses, including Suzanne Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (July 1999), pp. 912-934;
7. and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Conciliation, Counter-terrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence: A Comparative Study of Five Cases," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 3-6, 2003.
8. This fact is critically important because, as Stedman notes, the "crucial difference between success and failure of spoilers is the role played by international actors as custodians of peace." Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," p. 6.
9. Ibid., p. 49.
10. Ibid., p. 44.
11. Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace." This point is less relevant for those satisfied with the terms of the agreement, that is, actors who favor the status quo. But spoilers are, by definition, revisionists.
12. Leaders may evaluate their circumstances in different ways - either as a result of their own cog nitive biases or because of the motivated biases of their subordinates. If this were the case, then spoiler type might reenter a material analysis through the back door. The conflict between cognitive and purely material analyses has a long history and shall not be reprised in this article. If, however, parties to a peace process undertake even moderately rational strategies, then Bayes's rule suggests that as data accumulate after a policy change, all parties should eventually converge into a correct appraisal of the material circumstances. This rationality assumption does not presuppose that all actors who begin with the same set of beliefs will not make mistakes, or even that different actors will update their beliefs at different rates. Rather, given sufficient information (as should be available in civil wars in which the parties have abundant opportunities to accumulate data about one another) and plausible feedback/updating cycles, one should expect the material basis to eventually dominate the cognitive basis of action. Also, actors who systematically disregard the feedback from the world around them (i.e., by acting irrationally) will tend to find themselves selected against and may no longer serve as potential spoilers in any case. See, for example, Robert Jervis, "War and Misperceptions," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 101-126;
13. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986);
14. and James G. March, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen (New York: Free Press, 1994).
15. See Marie-Joelle Zahar, "Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes," in John Darby and Roger McGinty, eds., Progressing towards Settlement (London: Palgrave, 2004).
16. See, for instance, Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," pp. 11-12.
17. Or perhaps he will be as greedy as he needs to be, because for those for whom peace likely means death or incarceration, few incentives to cooperate exist.
18. For recognition that this may indeed be a weakness of the model, see Stephen John Stedman, "Introduction," in Stedman, John Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 14.
19. See, for instance, I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
20. See, for instance, Gary S. Becker, "Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (December 1985), pp. 329-347;
21. and Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3 (August 1983), pp. 371-400.
22. Stedman makes a similar point in an earlier article where he cites data suggesting that, in intrastate conflicts, unilateral military victories produce more stable outcomes than do negotiated settlements. The results indicate that parties often use cease-fires and truces for tactical advantage-thus altering their means (spoiler behavior) but never their preferences. Again, given that a spoiler can be limited on the day of the signing of a peace accord and total a year later, trying to moderate one's behavior according to a static perception of a spoiler typology is both dangerous and likely to be self-defeating. See Stephen John Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 375.
23. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).
24. See, for instance, Robert Powell, "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 5 (June 2002), pp. 255-289;
25. and James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.
26. R. Harrison Wagner, "Bargaining and War," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 469-484;
27. and Suzanne Werner, "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 3 (June 1998), pp. 321-343.
28. Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace."
29. As a result, custodians must be willing either to invest sufficient resources to maintain the balance of power that existed when the accords were signed or to adjust the agreements to reflect the distribution of power on the ground. Although it would be ideal to have a means by which the original accords might be adjusted should circumstances change, if accords are too flexible, they cannot serve as a focal point for further confidence building. Therefore, although room to maneuver is desirable, to the extent that a signed accord serves any purpose beyond recognising the power on the ground, it is likely in its enforceable inflexibility.
30. See, for instance, Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47;
31. Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002);
32. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War"; and Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 1 (February 1999), pp. 3-22.
33. Henk E. Goemans and Giacomo Chiozza, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (July 2004), pp. 604-619.
34. For instance, some observers suspect that this was the situation in which Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana may have found himself vis-à-vis the extremists in his National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development Party in the period leading up to the 1994 genocide. See, for instance, Stedman "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes"; and Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 198-203.
35. Although, evidence suggests that, in line with the argument offered herein, changes in the relative distribution of power do tend to be the most significant factor leading to instability in the postwar phase. See Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace."
36. This includes promising to punish all parties who fail to cooperate, not only those who have been identified as potential spoilers.
