Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights

Economics of Transition

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 103-127

  Polishchuk, Leonid ^a   Savvateev, Alexei ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

Institutional change; Political preferences; Production and appropriation; Property rights

Indexed keywords

NATIONAL ECONOMY; OWNERSHIP; PROPERTY RIGHTS; TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY;

EURASIA; RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 1842506045     PISSN: 09670750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00173.x     Document Type: Article

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