Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 132, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 236-273

  Eliaz, Kfir ^a   Ray, Debraj ^a   Razin, Ronny ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Decision making; Groups; Pivotality; Preference intensities

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845588328     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.008     Document Type: Article

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