The logic of Islamic practice: A religious conflict in Central Asia

Central Asian Survey

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 267-286

  Abashin, Sergei ^a  

^a INSTITUTE OF ETHNOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL CONFLICT; ISLAMISM;

ASIA; CENTRAL ASIA; EURASIA;

EID: 33847175237     PISSN: 02634937     EISSN: 14653354     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02634930601022542     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. This article is based on research carried out with the support of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.
2. E. Said, 'Afterword' in E. Said, Orientalism (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), p 333
3. E. Said, 'Preface' in E. Said, Orientalism (New York, 2003), pp xv-xxx.
4. D. DeWeese, Islam and the legacy of Sovietology: A review essay on Yaacov Ro'i's Islam in the Soviet Journal of Islamic Studies, 2002, Vol 13, No 3, pp 298-330.
5. Ibid, p 309.
6. For an interesting critique of 'expert' knowledge concerning issues of ethnicity, territory and citizenship see M. Reeves, 'Locating danger: konfliktologiia and the search for fixity in the Fergana Valley borderlands', Central Asian Survey, 2005, Vol 24, No 1, pp 67-81.
7. For an account of the different political and theological trends in contemporary Central Asian Islam, see A. Muminov, 'Traditsionnye i sovremennye religiozno-teologicheskie shkoly v Tsentralnoi Azii', Tsentralnaya Azia i Kavkaz, 1999, Vol 4, No 5, pp 81-83
8. B. Babadzhanov, 'Islam in Uzbekistan: From the struggle for "religious purity" to political activism', in Central Asia. A Gathering Storm?, B. Rumer (ed) (New York, London: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp 299-330
9. B. Babadzhanov, 'Religiozno-oppozitsionnye gruppy v Uzbekistane', in Religioznyi ekstremizm v Tsentralnoi Azii: Problemy i perspektivy (Dushanbe, 2002), pp 43-61.
10. However, even in this excellent research a tendency to reduce the complexity of Islamic practice to simplistic oppositions between 'traditionalist' and 'reformist' camps (see the very interesting article by B. Babadzhanov, A. Muminov, M. D. Olcott, 'Muhammadzhan Hindustani (1892-1989) i religioznaya sreda ego epokhi (predvaritelnye razmyshlenia o formirovanii "sovetskogo islama" v Srednei Azii)', Vostok, 2004, Vol 5, pp 43-59).
11. In this article I use terms 'Uzbek' and 'Tajik' without discussing how their meanings have changed throughout history. See S. Abashin, 'Arkheologia sredneaziatskikh natsionalizmov: Les mot et les choses', Ab Imperio, 2003, No 1, pp 497-522.
12. P. Bourdieu, 'Genése et structure du shamp religieux', Revue française de sociologie, 1971, XII, pp 295-334
13. (P. Bourdieu, 'Genesis i struktura polya religii' P. Bourdieu, Sotsialnoe prostranstvo: Polya i praktiki (Sankt-Peterburg: Aleteya, 2005), p 23).
14. Ibid., p 19.
15. Ibid., pp 20, 42.
16. For more details on the descendents of the saints see B.G. Privratsky, Muslim Turkistan: Kazak Religion and Collective Memory (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001)
17. B. G. Privratsky, '"Turkistan belongs to the Qojas": Local knowledge of a Muslim tradition', Devout Societies vs Impious States? Transmitting Islamic Learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the Twentieth Century, S. A. Dudoignon (ed) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004), pp 161-212.
18. See E. Rezvan, 'Khodzha', Islam: Entsiklopedicheskyi slovar (Moskva, 1991), p 280.
19. See W. Barthold [G.E. Wheeler], 'Ishan', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, CD-ROM Edition, v.1.0 (Koninklijke NV, Leiden, 1999), V.IV, 113a-113b
20. S. Abashin, 'Ishan', Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiskoi imperii: Entsiklopedicheskyi slovar, Vyp. 2 (Moskva, 1999), pp 40-41.
