Economic theory and the application of incentive contracts to procure operating reserves

Electric Power Systems Research

Volumn 77, Issue 5-6, 2007, Pages 518-526

  Wang, L ^a,b   Yu, C W ^b   Wen, F S ^a  

^a ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Electricity market; Operating reserve; Pareto equilibrium; Principal agent model

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PARETO PRINCIPLE; RELIABILITY; RISK ASSESSMENT;

ELECTRICITY MARKET; OPERATING RESERVES; PARETO EQUILIBRIUM; PRINCIPAL AGENT MODELS;

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY;

EID: 33846646524     PISSN: 03787796     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.epsr.2006.05.004     Document Type: Article

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