Pocket protests: Rhetorical coercion and the micropolitics of collective action in semiauthoritarian regimes

World Politics

Volumn 58, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 378-412

  Lyall, Jason M K ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTHORITARIANISM; POLITICAL REPRESSION; POPULAR PROTEST;

EURASIA; RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 33847116843     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/wp.2007.0003     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs, "Development and Democracy," Foreign Affairs (September-October 2005)
2. Lucan A. Way, "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine," World Politics 57 (January 2005)
3. Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005)
4. Jason Brownlee, "Ruling Parties and Durable Authoritarianism," Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law Working Paper 23 (Stanford University, 2004)
5. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, D.C.: CEIP, 2003)
6. Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002)
7. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Rise of Cornpetitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002)
8. Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics 54 (January 2002).
9. M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
10. Lilia Shevtsova, Pulin's Russia (Washington, D.C.: CEIP, 2005)
11. Richard Rose, Neil Munro, and William Mishler, "Resigned Acceptance of an Incomplete Democracy: Russia's Political Equilibrium," Post-Soviet Affairs 20 (July-September 2004)
12. Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience," World Politics 55 (January 2003)
13. Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003)
14. Henry Balzer, "Managed Pluralism: Vladimir Putin's Emerging Regime," Post-Soviet Affairs 19 (July-September 2003).
15. Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (May 1973).
16. Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam, "Scale Shift in Transnational Contention," in Donatella Porta, ed., Transnational Protest and Global Activism (New York: Rowman Littlefield, 2005).
17. On social movements, see, for example: Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and Doug McAdam, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
18. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
19. and David Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51 (August 1986).
20. This article also draws upon electronic communications between activists to provide a behind-the-scenes perspective on their organizations. Due to safety and privacy concerns, I will not cite these missives directly and will quote all activists anonymously. Where possible, confirming evidence from published sources is cited.
21. See, e.g., Mark Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995)
22. Gilda Zwerman and Patricia Steinhoff, "When Activists Ask for Trouble," in Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol Davenport, eds., Repression and Mobilization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005)
23. and Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution," American Sociological Review 61 (February 1996).
24. For an overview, see Christian Davenport, "Repression and Mobilization," in Davenport, Johnston, and Davenport.
25. This assumption is most explicit in Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (fn. 1). The assumption of rational calculation flows from Olson's framework of collective action and is widespread in studies of social movements and protests.
26. See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)
27. and, for an overview of this extensive literature, see Elinor Ostrom, "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action," American Political Science Review 92 (March 1998).
28. "Social Unrest in China," CRS Report for Congress (May 2006)
29. "Zimbabwe: Inflation at 1,000 Percent Stirs 'Groundswell of Anger' at Mugabe," BBC Monitoring Africa, May 15, 2006
30. "Cairo Police Attack Crowd at Rally in Support of Jailed Leader," The Independent (London), May 19, 2006.
31. J. Richard Harrison and Glenn Carroll, Culture and Demography in Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
32. On "audience costs" in international relations, see Kenneth Schultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," American Political Science Review 92 (December 1998)
33. and James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994).
34. On focal points, see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
35. On rhetorical entrapment, see also Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 222.
36. Joshua Tucker, "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and the '2nd Wave' of Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions" (Manuscript, Princeton University, 2005).
37. On shaming, see Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
38. See also Kevin J. O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance," World Politics 49 (October 1996)
39. and James Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
40. Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
41. Transnational contacts can also inhibit organizational change or introduce other suboptimalities into patterns of collective protest. See, for example, Sarah Henderson, Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 2003)
42. and Lisa Sundstrom, "Foreign Assistance, International Norms, and Civil Society Development," International Organization 52, no. 2 (2005).
43. Zwerman and Steinhoff (fn. 6).
44. Debra Javeline, Protest and the Politics of Blame (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
45. Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," World Politics 44 (October 1991).
46. Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko, Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia (Washington: CEIP Press, 2004), 1.
