Logic without experience: The problem of federal appellate courts

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 97-154

  Sherry, Suzanna ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 33846565329     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (525)

1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. Were the Court to forthrightly overrule some of its earlier cases, justifying its action as a necessary corrective to overly strict limits on federal jurisdiction (especially for civil rights claimants), it might well be correct. But the expansion of jurisdiction appears thoughtless and unjustified (even if justifiable). Some commentators applaud the loosening of particular restrictions on jurisdiction, but only in a single doctrinal context and usually without considering either the adequacy of the Court's analysis or the effect on district courts. See Robert V. Percival & Joanna B. Goger, Escaping the Common Law's Shadow: Standing in the Light of Laidlaw, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 119, 141-44 (2001) (praising recent standing case);
5. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21-41 (2003) (praising recent sovereign immunity case);
6. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, "Inextricably Intertwined" Explicable at Last?
7. Rooker-Feldman Analysis After the Supreme Court's Exxon Mobil Decision, FED. CTS. L. REV., at 11-25 (May 2006), http://www.fclr.org/docs/2006fedctslrevl.pdf (praising recent case narrowing Rooker-Feldman doctrine);
8. Kristen M. Shults, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A Resounding Victory for Environmentalists, Its Implications on Future Justiciability Decisions, and Resolution of Issues on Remand, 89 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1011-18 (2001) (praising recent standing case);
9. Adam P.M. Tarleton, Note, In Search of the Welcome Mat: The Scope of Statutory Federal Question Jurisdiction After Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1394, 1407-08 (2006) (praising recent federal question case):
10. Paul A. Avron, The Little Doctrine that (Almost) Could: The Supreme Court Clarifies the Narrow Scope of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, FED. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 22, 23 (2006) (praising recent case narrowing Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
11. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
12. Id. at 38-40.
13. 274 U.S. 357, 359, 380 (1927).
14. 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
15. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 509 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
16. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
17. Id. at 228-29, 243.
18. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 641-59 (1979);
19. Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1148-63 (1977);
20. Burton D. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740, 743, 765-66 (1974).
21. Harris, 281 F. Supp. at 516-17.
22. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
23. Id. at 40-41.
24. The Court ignored both the historical purposes of § 1983 and the fact that equitable barriers were not thought to apply across different jurisdictions at the time of its enactment, and thus that its drafters almost certainly contemplated that it could be used by federal courts to enjoin unconstitutional state criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 232-34;
25. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 971-1000 (1987);
26. Ralph U. Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REV. 591, 649-83 (1975);
27. Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987, 997.
28. Justice Black's majority opinion also incorrectly attributes the phrase "Our Federalism" to "the early struggling days of our Union of States," Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45, when in fact it had first been used by Justice Frankfurter in 1939, and had appeared in the United States Reports only sporadically since. See Michael G. Collins, Whose Federalism?, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 75, 75-78 (1992).
29. For other criticism of Younger, see, for example, LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 128-31 (1994);
30. George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide-Rethinking Younger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 119-25 (1990);
31. Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 534-46 (1989);
32. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 84-95 (1984);
33. Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 477-87 (1978);
34. William H. Theis, Younger v. Harris: Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 155-72 (1981).
35. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 473-75 (1974).
36. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sens., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626-29 (1986);
37. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 436-37 (1982).
38. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 342 n.11 (1975).
39. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987).
40. I leave to one side the doctrines governing the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. While these doctrines have also followed the trends identified in text-it became harder to have a claim heard on the merits during the last third of the twentieth century, followed by some easing of restrictions since 2000-statutory changes complicate the picture and make it beyond the scope of this Article.
41. See. e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
42. 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
43. 412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973).
44. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
45. Id. at 517-18 (holding that there was no standing because construction plaintiffs (sellers) had failed to show the availability of willing buyers, and low-income plaintiffs (buyers) failed to show the availability of willing sellers).
46. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984).
47. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992);
48. Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1991);
49. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-42 (1976).
50. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). For the original language, see Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
52. Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1334 (1977);
53. accord Barbara Ann Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 59 (1982) ("[T]he statute frequently has been overlooked or disregarded by the federal courts.").
54. See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1979);
55. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-64 (1979);
56. Union & Planters' Bank v. City of Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903);
57. see also Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963).
58. In Durfee, the Court was faced with determining the preclusive effect of a prior state-court judgment on a case originally brought in a second state's court but removed to federal court. Id. at 107-09.
59. Although the Court relied on § 1738, it did so entirely in the context of the statutory requirement that the courts of each state give full faith and credit to the judgments of other states. Id. at 107 ("The case before us presents questions arising under" the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, which is applicable to state courts only);
60. id. at 109 ("Full faith and credit thus generally requires every State to give to a judgment at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it.");
61. id. at 110 (discussing exceptions to the doctrine that "a judgment of a court in one State is conclusive upon the merits in a court in another State").
