Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 421-437

  Kibris, Özgür ^a   Sertel, Murat R ^b  

^a SABANCI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

^b KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847344668     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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