An ironic reductio for a 'pro-life' argument: Hurlbut's proposal for stem cell research

Bioethics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 98-110

  Elliott, Kevin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Abortion; Altered nuclear transfer (ANT); Cloning; Embryo; Paradox of the heap; Sorites; Stem cell research

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CELL NUCLEUS TRANSPLANTATION; CONCEPTION; EMBRYONIC STEM CELL; GENETIC ENGINEERING; HUMAN; HUMAN CLONING; MEDICAL RESEARCH; MORALITY; RESEARCH ETHICS; SOMATIC CELL; UNITED STATES;

BIOETHICS; CLONING, ORGANISM; EMBRYO RESEARCH; HUMANS;

EID: 33846019616     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2007.00530.x     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. This paper uses the term 'pro-life' as a label for thinkers who claim that typical human embryos have a moral status close to or identical to that of fully developed persons. The article employs this term because it is a simple and well recognized label, but it uses quotation marks in order to emphasize that the term is vague and has significant rhetorical connotations.
2. H. Zucker et al. 2004. Session 6: Seeking Morally Unproblematic Sources of Human Embryonic Stem Cells. Washington, D.C.: The President's Council on Bioethics at http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/dec04/session6.html [Accessed December 8 2004].
3. G. Cook. New Technique Eyed in Stem-Cell Debate. The Boston Globe 2004 (November 21): A1.
4. See also G. Cook. Stem Cell Alternatives Gain Key Support. The Boston Globe 2004 (December 4): A1.
5. See e.g. N. Wade. Stem Cell Test Tried on Mice Saves Embryo. The New York Times 2005 (October 17): A1.
6. See also A. Meissner and R. Jaenisch. Generation of Nuclear Transfer-Derived Pluripotent ES Cells from Cloned Cdx2-Deficient Blastocysts. Nature 2005 (October 16). http://www.nature.com [Accessed 6 November 2006].
7. For a recent discussion of the sorites paradox, see J. Stanley. Context, interest relativity and the sorites. Analysis 2003; 63: 269-280.
8. R. Doerflinger. The Ethics of Funding Embryonic Stem Cell Research: A Catholic Viewpoint. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 1999; 9.2: 137-150.
9. Ibid: 137-138.
10. Ibid: 139, (italics added).
11. For examples of genetic defects that are embryonic lethal in mice, see Y. Qiu et al. Null Mutation of mCOUP-TFI Results in Defects of Morphogenesis of the Glossopharyngeal Ganglion, Axonal Projection, and Arborization. Genes Dev 1997; 11(Aug. 1): 1925-1937;
12. see also I. S. Lantinga-van Leeuwen et al. Lowering of Pkd1 Expression is Sufficient to Cause Polycystic Kidney Disease. Hum Mol Genet 2004; 13(Dec. 15): 3069-3077.
13. It is important to recognize that there are at least two different ways in which one might defend the sorites argument in claims (4) and (5). Some 'pro-life' thinkers, like Doerflinger, appear to think that there are convincing metaphysical or theological arguments in favor of the notion that all human embryos should be regarded as having high intrinsic value from the moment of conception. (See also Patrick Lee. 1996. Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press;
14. P. Lee. The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence. Bioethics 2004; 18: 249-263.)
15. For example, these thinkers might accept claims (4) and (5) because they believe that all changes that an embryo undergoes over the course of development are (in Aristotelian terms) merely 'accidental' as opposed to 'substantial' or 'essential' (see e.g., N. Austriaco, O.P. On Static Eggs and Dynamic Embryos: A Systems Perspective. Natl Cathol Bioeth Q 2002; 2: 659-683). One might worry, however, that there is often significant disagreement about the strength of the premises for these metaphysical or theological arguments.
16. (For a very brief discussion of the metaphysical ambiguity surrounding these issues, see Kevin Elliott Replies. Natl Cathol Bioeth Q 2005; 5: 227-228.) Therefore, some 'pro-life' thinkers appeal to a second reason for accepting claim (4), namely, that it is a cautious response to uncertainty about the moral status of the embryo. This paper raises concerns about the sorites argument no matter how one justifies it, but the concluding section clarifies that it creates particularly significant difficulties for those who appeal to cautiousness under uncertainty rather than to a metaphysical justification.
17. Section IV of the paper, which considers objections, provides further reasons for thinking that those who accept claim (4) are likely to accept claim (5) as well.
18. Zucker et al., op. cit. note 2, pp. 100-101.
19. See I.-M. Shih and R. Kurman. Molecular Basis of Gestational Trophoblastic Diseases. Curr Mol Med 2002; 2: 1-12.
20. For example, although adult stem cells have typically been regarded as only multipotent (i.e. having the capability of differentiating into cells that represent only one of the three germinal layers of the embryo), some recent evidence indicates that some adult stem cells may have pluripotent characteristics (i.e. having the capability of differentiating into more than one of the three germinal layers of the embryo); see Y. Jiang et al. Pluripotency of Mesenchymal Stem Cells Derived from Adult Marrow. Nature 2002; 418(July 4): 41-49.