37. Although madmen do exist, in the vast majority of cases, potential spoilers - regardless of the degree of their demands - are strategic actors and, faced with the right set of (dis)incentives, can be deterred or co-opted. Even Joseph Kony, the notoriously "mad" leader of the Lord's Resistance Army runs his organisation in a rational, strategic manner. See, for instance, James Bevan, "The Myth of Madness: The Organization of the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, March 22-25, 2006.
38. To be clear, we do not seek to identify the conditions writ large under which peace agreements will be successfully implemented. Rather, we aim to identify the best strategies to deter or defeat actors who would seek to undermine peace processes for their own ends.
39. On the relative importance of extractive resources in civil wars, see, for instance, Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000);
40. and Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
41. Stedman, "Introduction," p. 14.
42. The literature on the importance of outsiders in making peace agreements work is extensive. See, for instance, Fen Osier Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996);
43. Roy Licklider, "Obstacles to Peace Settlements," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001);
44. Donald S. Rothchild, "Settlement Terms and Postagreement Stability," in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, Ending Civil Wars, pp. 117-138;
45. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars"; Walter, Committing to Peace;
46. and Werner, "The Precarious Nature of Peace." The issue of effective spoiler strategies is consistent with - but not identical to - the issues surrounding what makes peace processes succeed or fail.
47. Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," pp. 37-39.
48. See, for example, Victoria Brittain, The Death of Dignity: Angola's Civil War (Chicago: Pluto, 1998);
49. and James Ciment, Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa (New York: Facts on File, 1997).
50. Savimbi was a member of the Ovimbundu tribe, the largest ethnic group in Angola, which made up roughly one-third of its population. Rather than trying to leverage his popularity into creating a strong military force (which would have necessitated strong outside backing), Savimbi focused on the Maoist tenets of self-reliance and education of the peasantry. At the time of independence, he was no match militarily for the CIA- and South African-backed FNLA or the Cuban/Soviet-backed MPLA. See W. Martin James III, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1992), pp. 53, 94.
51. Ibid., p. 137.
52. See also Daniel Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From local. Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1999).
53. Spikes quotes Savimbi as saying, "It was no good committing ourselves to a war with the MPLA unless we were strong enough to fight them." Ibid., p. 187.
54. Following the 1974 military coup in Portugal, the leaders of the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA agreed to participate in negotiations designed to pave the way for independence and a transition to democracy. Given the fluid strategic situation and the profusion of arms pouring into the country, however, the agreement was essentially dead on arrival.
55. Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, p. 142.
56. See also James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-2990, pp. 55, 72.
57. James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990, pp. 106-107, 219.
58. In the waning days of the war against the Portuguese, the FNLA launched an attack from the north and was soundly defeated. Some ENLA elements joined forces with UNITA, while others formed the core of the South African special forces battalion that operated out of Namibia and southern Angola. During the Bicesse negotiations, former FNLA leader Holden Roberto returned from exile and demanded that the FNLA be granted the same status as UNITA and the MPLA at the bargaining table. Roberto was too weak to press his claim, however, so the demand was ignored, and the peace process moved forward.
59. Daniel S. Papp, "The Angolan Civil War and Namibia: The Role of External Intervention," in David R. Smock, ed., Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 186.
60. Paul Hare, "Angola: The End of an Intractable Conflict," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), p. 217.
61. Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, "Great- and Medium-Power Mediations: Angola," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 518, No. 1 (November 1991), p. 41.
62. See Yvonne C. Lodico, "A Peace That Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola," in William J. Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).
63. Its budget of $118 million was dwarfed, for instance, by the budget of the UN mission to Mozambique, which was $327 million in 1993 alone. See International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1995-1996 (London: IISS, 1995).
64. See IISS, "Angola," The Military Balance, 1991-1992 (London: IISS, 1991); IISS, The Military Balance, 1992-1993 (London: IISS, 1992); and Hare, "Angola," pp. 218-219.
65. Lodico, "A Peace That Fell Apart," p. Ill; and Ciment, Angola and Mozambique, p. 4.
66. Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 66.
