Incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 214-229

  Persson, Mats ^a   Siven, Claes Henric ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Deterrence; Economics of crime; Imprisonment; Incapacitation

Indexed keywords

EID: 32644490542     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.03.011     Document Type: Article

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