21. See S. Abashin, 'Tura', Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiskoi imperii, Vyp. 2, pp 88-89.
22. Ishans had a title sayyid, typical for the descendents of the Prophet, but in O. they were only known as ishans. On the role of the Prophet's descendents in Muslim society see C. Van Arendonk [W. A. Graham], 'Sharif', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. IX, pp 329b-338a.
23. See H. Algar, 'Nakshband', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. VII, pp 933a-934a
24. H. Algar, K. A. Nizami, 'Nakshbandiyya', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. VII, pp 934b-938b. Sufi symbols and terminology play an important role in the relationship between the descendents of the saints and the residents of O. Although this relationship can not be called Sufi in the classical, religious meaning of the word, conscious or subconscious appeal to the Sufi tradition allows the descendents of the saints to legitimise their status.
25. Traditionally, paternal descent is considered to be more important than the maternal. However, in the holy lineages maternal descent is just as important and as recognised as descent through the paternal line, especially if it includes important figures. The descendents of the saints manipulate their ancestral names according to the circumstances in a way that brings them the most symbolic and social gain.
26. In Central Asian society etiquette dictates that descendents of saints be treated with respect and special titles are used when addressing them. It is forbidden to curse or harm them in any way, and it is considered good (halol) to help them and give offerings etc. Breaking these rules is believed by many to bring misfortune.
27. The acknowledged norm is that male descendents of the saints are permitted to marry a 'commoner', while it is strictly prohibited for females. In reality, of course, these rules are often broken.
28. Some saints in other towns and villages of Central Asia are legitimised by rich 'Islamic' written tradition, which the saint's descendents and followers try to preserve and promote these written sources include including scientific works and publications about saints and holy places. The government also plays a role in legitimising saints by including them in the pantheon of national heroes. Restoration of mazars, the public visitation of the shrines by officials, and regular use of the saint names in public speeches increases the popularity of shrines and strengthens the status of the descendents of the saints, as well as their income from offerings.
29. For example, once Muhtarhon-ishan was asked by a couple to perform a marriage prayer (nikoh), but, as it turned out, the woman had not received a divorce from her previous husband. This scandalous situation demonstrated a certain lack of legitimacy of ishans as mullas which called into question their right to be mullas.
30. About bu-otin or otincha see H. Fathi, 'Otines: The unknown women clerics of Central Asian Islam', Central Asian Survey, 1997, No. 16(1), pp 27-43
31. A. Kramer, 'Otin', Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiskoi imperii, Vol 3 (Moskva, 2001, pp 77-79).
32. There is another category of women practising magic and healing called bahshi, see B. Spuler, 'Bakhshi', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. I, p 953a
33. V. Basilov, Shamanstvo u narodov Srednei Azii (Moskva, 1992). This is a separate topic, and therefore I will not discuss it in detail. However, it is worth noting that in O. bahshis receive a special blessing to practice from Mukarram, Iskanderhon-tura's daughter.
34. In other villages and towns in Central Asia, the 'descendants of the saints' successfully converted their symbolic capital into the social sphere, politics and culture. See S. Abashin, 'Gellner, "potomki svyatykh" i Srednaya Azia: Mezhdu islamom i natsionalizmom', Ab Imperio, 2004, No. 3, pp 535-562.
35. See E. Geoffroy, 'Shaykh', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. IX, pp 397a-398a.
36. In the past this ritual related to the commencement of agricultural work and was accompanied by prayers for rain. Nowadays, hudoii is an annual collective prayer for wellbeing.
37. See J. Calmard, 'Molla', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. VII, pp 221a-225a.
38. See J. Pedersen, 'Masdjid', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. VI, pp 674b-675b.
39. Domla, domulla - teacher (see A. Muminov, 'Damulla', Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiskoi imperii, Vol 2, pp 28-29).