67. For instance, in 1991-92 government forces reportedly numbered between 96,000 and 127,000 (plus 50,000 reserves), while UNITA boasted 28,000 regulars and 37,000 in militia units. By June 1993 government forces had fallen to 45,000 (plus 20,000 paramilitaries), while UNITA forces hovered around 40,000, reportedly bolstered by continuing aid from South Africa. See IISS, "Angola," ne Military Balance, 1991-1992;
68. IISS, "Angola," The Military Balance, 1992-1993;
69. and IISS, "Angola," The Military Balance, 1993-1994 (London: IISS, 1993).
70. Hare, "Angola," p. 219.
71. Ciment, Angola and Mozambique, p. 86.
72. Lodico, "A Peace That Fell Apart," p. 119.
73. As leader of the Ovimbundu, Savimbi was favored to win. In the end, he received only 40 percent of the vote, while the MPLA candidate, Eduardo dos Santos, received 49 percent. Why Savimbi lost remains an open question, but some observers suggest that the majority of Angolans preferred MPLA corruption to UNITA violence. One popular motto was "The MPLA steals, but UNITA kills." See, for instance, "The Shameless Rich and Voiceless Poor," Economist, January 22, 2004, pp. 42-43.
74. Hare, "Angola," p. 221.
75. Indeed, he acknowledged the possibility that had Savimbi been in a position of military weakness at the end of the 1992 elections, "and had the international community held a monopoly of rewards, inducement might have brought him back into the fold." See Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," p. 26.
76. Brittain, The Death of Dignity, p. 62.
77. See IISS, "Angola," The Military Balance, 1995-1996, p. 230.
78. Hare, "Angola," p. 221.
79. See IISS, "Angola," The Military Balance, 1996-1997 (London: IISS, 1996).
80. See, for instance, Margaret Joan Antsee, Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93 (New York: St. Martin's, 1996);
81. and Paul Hare, Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insider's Account of the Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 124.
82. Victoria Brittain, "Savimbi...Again," Southern Africa Report, Vol. 10, No. 3 (March 1995), p. 14.
83. In an interview in the French newspaper Libération, Savimbi declared, "As long as there is a plan to assassinate me I won't be part of all this. The government will really have to prove that they will keep their side of the bargain - just signing a paper is not enough." Quoted in ibid.
84. Paris, At War's End, p. 68.
85. Quoted in Hare, Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace, p. 124.
86. Quoted in ibid., p. 142.
87. Quoted in ibid., p. 105.
88. Paris, At War's End, p. 68.
89. Tony Hodges, Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 18-19, quoted in Hare, "Angola," p. 220.
90. See, for instance, Fred Bridgland, "Ghost of Savimbi Haunts Angola," Scotsman, February 22, 2003.
91. Quoted in Justin Pearce, "General Gato: UNITA's New Leader," BBC News, April 4, 2002.
92. IISS, Strategic Survey, 2001-2002 (London: IISS, 2002), pp. 318-319.
93. Hare, "Angola," p. 225.
94. Pearce, "General Gato."
95. Consider, for instance, that in the Angolan case, the balance of power tipped toward Savimbi as the Bicesse process moved toward fruition, whereas the balance tipped away from Dklahama in Mozambique. During the mid-to-Iate 1980s, government forces held a 1.6 to 1.8:1 advantage over the rebels. In 1989, however, the government's advantage ballooned to 3:1. It expanded still further in 1990, the year the cease-fire that produced the General Peace Agreement was signed. See the Mozambique sections in IISS, The Military Balance, 1987-1988 (London: IISS, 1987);
96. IISS, The Military Balance, 1988-1989 (London: IISS, 1988);
97. IISS, The Military Balance, 1990-1991 (London: IISS, 1990);
98. IISS, The Military Balance, 1991-1992;
99. IISS, The Military Balance, 1992-1993;
100. and IISS, The Military Balance, 1993-1994.
101. See Alex Vines, RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique? (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), pp. 5-10.
102. Pamela Reed, "The Politics of Reconciliation: The United Nations Operation in Mozambique," in Durch, UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, p. 27.
103. Vines, RENAMO, p. 16.
104. Paris, At War's End, p. 141;
105. and Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994).
106. See Vines, RENAMO, chap. 5.
107. Richard Singe, Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 10.
108. See also Jim Wurst, "Mozambique Disarms," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 50, No. 5 (September/October 1994), p. 36. Wurst notes that the general war fatigue of people from all strata in Mozambican society and the carnage created by the war served as a major catalyst for the peace process .
