Private provision of environmental public goods: Household participation in green-electricity programs

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-16

  Kotchen, Matthew J ^a   Moore, Michael R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Green electricity; Impure public goods; Private provision; Pure public goods

Indexed keywords

ENERGY UTILIZATION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SURVEYS;

GREEN ELECTRICITY; IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS; PRIVATE PROVISION; PURE PUBLIC GOODS;

ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING;

ELECTRICAL POWER; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; HOUSEHOLD ENERGY; LOCAL PARTICIPATION; PRIVATE SECTOR; PUBLIC GOODS; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

EID: 33845944051     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2006.06.003     Document Type: Article

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