Resource allocation mechanism providing trust and incentive in grid

Ruan Jian Xue Bao/Journal of Software

Volumn 17, Issue 11, 2006, Pages 2245-2254

  Zhang, Yu ^a   Lin, Li ^a   Huai, Jin Peng ^a   Li, Xian Xian ^a   Zhong, Liang ^a  

^a BEIHANG UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

CROWN (China research and development environment over wider area network); Incentive; Price strategy; Resource allocation; Trust

Indexed keywords

EVALUATION; WIDE AREA NETWORKS;

ADAPTIVE TRUST INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE RESOURCE ALLOCATION; GRID COMPUTING; GRID ENVIRONMENT; INCENTIVE; PRICE STRATEGY; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; TRUST;

RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 33845895770     PISSN: 10009825     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1360/jos172245     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Chun BN, Ng J, Parkes DC. Computational resource exchanges for distributed resource allocation. Technical Report, Harvard University, 2004.
2. Feldman M, Lai K, Stoica I. Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks. In: Breese JS, ed. Proc. of the 5th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC). New York: ACM Press, 2004. 102-111.
3. Kwok YK, Song SS, Hwang K. Selfish grid computing: Game-Theoretic modeling and NAS performance results. In: Rajkumar Buyya R, ed. Proc. of the Cluster Computing and Grid (CCGrid). Washington: IEEE Computer Society, 2005. 1143-1150.
4. Ranganathan K, Ripeanu M, Sarin A, Foster I. To share or not to share: An analysis of incentives to contribute in collaborative file sharing environments. In: Proc. of the Workshop on Economics of Peer to Peer Systems. 2003. http://people.cs.uchicago.edu/-matei/PAPERS/
5. Ma RTB, Lee SCM, Lui JCS, Yau DKY. A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks. In: Coffman E, ed. Proc. of the ACM SIGMETRICS/PERFORMANCE. New York: ACM Press, 2004. 189-198.
6. Feldman M, Lai K, Zhang L. A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters. In: Riedl J, ed. Proc. of the 6th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce. New York: ACM Press, 2005. 127-136.
7. Golle P, Leyton-Brown K, Mironov I. Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer network. In: Proc. of the 3rd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce. New York: ACM Press, 2001. 264-267.
8. Buyya R, Abramson D, Venugopal S. The grid economy. IEEE Special Issue on Grid Computing, 2005, 93(3): 698-714.
9. Buyya R. Economic-Based distributed resource management and scheduling for grid computing[Ph. D. Thesis]. Melbourne: Monash University, 2002.
10. Huang LC, Wu ZH, Pan YH. A grid architecture for scalable e-science and its prototype. Journal of Software, 2005, 16(4): 577-586 (in Chinese with English abstract). http://www.jos.org.cn/1000-9825/16/577.htm
11. Zhuang ZZ, Liu YH, Xiao L. Dynamic layer management in super-peer architectures. In: Elgenmann R, ed. Proc. of the 33th Int'l Conf. on Parallel Processing (ICPP). Washington: IEEE Computer Society, 2004. 29-36.
12. Chawathe Y, Ratnasamy S, Breslau L. Making gnutella-like P2P systems scalable. In: Feldmann A, ed. Proc. of the Conf. on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications (SIGCOMM). New York: ACM Press, 2003. 407-418.
13. Beth T, Malte B, Birgit K. Valuation of trust in open networks. In: Proc. of the Conf. on Computer Security. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1994. 3-18.
14. Li CL, Li LY. A utility-based two level market solution for optimal resource allocation in computational grid. In: Feng WC, ed. Proc. of the 34th Int'l Conf. on Parallel Processing (ICPP). Washington: IEEE Computer Society, 2005. 23-30.
15. Varian HR. Microeconomic Analysis. 3rd ed., New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992.
16. Cao HQ, Xiao N, Lu XC, Liu Y. A market-based approach to allocate resources for computational grids. Journal of Computer Research and Development, 2002, 39(8): 913-916 (in Chinese with English abstract).
17. Huai JP, Zhang Y, Li XX, Liu Y. Distributed access control in CROWN groups. In: Feng WC, ed. Proc. of the 34th Int'l Conf. on Parallel Processing (ICPP). Washington: IEEE Computer Society, 2005. 435-442.