62. See, e.g., Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Notwithstanding the existence of § 1738... there are a number of cases in this circuit which have analyzed the issue of the extent to which the prior state court judgment precludes the subsequent Federal Civil Rights Act lawsuit and make no references whatever to § 1738 or to the concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel which would be employed by the courts of the state in which the prior judgment was rendered.");
63. Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he implementation of federal statutes representing countervailing and compelling federal policies justifies departures from a strict application of [§ 1738].");
64. Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that "'other well-defined federal policies... may compete with those policies underlying section 1738'" (quoting Am. Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1972)));
65. Am. Mannex Corp., 462 F.2d at 690 ("[Section 1738] does not necessarily mean, however, that a federal court is invariably bound to a state's own interpretation of res judicata or judicial estoppel.");
66. Midgett v. United States, 603 F.2d 835, 845 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (state preclusion rules must yield to "important and established federal policy");
67. Williams v. Sclafani, 444 F. Supp. 906, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that "relaxed principles of res judicata" apply in civil rights suits);
68. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. La. Milk Comm'n, 365 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (M.D. La. 1973) ("While the federal court hearing the second case will give great consideration to the State's interpretation of its doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel, it is not necessarily bound by those interpretations.");
69. see also Atwood, supra note 31, at 71-72 & nn. 63-65 (collecting cases that show the inconsistency of Supreme Court precedent and the lower courts' failure to develop coherent law on the preclusive effects of state-court judgments).
70. See generally William H. Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 859 (1976) (arguing that civil rights claims should usually not be barred by res judicata).
71. PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO, & HERBERT WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 842 (2d ed. 1973) (quoting § 1738). The 1983 first edition of another casebook, written shortly after the Supreme Court began the resurrection of § 1738 in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), contains only a one-page note on McCurry (in the chapter on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)), which suggests that even in the early 1980s federal courts scholars did not view § 1738 as an important doctrine.
72. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS 712-13 (1st ed. 1983).
73. Allen, 449 U.S. at 103-05.
74. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81-85 (1984).
75. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373-79 (1996);
76. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379-87 (1985).
77. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-99 (1986).
78. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468-83 (1982);
79. see also Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 380-86 (finding no exception to § 1738 under section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
80. Parsons Steel, Inc., v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523-26 (1986) (finding no exception to § 1738 under Anti-Injunction Act relitigation exception).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2000).
82. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83. 255 U.S. 180 (1920).
84. Id. at 199.
85. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
86. Id. at 817 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)).
87. As the dissent in Merrell Dow pointed out, a congressional intent against creating a private cause of action-essentially a decision to relegate statutory claims to federal agencies in the first instance-is not the same as a congressional preference for state courts over federal courts; indeed, to the extent that Congress chose agencies for reasons of uniformity and expertise, its decision suggests a congressional view that if any court is to adjudicate statutory claims, it should be a federal court. Id. at 831-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
89. Id. at 549.
90. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
91. Finley, 490 U.S. at 553.
92. See id. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, since the Court did not persuasively distinguish pendent-party from pendent-claim jurisdiction as a matter of constitutional or statutory interpretation (but simply as pragmatically different), Finley put in jeopardy even the twenty-year-old liberalization of pendent-claim jurisdiction.
93. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 247, 260 ("Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's unwillingness to limit or impair pendent claim and ancillary jurisdiction, Finley's premises create a wedge for chipping away at those doctrines.");
94. Wendy Collins Perdue, Finley v. United States: Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction, 76 VA. L. REV. 539, 567-68 (1990) ("By characterizing Gibbs as inconsistent with the requirement of statutory authorization of jurisdiction, the Court has in essence declared pendent-claim jurisdiction to be an unconstitutional usurpation of power.").
95. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)); see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
96. U.S. CONST, amend. XI.
97. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
98. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
99. For an overview of this history, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 78-92 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
100. id. at 101-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
101. For a list of some of the voluminous scholarship supporting this interpretation, see id. at 110 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting).
102. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23 (1989).
103. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 232 (1989);
104. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon. 473 U.S. 234, 241, 255 n.7 (1985).
105. 517 U.S. 44.
106. Id. at 59-66.
107. Id. at 72.
108. For an explanation and critique of this process of " constitutionalization," see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760-95 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (Americans with Disabilities Act);
110. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-91 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
111. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-14 (Fair Labor Standards Act);
112. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670-72 (1999) (Lanham Act);
113. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635-39 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act).
114. In addition to the sources cited supra notes 12 & 16 (criticizing Younger), and 50 (criticizing Finley), see, for example, Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1493-94 (1991);
115. Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 503-10 (1997);
116. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20-24;
117. Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling Administrative Decisionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367, 379-94 (1990).
118. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Causation, Constitutional Principles, and the Jurisprudential Legacy of the Warren Court, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1185-1202 (2002);
119. Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 538-39 (2004);
120. E. Martin Estrada, Pushing Doctrinal Limits: The Trend Toward Applying Younger Abstention to Claims for Monetary Damages and Raising Younger Abstention Sua Sponte on Appeal, 81 N.D. L. REV. 475, 489-96 (2005);
121. Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1660-64 (2002);
122. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress's Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 282-83 (2005);
123. John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1728-33 (2004);
124. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and "Federal Courts," 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 1954-75 (2003);
125. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1291-1312 (2005);
126. David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1225-34;
127. Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1117-52 (2006).
128. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
129. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 ("congruence and proportionality");
130. id. at 368 ("history and pattern");
131. id. at 372 ("congruence and proportionality");
132. id. at 373 ("serious pattern" and "marked pattern");
133. id. at 374 ("congruent and proportional");
134. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 ("congruence and proportionality") ;
135. id. at 90 ("widespread pattern");
136. id. at 91 ("widespread and unconstitutional... discrimination");
137. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639 ("congruence and proportionality");
138. id. at 645 ("widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights");
139. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) ("congruence and proportionality");
140. id. at 526 ("widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights");
141. id. at 531 ("widespread pattern").
142. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (holding abrogation of state sovereign immunity in the ADA unconstitutional);
143. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 87-92 (holding abrogation of state sovereign immunity in the ADEA unconstitutional).
144. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999) (holding that the Lanham Act does not abrogate state sovereign immunity);
145. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643-44 (1999) (holding the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act unconstitutional).
146. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2611-54 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006). For a list of the eight decisions, see infra note 71.
147. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(c) (2000).
148. Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2001);
149. Lizzi v. Alexander, 255 F.3d 128, 134-38 (4th Cir. 2001);
150. Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000); Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 226-29 (3d Cir. 2000);
151. Kazmier v.Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 527-33 (5th Cir. 2000);
152. Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2000);
153. Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 67-69 (2d Cir. 2000).
154. But see Hibbs v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 851-61 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
155. See, e.g., Hale, 219 F.3d at 68-69.
156. 538 U.S. 721.
157. Id. at 728-40.
158. Id. at 731 n.5.
159. Id. at 728 n.2 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (a)(5) (2000)).
160. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279-81 (1979) (disparate impact on women does not violate Constitution);
161. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (disparate impact on racial minorities does not violate Constitution);
162. cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (pregnancy discrimination does not violate Title VII because it is not gender discrimination);
163. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-505 (1974) (distinction based on pregnancy does not violate the Constitution).
164. For elaboration of the arguments in this paragraph, see Suzanna Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 238-48.
165. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 87-92 (2001).
166. 541 U.S. 509, 530-34 (2004).
167. Id. at 513.
168. Id. at 531.
169. As the dissent pointed out, "there [was] nothing in the legislative record or statutory findings to indicate that disabled persons were systematically denied the right to be present at criminal trials, denied the meaningful opportunity to be heard in civil cases, unconstitutionally excluded from jury service, or denied the right to attend criminal trials." Id. at 543 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
170. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996)
171. (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321-23 (1934));
172. id. at 70 n.13
173. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton));
174. see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (finding immunity retained "except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments").
175. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
176. 126 S. Ct. 990, 1004-05 (2006).
177. Id. at 994.
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
179. Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1002-05.
180. Id. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1009.
182. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 n.16 (1996).
183. Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1005.
184. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (1987).
187. US. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
188. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
189. 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
190. Id. at 311.
191. Id. at 317.
192. Id. at 314. As one reader of this Article noted, the sentence quoted in text is one that only a lawyer could love.
193. Id. at 311 n.1.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
195. See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (Rule 23 class action);
196. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (Rule 20 joinder).
197. See Russ v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 808, 819 (E.D. Pa. 1997);
198. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 961 (1991).
199. I say this with apologies to the trio of respected law professors who drafted the legislation, one of whom is my co-author. See Rowe et al., supra note 106.
200. The requirements for diversity jurisdiction, specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, are that the parties are from different states and the amount in controversy is above $75,000. The Supreme Court has long interpreted the statute as also requiring "complete diversity" so that no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any defendant. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806).
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
202. See, e.g., Walter v. Ne. R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 370, 374 (1893);
203. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 933 (2d Cir. 1998);
204. Libby v. City Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1978);
205. Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961);
206. see 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3704, at 110-16 (Supp. 2006).
207. For circuits that held that § 1367(b) overruled Clark or Zahn or both, see Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2990 (2005);
208. Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2003), aff'd, 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005);
209. Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-17 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. dismissed, 536 U.S. 979 (2002);
210. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-40 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002);
211. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930-33 (7th Cir. 1996);
212. In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 529 U.S. 333 (2000).
213. For circuits that held that § 1367(b) did not change the prior doctrines, see Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 132-37 (1st Cir. 2004), overruled by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005);
214. Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 960-62 (8th Cir. 2000);
215. Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1999);
216. Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 637-41 (10th Cir. 1998).
217. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
218. Id. at 2621.
219. As I will discuss in Part III, Allapattah is also a prime example of the Court's heedlessness of the effect of its decisions on the trial courts, because its reasoning creates more difficulties for those courts than it solves.
220. 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1746-49 (2006). The plaintiff, Vickie Lynn Marshall, is better known by her stage name, Anna Nicole Smith.
221. See Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1500-02 (2001);
222. John F. Winkler, The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 PROB. L.J. 77, 117-36 (1997).
223. See, e.g., Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946).
224. See, e.g., Turja v. Turja, 118 F.3d 1006, 1008-09 (4th Cir. 1997);
225. Blakeney v. Blakeney, 664 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 1981).
226. See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1299-1302 (10th Cir. 1999);
227. Bedo v. McGuire, 767 F.2d 305, 306-07 (6th Cir. 1985).
228. Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1982).
229. Id. at 713-17.
230. Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1739 (2006).
231. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
232. Id. at 284 (confining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting disctrict court review of those judgments").
233. Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1995).
234. Fariello v. Campbell, 860 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
235. On the variety among state preclusion doctrines, see Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 963-83 (1998).
236. See id. at 973 & nn. 129-34 (listing states in which judgment pending appeal is not given preclusive effect).
237. See id. at 966-67 & nn.80-88 (listing states that still adhere to mutuality doctrine).
238. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
239. Id. at 416.
240. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1343-44 (1980).
241. 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
242. Id. at 486.
243. Id. at 483 n.16.
244. See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action. 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1087-88 (1999).