47. Daniel Posner, "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference," American Political Science Review 98 (November 2004)
48. Edward Miguel, "Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania," World Politics 56 (April 2004)
49. Leonard Wantchekon, "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin," World Politics 55 (April 2003).
50. Each total corresponds to a rating of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest. Freedom House, Freedom in the World (New York: Freedom House, various years).
51. Charles Tilly, "From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements," in Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds., How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minneapolis Press, 1999).
52. These research visits occurred during September-December 2001, September 2002-February 2003, and August 2005.
53. Sebastian Smith, Allah's Mountains: The Battle for Chechnya, 2nd ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006)
54. Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2002)
55. Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999)
56. John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
57. For examples of his rhetoric, see Yeltsin, "Speech to the Opening Session of the People's Deputies," March 11, 1993
58. idem, "Press Conference with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (ORT)," August 19, 1993
59. and idem, "Annual State of the Nation Address," February 23, 1996.
60. A. Rikhter, Zhurnalistika i voina (Journalism and War) (Moscow: Issledovatel'skaia gruppa Rossiisko-amerikanskogo informatsionnogo press-tsentra, 1998), tables 20-21.
61. Emil' Pain and Arkadii Popov, "Rossiiskaia Politika v Chechne," Izvestiia, February 7-10, 1995.
62. Rikhter (fn. 27), table 38.
63. Between December 1994 and December 1995, 14 journalists were killed, 4 disappeared, and at least 146 were arbitrarily detained.
64. Leon Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 615.
65. Trenin and Malashenko (fn. 20), 23-27, 50.
66. Iu. Baturin et al., Epokha El'tsina: ocherki politicheskoi istorii (The Yeltsin era: Essays in political history) (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), 620, 638.
67. In addition to protesting, the antiwar movement also facilitated the return of hundreds of captured Russian solders, publicized human rights abuses by Russian soldiers, and even brokered negotiations with Shamil Basayev in 1995.
68. Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), 258.
69. It is true that Chechen actions (especially the Budennovsk hostage taking in June 1995 and victories in Grozny in August 1996) increased the pressure on Yeltsin. Yet without the pressure generated by the antiwar groups, Yeltsin and his military would have been free to escalate the war, as they tried to do after each defeat. It was the impending prospect of electoral defeat, and not battlefield outcomes, that forced Yeltsin's hand.
70. On Russian attitudes, see William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 43-87
71. Timothy Colton, Transitional Citizens (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
72. Mark Kramer, "The Perils of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Russia's War in Chechnya," International Security 29 (Winter 2004-5)
73. Trenin and Malashenko (fn. 20)
74. Evangelista (fn. 25).
75. Richard Sakwa, Russia's Choice (New York: Routledge, 2004), 170-81.
76. Harry Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 152-72.
77. Common Action became the Russian All-National Committee for the Cessation of War and the Establishment of Peace in the Chechen Republic in November 2002. Key members include the Committee for Anti-War Actions (KAD), the Antimilitarist Radical Association (ARA), the Anti-War Club (AK), For Human Rights, and Memorial. In St. Petersburg, the Antiwar Committee against the Regime's Colonial and Militaristic Policies comprised the Petersburg League of Anarchists, Punk-Revival, and Workers' Democracy, among others.
78. Author interview with antiwar activist, Moscow, December 7, 2002, and subsequent correspondence.
79. See, e.g., "Putin Firm on Russian Human Rights," BBC, February 10, 2005;
80. Putin, "Stenogram of Answers at a Kremlin Press Conference with Russian and Foreign Journalists," June 20, 2003
81. and idem, "Annual Speech to Russia's Federation Assembly," July 8, 2000.
82. This parodies the Soviet slogan "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the entire country."
83. This remark appeared as the "quote of the day" in September 25, 1999, editions of Komsomol'skaia pravda, Nezavisimaia gazeta, and Novye Izvestiia, among others.
84. See "Rezoliutsiia o neobkhodimosti konsolidatsii antivoennogo dvzheniy," November 9-10, 2002
85. Gazeta Regional'nikh Pravozashchitnykh Organizatsii (February-March 2003), 8-9.
86. This may be true of most, if not all, Russian activists and not simply of antiwar protestors. See Sarah Mendelson and Theodore Gerber, "Local Activist Culture and Transnational Diffusion" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2005).
