Market sharing agreements and collusive networks

International Economic Review

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 387-411

  Belleflamme, Paul ^a   Bloch, Francis ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2442604240     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00130.x     Document Type: Review

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