21. Claim (5*) uses the term 'organization' to refer to the 'principal [sic] of unity' or 'coherent drive in the direction of the mature human form' that Hurlbut alleges to be present in normal human embryos; see Zucker et al., op. cit. note 2, p. 101. As Douglas Melton and his colleagues point out, however, it is not clear that these concepts that Hurlbut employs have a clear biological meaning;
22. see D. Melton et al. Altered Nuclear Transfer in Stem-Cell Research - A Flawed Proposal. N Engl J Med 2004; 351(27): 2791-2792. This paper gives Hurlbut the benefit of the doubt and examines the implications of his position, assuming that it is possible to make his concept of organization biologically meaningful.
23. Ibid.
24. Zucker et al., op. cit. note 2, p. 101.
25. For more information about epigenetic mechanisms of inheritance, see E. Jablonka. 2001. The Systems of Inheritance. In Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution. S. Oyama, P. Griffiths & R. Gray, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 99-116.
26. See also E. Jablonka and M. Lamb. 1995. Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: The Lamarckian Dimension. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
27. Moss. 2003. What Genes Can't Do. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
28. M. DeBaun et al. Association of In Vitro Fertilization with Beckwith-Wiedemann Syndrome and Epigenetic Alterations of LIT1 and H19. Am J Hum Genet 2003; 72: 156-160;
29. A. Moll et al. Incidence of Retinoblastoma in Children Born After In-Vitro Fertilisation. Lancet 2003; 361: 309-310.
30. W. Hwang et al. Evidence of a Pluripotent Human Embryonic Stem Cell Line Derived From a Cloned Blastocyst. Science 2004; 303(12 March): 1669-1674.
31. P. Lee, op. cit. note 10.
32. S. Gilbert, A. Tyler & E. Zackin. 2005. Bioethics and the New Embryology. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.
33. Doerflinger, op. cit. note 6, pp. 137-138.
34. The main text of the paper emphasizes that thinkers like Doerflinger would accept both claim (4) and claim (5) based on metaphysical or theological reasoning. Footnote 10 emphasized, however, that many 'pro-life' thinkers might appeal to moral caution under uncertainty (rather than metaphysics) in defense of claim (4). Those who appeal to moral caution also seem very likely to accept claim (5) in addition to claim (4). If they commit themselves to responding to uncertainty about the moral status of typical embryos by treating them as human persons, it seems unlikely that they would be willing to take the moral risk of denying personhood to an embryo just because it varies slightly from typical embryos.
35. One might worry that this paper uncritically reifies the concept of an 'embryo' and that this creates a false dichotomy between claims (5) and (5*). In other words, one might claim that there is actually no fundamental ontological difference between 'embryos' (which are discussed in claim (5)) and 'pseudo-embryos' or other cell masses (which are discussed in claim (5*)). I am sympathetic to this criticism, but I am making a distinction between embryos and pseudo-embryos (and therefore between claims (5) and (5*)) in order to give 'pro-life' thinkers such as Hurlbut (who presuppose this distinction) the benefit of the doubt. If one were to abandon any fundamental ontological basis for distinguishing embryos from 'pseudo-embryos,' then 'pro-life' thinkers would seem to face serious problems trying to make a moral distinction between typical embryos and any other masses of human cells.
36. M. Warren. On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion. Monist 1973; 57: 43-61.
37. J. Noonan. 1970. The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 57.
38. Hwang et al., op. cit. note 20.
39. There are at least two specific ways in which one might use the ideas in this paper to cast doubt on the metaphysical arguments that purport to establish high moral value for human embryos. First, the paper highlights the importance of scrutinizing metaphysical arguments to make sure that they do not tacitly depend on an uncritical appeal to the sorites argument in claim (4). For example, if one claims only that the organizational state of typical embryos enables them to develop gradually into human persons (without providing further metaphysical reasons for thinking that typical embryos already constitute human persons), then one is arguably basing one's argument on nothing more than the sorites argument in claim (4). In that case, one is left with no independent metaphysical support for accepting claims (4) and (5) while denying claim (5*). A second way that this paper raises problems for metaphysical arguments regarding the status of typical embryos is that the continuum in claim (5*) highlights the similarities between typical embryos and all other human cells. Therefore, although it does not force one to deny high moral status to typical embryos, the paper does encourage one to consider whether the unique moral status of a human person might be located not in the embryo itself but rather in the later product of an embryo's interactions with its environment. See also K. Elliott. Developmental Systems Theory and Human Embryos: A Response to Austriaco. Natl Cathol Bioeth Q 2005; 5: 49-59,
40. and Elliott, op. cit. note 10.