87. "Voda kamen' tochit," Piket na Pushkinskoi 1 (2000), 5.
88. Author interview with antiwar activist, Moscow, December 7, 2002.
89. In St. Petersburg the police have taken to videotaping these pickets, ostensibly because they attract a fairly high proportion of young demonstrators who are affiliated with anarchist movements.
90. Totals derived from weekly organization records as well as from participant observation.
91. There is an implicit counterfactual here: if activists updated their slogans to match mainstream views, they would recruit at a faster rate with higher success than if they continue their current efforts that appeal to a much narrower segment of the populace.
92. Maskhadov, once the president of Chechnya and political figurehead of the independence movement, was killed in March 2005 by Russian forces.
93. Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. Mendelson, "Russian Public Opinion on Human Rights and the War in Chechnya," Post-Soviet Affairs 18 (October-December 2002), 293-305.
94. One report claimed, for example, that participants at a large December 2003 antiwar rally were each promised 150 rubles (about $5 dollars) for attending. The article paints such rallies as "social rackets." See "Rules of the Game," Kommersant" -Den'gi, April 26, 2004.
95. Mendelson and Gerber (fn. 47).
96. Author correspondence with activist, July 2003.
97. Yuri Levada, "What the Polls Tell Us," Journal of Democracy 15 (July 2004)
98. Sirke Makinen, "Russia's Integrity: Russian Parties of Power and the Yabloko Association on Russo-Chechen Relations, 1999-2001," Europe-Asia Studies 56 (December 2004)
99. Rose, Munro, and Mishler (fn. 2).
100. Levada Center Poll, June 9-14, 2006.
101. Lev Gudkov, "Ksenofobiia kak problema," Nezavisimaia gazeta, December 26, 2005, 10.
102. Gerber and Mendelson (fn. 54).
103. Some signs do make this appeal, but they tend to get lost among a welter of other unconnected banners.
104. Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
105. Russia's press freedom score averaged 51 during the first Chechen war and 63 during the second, with 100 representing the worst possible score. The 2005 score was 68; Freedom House, Press Freedom Survey (various years).
106. Now available online at http://voinenet.ru/articles/16/index.shtml.
107. Author correspondence with activist, May 6, 2003.
108. Available at http://www.hro.org/army.
109. The circulation for Nezavisimaia gazeta and Novaia gazeta is 50,000 and 135,000, respectively.
110. See "Voina molodykh," Literaturniia gazeta, August 13, 2003, 7. Films include Brat, Kavkazakii plennik, and Blokpost.
111. See also Anna Politikovskaia, Vtoraia chechenskaia (Moscow: Zakharov, 2002).
112. One poll found that 30 percent of respondents had served in the military and another 52 percent had relatives who had served; "The Army - a Man's Destiny?" Public Opinion Foundation, October 3, 2002.
113. Mendelson and Gerber (fn. 47), 25-26.
114. The petition ("Zapros Putinu...") can be found at http://www.hro.org/war/anti/2004/05/17-1.php.
115. "V Ryazani rasprostraneny gazety protiv voiny v Chechne," HRO.org., July 26, 2004, at http://www.hro.org/war/anti/2004/07/26-1.php.
116. Moscow has 10.4 million inhabitants (2002), St. Petersburg 4.7 million, and Ryazan, 522,000.
117. "Votum peremiriia," Kommersant," February 14, 2005, and "Odin protsent protestuiushchikh," Izvestiia, January 25, 2005.
118. This campaign, under the direction of pro-Putin movement Nashi, attracted about seven thousand demonstrators to Red Square on September 1, 2005. The antiwar movement's matching protest drew about five hundred. See "Either a Holiday or a Wake," Novye Izvestiia, September 5, 2005.
119. "Rock Stars Recruited to Fight Revolution," Moscow Times, March 31, 2005.
120. "Voda kamen' tochit," Piket na Pushkinskoi 1 (2000), 6.