The status quo bias and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy: Impact of voting rules, the European Commission and external changes

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 562-590

  Pokrivcak, Jan ^a   Crombez, Christophe ^b,c   Swinnen, Johan F M ^b  

^a SLOVAK UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE IN NITRA   (Slovakia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agricultural policy; Policy reform; Political economy; Political process

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846268071     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: 14643618     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbl027     Document Type: Article

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