40. The local authorities knew about this prayer house but ignored it.
41. See A. Kramer, 'Bibi Seshanba', Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiskoi imperii, Vol 4. (Moskva, 2003), p 17;
42. A. Kramer, 'Mushkul Kushod', Ibid., p 56. According to my informants, Abdumutal-mahsum tried to extend his jurisdiction on these traditionally female rituals.
43. On conflicts between bu-otins see H. Fathi, Femmes d'autorité dans l'Asie centrale contemporaine. Quête des ancêtres et recompositions identitaires dans l'islam postsoviétique (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2004). I do not touch upon this topic in my article as I had not witnessed any such conflicts in O. during my fieldwork, but it does not mean they did not exist.
44. See A. S. Tritton, 'Djanaza', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. II, pp 441b-442b.
45. See B. Lewis, A. J. Wensinck [J. Jomier], 'Hadjdj', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, V. III, pp 31b-38b. The title of haji can be adopted not only by new mullahs. In one of the neighbouring villages Kori-buva-mahsum took a new name of Haji-buva after his pilgrimage to Mecca.
46. The official mosque in O. opened in 1988. The opening was attended by the representatives of the local government and official mullahs from oblast and raion centres.
47. A muazzin (the local term is sufi) is a person who calls Muslims to prayer. These figures, although important, did not play an active role in the religious conflict and, therefore, I do not refer to them in this article.
48. B. Pétric draws attention to this difference in B. M. Petric, Pouvoir, don et réseaux en Ouzbekistan post-soviétique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), p 229.
49. On the 'commercialisation' of rituals and religious activities in 1990s, see V. Koroteyeva, E. Makarova, 'Money and social connections in the Soviet and post-Soviet Uzbek city', Central Asian Survey, 1998, Vol 17, No 4, p 593
50. D. Kandiyoti, N. Azimova, 'The communal and the sacred: Women's worlds of ritual in Uzbekistan', Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute, 2004, No 10, p 335.
51. Bourdieu, 'Genezis i struktura polya religii', p 44.
52. In the 1920s Sharī'a religious courts were recognised by the Soviet state.
53. Bourdieu, 'Genezis i struktura polya religii', p 43.
54. Central Asian Muslims used all opportunities given by Islamic doctrine tradition to avoid following the scriptural prescriptions. In the case of descendents of the saints, since they are believed to embody Islam they are able occasionally to breach formal requirements.
55. Despite being prohibited by law, polygamy was practised in Central Asia during the whole of the Soviet period. It usually happened when the first wife could not have children. Local authorities routinely turned a blind eye to this.
56. P. Bourdieu, 'La production de la croyance. Contribution à l'économie des biens symboliques', Actes de la recherché en sciences sociales, 1977, No 13, pp 3-43
57. (the quote is taken from the Russian edition, see P. Bourdieu, 'Proizvodstvo very: Vklad v ekonomiku simvolicheskikh blag', P. Bourdieu, Sotsialnoe prostranstvo, p 195).
58. Argument about the Islamic nature of rituals is a common means through which competing groups assert their positions. For centuries rivalry in Central Asia between different sections of the ulama (the religiously educated elite among Muslim), political parties and Sufi brotherhoods was expressed in this way. See B. Babadzhanov, 'Zikr dzhahr i sama': sakralizatsia profannogo ili profanatsia sakralnogo?', Podvizhniki islama: Kult svyatykh i sufizm v Srednei Azii i na Kavkaze (Moskva, 2003), pp 237-252.
59. Close relatives of the deceased, who greet the guests, do not eat any food cooked in the house of the deceased during the funeral meal. They eat at neighbours' houses or only eat food brought by the guests.
60. Funeral meals are also held during the first hayit (Muslim religious festival, such as qurbon or ruza) after the funeral.