109. See Wurst, "Mozambique Disarms," p. 36; and Carolyn Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), p. 226.
110. Singe, Mozambique, p. 27.
111. Reed, "The Politics of Reconciliation," p. 284.
112. Ajello described the level of international backing as a "miracle." Quoted in Singe, Mozambique, p. 32.
113. See IISS, "Mozambique," The Military Balance, 1995-1996.
114. Ibid.; and IISS, "Angola," The Military Balance, 1992-1993.
115. See Vines, RENAMO, pp. 154-155;
116. and Singe, Mozambique, p. 102.
117. Singe, Mozambique, p. 91.
118. See also "Teetering at the Verge of Peace," Economist, August 13, 1994, p. 41.
119. Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, p. 229;
120. and Reed, "The Politics of Reconciliation," p. 280.
121. Quoted in Singe, Mozambique, p. 45.
122. Paris, At War's End, p. 144;
123. and Ciment, Angola and Mozambique,
124. Singe, Mozambique, p. 131.
125. Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, p. 227.
126. Unlike Savimbi in Angola, Dhlakama lacked "a critical mass of support" and consequently could maintain his bases only by terrorizing the local population into compliance. Quoted in M. Anne Pitcher, "Celebration and Confrontation, Resolution and Restructuring: Mozambique from Independence to the Millennium," in York Bradshaw and Stephen N. Ndegwa, eds., The Uncertain Promise of Southern Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 192-194.
127. Sorpong Peou, "Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement: Challenges, Strategy, and Out-come," in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, Ending Civil Wars, p. 499.
128. Although the 1960-64 UN mission to the Congo had more men on the ground, Trevor Findlay and others have argued that the scope of the Cambodian mission was unprecedented. For details, see Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
129. Grant Curtis, Cambodia Reborn? The Transition to Democracy and Development (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1998), p. 9.
130. That is, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which would later become the State of Cambodia, whose political arm was the Cambodian People's Party.
131. However, "little reliable evidence [was] available" during this period of Cambodian history, so these figures should be approached with some skepticism. IISS, The Military Balance, 1988-1999 (London, IISS, 1998), p. 166;
132. and IISS, The Military Balance, 1989-1990 (London: IISS, 1989), pp. 155-156.
133. Peou, "Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement," p. 502.
134. Ibid., p. 503.
135. Jai Bhagwan, "Khmer Rouge: The Bone of Contention in Kampuchea," Strategic Analysis, Vol. 12, No. 8 (November 1988), pp. 893-903, cited in ibid.
136. Curtis, Cambodia Reborn? p. 3.
137. Ibid., p. 5.
138. Michael C. Williams, "Cambodia: Return to Darkness?" World Today, Vol. 53 (July 1997), p. 181.
139. Findlay, Cambodia, pp. 17, 103.
140. The KR was also included because of its close relations with China, the main regional power and a Permanent Five member of the Security Council, as well as because of its important role in the tripartite rebel government headed by FUNCINPEC. It was this government in exile that held Cambodia's seat at the UN. MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peace-makers, 1979-1998 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 74.
141. Ibid., p. 143. Findlay maintains that, whatever the perception of observers in the "heady days" after the signing of the Paris accords, the UN had neither the mandate nor the capability to replace the SOC/CPP at every level in Khmer society - nor, in most cases, to even oversee their activities effectively.
142. See Findlay, Cambodia, p. 13.
143. Mats Berdal and Michael Leifer, "Cambodia," in James Mayall, ed., The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 43.
144. For a more complete accounting on KR obstructionism, including the killing of seven UN personnel, see Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, pp. 137-140.
145. Findlay, Cambodia, p. 38. Loridon left Cambodia in 1992 in disgust over Akashi's timidity in dealing with the KR.
146. Stedman may have been inspired by FUNCINPEC leader Prince Ranariddh who said, "They [the KR] are trying to catch a train that they not only missed, but that they tried to sabotage. The train is going on, so why not try to catch the train of peace?" Quoted in Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, p. 186.
147. Their reasons for doing so are difficult to understand. Explanations range from lack of capacity, Chinese pressure, organizational collapse (which was demonstrated by sporadic voting of KR units in some areas of the country and not others), and a hope that FUNCINPEC would win and give them a place in the new government. See Williams, "Cambodia," p. 181. See also Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, p. 158.
