Voting on tax policy design: A test of the selfish versus social preferences hypotheses

Public Finance Review

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 263-284

  Ackert, Lucy F ^a,b   Gillette, Ann B ^a,b   Martinez Vazquez, Jorge ^c   Rider, Mark ^c  

^a KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA   (United States)

^c GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Equity; Inequity aversion; Optimal taxation; Social preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847035528     PISSN: 10911421     EISSN: 15527530     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1091142106293102     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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