61. This was supported by the government as well as the official Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. See S. Abashin, 'Vopreki "zdravomu smyslu"? (K voprosu o "ratsionalnosti/ irratsionalnosti" ritualnykh raskhodov v Srednei Azii', Vestnik Evrazii, 1999, No 1-2 (6-7), pp 92-112
62. B. Babadzhanov, 'O fetvakh SADUM protiv "neislamskikh obychaev"', Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: Vzglyad iznutri (Moskva, 2001), pp 175-176.
63. Similar stances taken by official religious figures during the Soviet period often had a 'fundamentalist' character. See B. Babadzhanov, 'O fetvakh SADUM protiv "neislamskikh obychaev"', p 180.
64. It should be noted that some, not the most influential, mahsums and descendents of the saints became supporters of the hajis.
65. Hajis used literature and videos with the speeches distributed by these preachers. These materials had a hypnotic effect on the residents of O. who were used to trusting the printed word and 'cinema'. It supported the special status of hajis as the bearers of new knowledge of Islam.
66. A lot has been written about the 'Wahhabi' groups in Namangan, which later transformed into the opposition Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and carried out armed anti-government activities during 1999 and 2000. See A. Abduvahitov, 'Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan', Russia's Muslim Frontier, D. F. Eickelman (ed) (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp 79-100. The members of this group did not call themselves 'Wahhabi', but this name became a popular label for the 'foreign' ideas that they promoted.
67. It is interesting to note that a secondary school teacher from the family of ishans (on his mother's side he is related to hajis), used host visitors from Namangan in his home. This fact could be interpreted as an attempt by some of the descendents of the saints to sideline mahsums in their struggle for dominance in the religious field. However, this was probably a one-off instance because later on, during the open clash between hajis and mahsums, the teacher did not get involved into the conflict. I do not know whether the new mullahs voiced their opinions on the magical practices of the descendents of the saints. It is likely that they disapproved of the practice of visiting mazars as a practice inconsistent with 'real' Islam but they never took any action to stop the practice.
68. I witnessed this happening in other villages of the Ferghana valley during my fieldwork in 1989-1991. Of course, I did not manage to speak to any of the Namangan mullahs, who avoided any unnecessary contact with people, but I remember the bewilderment on people's faces after their preaching.
69. For the chronology of events in Tajikistan at the beginning of 1990s see B. Bushkov, D. Mikulskyi, "Tadzhikskaya revolutsia" i grazhdanskaya voina, 1989-1994 (Moskva, 1995)
70. B. Bushkov, D. Mikulskyi, Anatomia grazhdanskoi voiny v Tadzhikistane: Etno-sotsialnye protsessy i politicheskaya borba, 1992-1996 (Moskva, 1997).
71. Novo-Matchinskii rayon was founded in the 1950s. Tajiks from the mountainous areas of Matcha settled here.
72. There were many descendents of the saints among the followers of the Islamic Renaissance Party.
73. During that period many religious figures adopted more radical views. In the late Soviet period the Kazi Kalon, the leader of the official Islamic administration in Tajikistan (Kaziyat), was Akbar Kahharov, also known as Turajon-zoda (he was from a family of ishans and turas). He was loyal to the state authorities and considered moderate in his religious views. However, even he called for more radical religious reform in 1991-1992 and for increasing the role of Islam in Tadjikistan. His views brought him close to the Islamic Renaissance Party. During the civil war Turajon-zoda immigrated to Iran. In 1997, after the peace agreement, he became the first Vice Prime Minister of Tajikistan, and in 2005 he resigned. See S. Gretsky, 'Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda', Central Asia Monitor, 1994, No 1, pp 16-24.
74. It is well known, that the Islamic Renaissance Party had a very strong support from Novaya Matchai.
75. P. Bourdieu, Le sens pratique (Paris: Les Édition de Minuit, 1980) (quoted from the Russian edition P. Bourdieu, Prakticheskyi smysl (Sankt-Peterburg: Aleteya, 2001), p 165).
76. E. Said, 'Afterword' in E. Said, Orientalism (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), p 333.