245. See, e.g., Gulla v. N. Strabane Twp., 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) ("'void the state court's ruling'" (quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996)));
246. Jones v. Crosby, 137 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 1998) ("review, reverse, or invalidate");
247. Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 856 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Rymer, J., concurring) ("reverse or modify");
248. Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996) (same);
249. Goetzman v. Agribank FCB, 91 F.3d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir. 1996) ("would change the state court result");
250. Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996) ("effectively nullify");
251. FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840 ("render that [state] judgment ineffectual");
252. Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) ("effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling");
253. Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, 15 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1994) ("effectively reverse");
254. Howell v. Supreme Court of Tex., 885 F.2d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1989) ("reverse or modify"):
255. Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 1988) ("effectively reverse");
256. Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 263-64 (10th Cir. 1986) ("reverse or modify"; "undo").
257. See, e.g., Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293-95 (6th Cir. 1998);
258. Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1997);
259. Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 253-54 (5th Cir. 1995);
260. Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1990).
261. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also id. at 291 (noting that Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction when federal-court plaintiff is "complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment").
262. Id. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)).
263. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 4, at 11-16.
264. Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 GREEN BAG 2D 317 (2006).
265. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
266. Id. at 179.
267. Id. at 167-68.
268. Id. at 168-71.
269. Id. at 171-74.
270. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
271. Id. at 177.
272. Id. at 183.
273. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2000) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf... to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.").
274. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
275. Id. at 578.
276. Id. at 567.
277. Id. at 564.
278. Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Environmental Standing, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321, 327 (2001);
279. see also Sam Kalen, Standing on Its Last Legs: Bennett v. Spear and the Past and Future of Standing in Environmental Cases, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1997) ("[T]he Bennett decision... marks a turning point in the treatment of standing in environmental cases.");
280. id. at 32 ("[Bennett] may doom the current law of standing.");
281. Shults, supra note 4, at 1003 ("[T]he decision in Laidlaw significant because it appears that the Court is opening its doors to allow in more environmentalists by... signaling a shift toward a less formalistic and more pragmatic approach to the standing doctrine.");
282. Ronald K. Christensen, Recent Development, Supreme Court Expands Standing Under the Endangered Species Act, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 146, 157-58 (1998) ("The [Bennett] decision has significantly broadened standing for citizen suit under the ESA. The Supreme Court's willingness to take the wording of 'any person' at face value provides broad opportunity for citizens to challenge governmental decisions and actions under the ESA.");
283. Hudson P. Henry, Note, A Shift in Citizen Suit Standing: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 247 (2001) ("Laidlaw signals a continuation of the Court's discomfort with Justice Scalia's purely private law model of litigation.");
284. Stephen Lanza, Note, The Liberalization of Article III Standing: The Supreme Court's Ill-Considered Endorsement of Citizen Suits in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1447, 1461-66 (2000) ("[T]he prevailing reaction [to Laidlaw] was that the Court has lowered the threshold for citizen standing....").
285. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1574-1615 (2003) (discussing the increase in discretionary activity and concluding that the risks of such activity have not been realized);
286. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 425-26 (1982) (discussing the greater power given to judges for "case management").
287. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986);
288. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986);
289. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
290. See generally Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (2005) (describing and criticizing the increased use of summary judgment in the wake of the 1986 trilogy);
291. David L. Shapiro, The Story of Celotex: The Role of Summary Judgment in the Administration of Civil Justice, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 343, 359-69 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (describing Celotex and its consequences);
292. Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 86-88 (2006) (describing frequency of judicial citation to Celotex).
293. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1990);
294. Redish, supra note 158, at 1339-55;
295. Resnik, supra note 157, at 376-80;
296. Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 558-62 (2006).
297. But see David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1991-98 (1989);
298. see also Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413 (1989) (examining discretion in the context of evidence rules);
299. Shapiro, supra note 158, at 363-64 (noting but not necessarily endorsing criticism of the trilogy of cases).
300. Marcus, supra note 157, at 1565-74 (describing a typology of judicial discretion).
301. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 975 (1987).
302. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 87-93 (1996);
303. James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 676-82 (1998).
304. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 157, at 417-31 (criticizing the rise of managerial judging, partly because it is unreviewable).
305. Although summary judgment is adjudicative rather than managerial, it shares several characteristics with managerial judging that distinguish it from the discretionary decisions I examine in the Article. First, like managerial judging, it is largely a pre-trial tool. More important, however, is that courts of appeals have largely abdicated their oversight of trial court rulings on summary judgment, see, for example, Tidmarsh, supra note 159, at 555-56 & nn. 179-85, which undermines the adjudicative safeguards.
306. It is possible to argue that some diminution of discretion is the inevitable product of any legal system: that any system of discretion slowly accretes into a system of rules unless care is taken to guard against this hardening of the legal arteries. What I suggest in this Article is that district court judges are in a better position to recognize and counter this tendency where it is detrimental to the legal system.
307. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
308. Id. at 726.
309. Id. at 726-27.
310. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988). The Court held that the discretion included the district court's decision whether to dismiss or to remand a state-law claim. Id.
311. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000).
312. Id. § 1367(c)(1)-(3).
313. Id. § 1367(c)(4).
314. See Shirin Malkani, Upside Down and Inside Out: Appellate Review of Discretion Under the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 661, 674-79.
315. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurrier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 447-48 (2d Cir. 1998);
316. McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1994);
317. Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1555-61 (9th Cir. 1994);
318. Palmer v. Hosp. Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994).
319. Itar-Tass, 140 F.3d at 447;
320. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1556.
321. Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1558;
322. see also Itar-Tass, 140 F.3d at 448 (quoting Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1558).
323. Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569.
324. Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 1995).
325. One commentator suggests that six circuits have "interpreted the statute as a codification of Gibbs" and as conferring "unlimited discretion" on district courts. Rachel Ellen Hinkle, The Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the Debate Over the District Court's Discretion to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction, 69 TENN. L. REV. 111, 120-21 (2001).
326. In four of the cases cited, one of the listed factors was unarguably present. See Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[I]t was an abuse of discretion to retain the state-law claims on a theory of supplemental jurisdiction after dismissal of the federal claims upon which supplemental jurisdiction depended.");
327. Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533, 541 (10th Cir. 1995) ("After resolving all her federal claims, the district court exercised its discretion and dismissed Ms. Anglemyer's remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)....");
328. Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that a district court may, in its discretion, retain state-law claim "notwithstanding the early demise of all foundational federal claims");
329. Diven v. Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l & Local 689, 38 F.3d 598, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Since appellants' non-federal claims against the local union predominate over the related federal cause of action against the national union, we affirm the district court's [refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction]."). In one of the cases cited, the court affirmed the district court's decision to retain jurisdiction on grounds of judicial economy (and its dismissal of the state-law claim on the merits), despite the dismissal of the federal claim before trial. Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993). Finally, in Borough of West Mifflin, discussed supra note 177 and accompanying text, the court of appeals reversed a district court's remand of an entire case (including the federal claim) to the state court from which it had been removed, and remanded to the district court for a determination of whether the state-law claims substantially predominated over the federal claim. 45 F.3d at 790.
330. See, e.g., United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
331. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
332. Id. at 94.
333. For discussions of Steel Co., see, for example, Jack H. Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 260-66 (2000);
334. Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235, 270-349 (1999);
335. Joan Steiriman, After Steel Co.: "Hypothetical Jurisdiction" in the Federal Appellate Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 855, 857-77 (2001).
336. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1999).
337. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999).
338. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 779-80 (2000).
339. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
340. For an argument that in other contexts the Supreme Court is similarly forcing lower- courts to decide ultimately unnecessary constitutional questions, in violation of the avoidance doctrine, see Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 851 (2005).
341. 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
342. The Panel is created pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2000).
343. Id. § 1407(a).
344. Id. § 1404(c).
345. Rule 14(b), Rules of Procedure of the J.P.M.L.
346. See, e.g., In re Am. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1531-35 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Lexecon, 523 U.S. 26;
347. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818-20 (3d Cir. 1982);
348. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curium);
349. see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 31.132, at 254 (1995) (noting that a "transferee judge may transfer cases for trial to any district, including the § 1407 transferee district, permitted by 28 U.S.C. 1404");
350. Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 479, 497 (1989) ("It is not uncommon for a transferee judge... to transfer to his own... district... the actions which were previously assigned to him or her.");
351. Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 581 n.42 (1977) (listing authorities supporting a transferee judge's ability to transfer an action to the transferee district for trial).
352. See, e.g., Am. Cont'l Corp., 102 F.3d at 1532 ("Permitting the transferee court to transfer a case to itself upon completion of its pretrial work often promotes efficiency in the disposition of the case or cases.");
353. Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 125 ("[The district judge] indicated that he felt that because of the complexity of these cases the interests of judicial efficiency made it highly desirable that the judge who conducted the pretrial proceedings continue as the trial judge.").
354. Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 33 (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 32 (1995)).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 35-36.
357. See Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152 (D. Mass. 2006).
358. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
359. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Banh, 522 U.S. 470, 478 n.3 (1998).
360. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
361. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1988).
362. See, e.g., NAACP v. Metro. Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1997), vacated, 522 U.S. 1145 (1998), reinstated, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 1998);
363. Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 864 (2d Cir. 1988).
364. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-47 (2000 & Supp. III 2003);
365. see, e.g., Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1997);
366. Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. 44 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1995);
367. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1413 (9th Cir. 1990);
368. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 757 (2d Cir. 1986).
369. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (2000);
370. see, e.g., Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc. 231 F.3d 399, 410-12 (7th Cir. 2000);
371. Bylinski v. Allen Park, 169 F.3d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir. 1999);
372. NAACP v. Metro. Council, 144 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (8th Cir. 1998);
373. Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1431 (2d Cir. 1993);
374. Atl. Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 988 F. Supp. 486, 495-97 (D.N.J. 1997);
375. Nowling v. Aero Servs. Int'l, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 733, 737-38 (E.D. La. 1990). One commentator, writing in 1999, concluded that "[n]early every court which has considered this question has concluded that the All Writs Act may serve as an independent basis for removal jurisdiction...."
376. Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 411 (1999) (cataloging and criticizing the courts' use of the All Writs Act for this purpose).
377. Other commentators also criticized the use of the All Writs Act to remove cases. See, e.g., Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier of Judicial Activism: Removal Under the All Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 773, 815-20 (2000).
378. 522 U.S. 470 (1998).
379. Id. at 472.
380. 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
381. Id. at 34.
382. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
383. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
384. E.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986).
385. See, e.g., id. at 1536-38;
386. Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986);
387. Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 205 (7th Cir. 1985);
388. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985).
389. See Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009-12 (1999).
390. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
391. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
392. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(B).
393. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990).
394. 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).
395. Id. at 93.
396. See id. at 87.
397. The law firm involved was required to circulate the court's opinion to each lawyer in the firm, along with "a memorandum that states that it is firm policy that its partners and associates adhere to the highest ethical standards and that if a lawyer's adherence to those standards results in the loss of a client, large or small, the lawyer will not suffer any adverse consequence." Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002), vacated sub nom. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d 86.
