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Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 185-204

Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core

Author keywords

Admission under unanimous consent; Core; Equal share; Free mobility; Jurisdiction structures

Indexed keywords


EID: 33846511165     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0043-4     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (15)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.