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Volumn 61, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 617-631

On the behavior of proposers in ultimatum games

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Gittins index; Laboratory experiment; Multi armed bandit; Non equilibrium behavior; Optimal learning; Ultimatum game

Indexed keywords


EID: 33751507177     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.07.014     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (28)

References (19)
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  • 13
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    • Leloup, B., 2000. May learning explain the ultimatum game paradox? (GRID Working Paper No. 00-03) Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan.
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    • Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
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    • End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner's dilemma supergames. A learning theory approach
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.