148. Sheri Prasso, "Cambodia: A $3 Billion Boondoggle," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March/April 1995), p. 36.
149. Steven Heder, "The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 'Self-Demobilizers,'" in Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds., Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peacekeeping (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 109.
150. Richard Solomon, "Bringing Peace to Cambodia," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 275-324. See also Peou, "Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement." Peou argues that the international community misread the KR, and that "greater attention to their minimal security and power requirements ... had the capacity to induce more cooperative behavior." Ibid., p. 501; see also pp. 499-530.
151. See Solomon, "Bringing Peace to Cambodia."
152. Michael Wesley, "The Cambodian Waltz: The Khmer Rouge and United Nations Intervention," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 1995/96), p. 61.
153. Peou, "Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement," p. 514.
154. Consider that while the KR came to the 1991 Paris negotiations boasting 30,000 "disciplined and feared" troops, their numbers declined steadily in subsequent years. By 1994 the KR had fewer than 11,000 troops; by 1997 there were no more than 3,500 KR fighters; and by the following year, they numbered between 600 and 1,000. See "Kampuchea/Cambodia" in the 1990-91 through 1998-99 issues of IISS, The Military Balance, After the 1998-99 issue, the KR was no longer even listed.
155. See also Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, p. 181.
156. See the 1992-93 and 1993-94 issues of IISS, The Military Balance.
157. See, for instance, Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution (London: BBS, 1998), pp. 503-505.
158. The KR's situation deteriorated further in the ensuing years. Beyond the aforementioned loss of external support, the KR suffered serial splits within the movement and large-scale defections by former Khmer fighters, the vast majority of whom were absorbed into the CPP-dominated Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. By late 1997 the KR had become a political nonentity, fundamentally incapable of undermining the peace. See Curtis, Cambodia Reborn? pp. 39-41;
159. and Becker, When the War Was Over.
160. Findlay, Cambodia, p. 41.
161. Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, pp. 102-103; and Berdal and Leifer, "Cambodia," p. 44.
162. For a detailed account of these activities, see Judy Ledger-wood, "Pattern of CPP Political Repression," in Heder and Ledger-wood, Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia.
163. Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, pp. 146-148. See also Berdal and Leifer, "Cambodia," p. 44; and Ledgerwood, "Pattern of CPP Political Repression," p. 129.
164. John M. Sanderson, "UNTAC: Successes and Failures," in Hugh Smith, ed., International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Centre, 1994), p. 27.
165. See, for example, Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, p. 104.
166. Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 68.
167. Findlay, Cambodia, p. 82.
168. Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, p. 173.
169. See, for instance, "Cambodia," IISS, The Military Balance, 1993-1994.
170. Findlay, Cambodia.
171. Quoted in "Hun the Atilla," New Republic, August 4, 1997, p. 7.
172. Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, p. 256.
173. Sanderson, "UNTAC," p. 18.
174. Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, p. 213.
175. Peou, "Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement," p. 512.
176. Although FUNCINPEC won in the election and was thus awarded a "first" position in the government, the CPP retained control of the security forces, bureaucracy, army, and judiciary. It also tenaciously held on to grassroots power by maintaining control over lower-level political appointments.
177. It remains an open question whether the KR would have continued cooperating had it been offered carrots akin to those offered to RENAMO.
178. See, for instance, "Peter Galbraith Discusses How Only Sunnis Can End Insurgency," All Things Considered, December 6, 2005.
179. Anecdotal evidence from journalist accounts suggests that this may have started happening in late 2005-early 2006.
180. Kenneth M. Pollack, "A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq," Saban Center Analysis, No. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, February 15, 2006), p. 19.
181. See, for instance, Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No. 3 (May 2003), pp. 34-54. Also, although in the cases examined here-with the exception of post-2002 Angola - the critical custodians of peace were external actors, they need not be. As Marie-Joelle Zahar has rightly noted, internal actors are sometimes those who exercise deterrence and enforce ment and serve as the critical custodians of peace agreements. In the end, the pedigree of the custodians is not the critical issue; instead, what matters is whether they are willing and able to affect the opportunity structure and change the payoff matrixes of the actors on the ground. See Zahar, "Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes."