Game theory and players' beliefs on the play

Knowledge, Beliefs and Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 107-133

  Schmidt, Christian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DAUPHINE   (France)

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EID: 33846091022     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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