398. For criticism of the court of appeals' decision in Pennie & Edmonds, see Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule II: A Cross-Circuit Comparison, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 727, 755 (2004);
399. Gregory P. Joseph, 'Sua Sponte' Sanctions, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14, 2003, at B6.
400. Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 93.
401. 323 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 2003).
402. Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
403. Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2003).
404. See Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing district court imposition of sanctions but explicitly declining to decide whether to adopt Second Circuit's "bad faith" requirement);
405. Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) (reversing district court imposition of sanctions, and citing in support a case that held only that the standards should be applied with particular stringency).
406. Young v. City of Providence. 404 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2005).
407. There is a lively scholarly debate about whether discretion under Rule 11 is good or bad. See, e.g., Maureen N. Armour, Practice Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (1996);
408. Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493, 554-68 (1997);
409. Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929-41 (1989);
410. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793 (1990);
411. Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REV. 7, 28-30 (1987);
412. William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 7, 36-37 (1994);
413. Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 879-80, 889-90 (1992);
414. Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 491-92 (1991).
415. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
416. Id. at 78.
417. See, e.g., Rx.com Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2005);
418. Genecin v. Genecin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 306, 320 (D. Conn. 2005);
419. Amoco Ukrservice v. Am. Meter Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2004);
420. Baycol Prod. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 209 (D. Minn. 2003);
421. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1364. 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2003);
422. Stein Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 196 F.R.D. 653, 658 (D. Utah 2000);
423. Emig v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 379, 394 (D. Kan. 1998);
424. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co. v. Radiator Specialty Co., 862 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (E.D.N.C. 1994);
425. Nichols v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 706 F. Supp. 1309, 1322 (M.D. Tenn. 1989);
426. Clemco Indus, v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816, 821 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
427. Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 870 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
428. Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559, 563 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
429. see also Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1675-83 (1992) (describing the effect of federal courts' "Erie-guesses" upon state courts and state law).
430. See Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 963-1017 (1989) (concluding, based on analysis of more than 550 cases, that all but two circuits-the Ninth, which had rejected the rule of deference, and the Federal Circuit, which had never considered it-adopted some version of deference to district court determinations on state law);
431. see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell. 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (concluding that as of 1991, all circuits except the Third and Ninth adopted the rule of deference).
432. 499 U.S. 225.
433. Id. at 231.
434. See Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 287 (2003).
435. Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 229.
436. In addition to the sources cited in notes 157-163, see, for example, AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 152-91 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1989);
437. Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1476-83 (1987);
438. Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 20-26 (1905);
439. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908);
440. Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1809-11 (1992).
441. The increase in the use of unpublished appellate opinions makes both options easier. See, e.g., Patrick Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 26 (2005) (finding 81% of 2004 courts of appeals decisions on the merits are accompanied by unpublished opinions);
442. David C. Vladek & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2005) ("unpublished dispositions now comprise over 80% of the output of our appellate courts"). The new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which will take effect in December 2006 unless Congress disapproves it, does not eliminate unpublished opinions but only permits litigants to cite them.
443. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 53-123 (1996);
444. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-129 (1985);
445. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 545, 545-46 (2004);
446. David Hittner & Kathleen Weisz Osman, Federal Civil Trial Delays: A Constitutional Dilemma, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 341 (1990);
447. Jon O. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1643-47 (1985). I recognize that other factors also contribute to the docket problems of federal district courts, and may indeed have a greater effect than the two trends I identify in this Article. But the other factors-including the federalization of many crimes, the creation of new federal civil causes of action, and the increase in the number of state prisoners (and therefore of potential habeas petitions)-are more intractable. I focus on the relationship between trial and appellate courts both because it offers a possible solution, and because it is of inherent interest to scholars studying the federal courts.
448. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
449. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
450. Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
451. Tennessee v. Lane. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
452. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 538-54 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
453. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 744-59 (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
454. Sherry, supra note 78, at 236-50;
455. Nicole E. Grodner, Note, Disparate Impact Legislation and Abrogation of the States' Sovereign Immunity After Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs and Tennessee v. Lane, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1173, 1189-93 (2005).
456. Cent, Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006).
457. See id. at 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to discern an intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity through the Bankruptcy Clause when no such intention has been found in any of the other clauses in Article I. Indeed, our cases are replete with acknowledgements that there is nothing special about the Bankruptcy Clause in this regard.").
458. For a brief critique of Katz, see Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor: Is Haifa Loaf Enough?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1793, 1817-18 (2006).
459. One commentator notes the inconsistency in an understated fashion, suggesting that Justice O'Connor's fifth vote for the majority is "somewhat surprising in light of her previous votes in state sovereign immunity cases" (she voted with the majority in Seminole Tribe, Alden, Florida Prepaid, College Savings Bank, Kimel, and Garrett, all of which struck down congressional abrogations). Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 515-16 n.109 (2006).
460. Grable & Sons Metal Prod. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
461. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
462. Despite my general preference for pragmatic rather than dogmatic judicial decisionmaking, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002), jurisdictional rules call for more clarity. See infra text accompanying notes 268-271.
463. Compare Stechler v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, No. Civ. A. 05-3485(HAA), 2006 WL 90916, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2006) (no jurisdiction), Samuel Trading, LLC v. Diversified Group, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889-92 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (same), Snook v. Deutsche Bank AG, 410 F. Supp. 2d 519, 521-24 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (same) and Sheridan v. New Vista, L.L.C., 406 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792-96 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (same) with Becnel v. KPMG LLP, 387 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985-89 (W.D. Ark. 2005) (jurisdiction).
464. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2136-37 (2006) (distinguishing Grable and finding no federal jurisdiction).
465. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2621.
466. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
467. State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Yates, 391 F.3d 577, 580 n.15 (5th Cir. 2004) (decided before Allapattah but relying on 5th Circuit precedent ultimately approved in Allapattah). This problem was noticed in the literature prior to Allapattah, but the Allapattah Court's reliance on the language of § 1367 brought it into sharp relief.
468. See, e.g., John B. Oakley, Joinder and Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts: The State of the Union of Rules and Statutes, 69 TENN. L. REV. 35, 50-56 (2001).
469. See, e.g., Engstrom v. Mayfield, 159 F. App'x. 697, 700-01 (6th Cir. 2005).
470. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2622
471. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2618.
472. For a critique of this "split the baby" approach to the jurisdictional amount and diversity of citizenship questions, see Adam N. Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs' Ears, and Congressional Expansions of Federal Jurisdiction: Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and its Lessons for the Class Action Fairness Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 279, 313-19 (2006).
473. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2635 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
474. (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989)).
475. See, e.g., Gorfinkle v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 431 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2005);
476. Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squires, LLP, 404 F. Supp. 2d 540, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
477. 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
478. See id. at 286 & n.1. The only other appearance of "inextricably intertwined" in the opinion is at 291, where the Court quotes the court of appeals below.
479. Id. at 284.
480. Compare Indus. Commc'n & Elec., Inc. v. Monroe County, 134 F. App'x 314, 318-19 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that Rooker-Feldman bars suit because "inextricably intertwined" with state-court judgment), Williams v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 04-30768, 2005 WL 776170, at *1-3 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2005) (same), Long v. Wolfe, No. 06CV0633, 2006 WL 1371093, at *3-6 (W.D. Pa. May 18, 2006) (same), and Willhite v. Collins, 385 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928-29 (D. Minn. 2005) (same), with Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, 449 F.3d 542, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that Rooker-Feldman does not bar suit because injury caused by defendant, not by state-court judgment), Davani v. Va. Dept. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 715-20 (4th Cir. 2006) (same), Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83-93 (2d Cir. 2005) (same), Fearing v. City of Lake St. Croix Beach, No. Civ. 04-5127, 2006 WL 695548, at *3-6 (D. Minn. Mar. 17, 2006) (same), and Bracht v. Grushewsky, No. 4:04 CV 1286, 2005 WL 2234578, at *2-5 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2005) (same). Several of the latter courts have erased the conflict by finding that "inextricably intertwined" is a "descriptive label attached to claims that meet the requirements outlined in [Saudi Basic Industries]," which has "no independent content." Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 86-87; accord, McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394-95 (6th Cir. 2006);
481. Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1142-45 (10th Cir. 2006);
482. Davani, 434 F.3d at 719. One specific question that arises frequently in this context is whether a claim of constitutional or other violations in the prosecution of the state suit or the procurement of the state judgment is barred by Rooker-Feldman after Saudi Basis industries. Compare Johnson v. Ohio Supreme Court, 156 F. App'x 779, 781-83 (6th Cir. 2005) (barred), Sinclair v. Bankers Trust Co. of Cal., No. 5:05-CV-072, 2005 WL 3434827, at 2-4 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (same), and Daniels v. Iowa, No. 4:04-CV-40420, 2005 WL 1398498, at *3-9 (S.D. Iowa May 23, 2005) (same), with McCormick, 451 F.3d at 392-96 (6th Cir. 2006) (not barred), and Goddard v. Citibank, NA. No. 04CV5317, 2006 WL 842925. at *3-6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2006) (same). The high number of unpublished Rooker-Feldman opinions (especially among those finding that the doctrine bars the suit), at both the district and circuit court levels, is an indication that many lower courts consider Rooker-Feldman indispensable in resolving unimportant nuisance suits. This suggests that the Court's narrowing of Rooker-Feldman is likely to have a significant effect on trial court dockets, at least if lower courts take the narrowing seriously.
483. 544 U.S. at 291.
484. See, e.g., Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that Rooker-Feldman cannot apply when federal-court suit filed while petition for certiorari to state supreme court still pending);
485. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 89 (unclear whether interlocutory orders are final enough to trigger Rooker-Feldman);
486. Trusery Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 590-91 (7th Cir. 2005) (interlocutory appeals are not final enough to trigger Rooker-Feldman);
487. Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 24-27 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that some interlocutory orders are final enough to trigger Rooker-Feldman);
488. Soad Wattar Living Trust of 1992 v. Jenner & Block, P.C., No. 04 C 6390, 2005 WL 1651191, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2005) (finding it unclear whether interlocutory orders are final enough to trigger Rooker-Feldman);
489. Sinclair v. Bankers Trust Co. of Cal., No. 5:05-CV-072. 2005 WL 3434827, at *2-4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 13, 2005) (finding that Rooker-Feldman applies despite filing of federal suit during pendency of state appeal).
490. In the year since Grable, for example, many defendants have removed to federal court under questionable circumstances, only to have the district court remand to state court. See, e.g., Samuel Trading, LLC v. The Diversified Group, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889-92 (N.B. Ill. 2006);
491. Stechler v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, No. Civ.A. 05-3485, 2006 WL 90916, at *4-8 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2006);
492. City of Beatrice v. Aquila, No. 4:05CV3284, 2006 WL 208831, at *3-8 (D. Neb. Jan. 25, 2006);
493. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 399419, at *2-6 (D. Minn. Feb. 16, 2006);
494. Snook v. Deutsche Bank AG, 410 F.Supp.2d 519, 521-24 (S.D. Tex. 2006);
495. Sheridan v. New Vista, L.L.C., 406 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792-96 (W.D. Mich. 2005).
496. Grable & Sons Metal Prod. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2372 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
497. For a sampling of the voluminous literature, see, for example, FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991);
498. Larry Alexander, Constitutional Rules, Constitutional Standards, and Constitutional Settlement: Marbury v. Madison and the Case for Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 369, 374-76 (2003);
499. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);
500. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1702-13 (1976);
501. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56-118 (1992).
502. See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891 (2004) (arguing for clarity and predictability in jurisdictional rules, and against discretion).
503. See supra Part II.A.
504. There may be some indication that the Supreme Court in the future will deliberately provide even less guidance to lower courts by ruling on the narrowest ground possible. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Chief Justice Sets a Standard, WASH. POST, June 20, 2006, at A17 (reporting that Chief Justice Roberts, in speech at Georgetown University Law School, suggested that the Court should decide cases as narrowly as possible).
505. Several scholars have made the analogous suggestion that Supreme Court Justices ought to be required to ride circuit again. See Stephen G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386 (2006);
506. Suzanna Sherry, Politics and Judgment. 70 Mo. L. REV. 973, 986 (2005).
507. As I describe later, this trend may be reversing. See infra note 278 and accompanying text. These figures, as well as all other data in this Part, are compiled from the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges prepared by the Federal Judicial Center [hereinafter Biographical Directory of Federal Judges], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited August 3, 2006). Data was collected on all court of appeals judges sitting between January 1, 1970 and August 1, 2006. Senior judges were excluded from all calculations. For all calculations, N is the total number of judges in the circuit in the relevant year (or years), and E is the number of judges in the circuit with prior district court experience. The percentage of judges with district court experience, for Figures 1 and 3 and statements in the text, is E/N. The probability of randomly selecting a three-judge panel without a former district court judge, for Figure 2 and the statements in the text, is: (N-E)(N-E-1)(N-E-2)/(N)(N-1)(N-2)
508. John H. Clarke was appointed to the Court in 1916 and retired in 1922. Edward T. Sanford was appointed in 1923 and sat until he died in 1930. Clarke was a district judge from 1914 to 1916 and Sanford from 1908 to 1923. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 275.
509. The First Circuit is the only circuit with a large enough number of former district court judges-at least four out of six since 1984, and three out of five for the four preceding years-to ensure that every panel has at least one; between 1992 and 2001, five of the six First Circuit judges had district court experience, making it likely that many panels consisted entirely of former district court judges. The First Circuit has the best record on the issues I survey: It is the only circuit to have rejected the Second Circuit's reduction of district court discretion in the Rule 11 context. See supra note 228. It was also one of the four circuits that read § 1367(b) narrowly, finding no supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs who did not meet the jurisdictional minimum. The others were the Third, with a below-median probability of producing panels without district court experience, the Eighth, just above the median, and the Tenth, which had the highest probability of producing such panels. See supra note 110; infra Figure 2. No data are perfect.
510. All data are current as of August 1, 2006. This drop is especially unexpected given that there has been a Republican administration for the past six years. Presidents usually draw judicial appointments from their own party. See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 357 (1997);
511. DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 32 (2000);
512. Robert A. Carp et al., Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 478, 485 (2006). A Republican following two or more terms of Democratic presidents, or a Democratic following two or more terms of Republican presidents, will therefore likely have fewer district court judges to draw from-the most recently appointed judges from his party when he takes office will have been appointed at least eight years before. Some will have retired, and others might be considered too old. As a president's term progresses, however, and especially into his second term, he will be able to draw from his own district court appointees. Thus, for the period between 1980 and 1992 (three terms of Republican presidents), the percentage of former district court judges on the courts of appeals increased from 39.2% to 40.9%. For Democrat Bill Clinton's two terms, it increased from 40.9% to 43%. While these increases are small, they are in stark contrast to the sharp decrease for the current administration's term and a half.
513. See supra note 278 (suggesting that presidents tend to pick judges from their own parties).
514. GOLDMAN, supra note 278, at 364;
515. accord Bollinger, The Mind in the Major American Law School, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2167, 2176 (1993);
516. Guido Calabresi, The Current, Subtle-and Not So Subtle-Rejection of an Independent Judiciary, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 643-44 (2002);
517. William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 2002), www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/ 2001year-endreport.html;
518. Lee C. see also Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 941 (2003) (criticizing the norm of prior judicial experience for Supreme Court Justices).
519. See Carp et al., supra note 278, at 490;
520. Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 188-89 (1991);
521. Tracey E. George, Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article III Protections, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 221, 226-41 (2003);
522. Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 455 (1999);
523. Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 170 n.5 (2006);
524. see also GOLDMAN, supra note 278, at 305-06 (describing the Reagan administration's detailed focus on the opinions of a district court judge being considered for nomination to the court of appeals).
525. This Article is meant as a first attempt to identify the problem and suggest solutions. Further empirical research is warranted regarding both the causes and cures. We might want to look more closely at the differences between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals; to look beyond district court experience to other types of litigation experience (including both state-court judicial experience and experience as a litigator); and to compare doctrinal developments in specific circuits with the representation of district court judges on the appellate bench, whether by appointment or by designation.