Talking up China: An analysis of China's rising cultural power and global promotion of the Chinese language

East Asia

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 3-33

  Ding, Sheng ^a   Saunders, Robert A ^b  

^a BLOOMSBURG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Chinese language; Confucius Institute; Cultural globalization; Pacific Rim; Rise of China; Soft power

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL INFLUENCE; GLOBALIZATION; LANGUAGE;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST;

EID: 33751275943     PISSN: 10966838     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12140-006-0021-2     Document Type: Article

References (113)

1. Classical Chinese is the traditional style of written Chinese based on the grammar and vocabulary of the Zhou Dynasty 2,500 years ago. It is very different from the current form of Chinese language. Classical Chinese served as lingua franca not only in China, but also in Japan, Korea, and Viemam.
2. Bozeman Adda, Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1960);
3. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965);
4. and Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993)
5. Such texts follow in the wake of Max Weber's seminal The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-05).
6. Michael J. Mazarr, "Review Essay: Culture in International Relations," Washington Quarterly, 19:2 (Spring 1996), 177-185.
7. Mazarr's essay attempts to synthesize theories presented in the following texts: Thomas Sowell, Race and Culture: A World View (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
8. Lawrence E. Harrison, Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success (New York: Basic Books, 1992);
9. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995);
10. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, 72:3 (Summer 1993), 22-49.
11. For example, by 1952, American anthropologists Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn had cataloged over 100 different definitions of the concept of culture. See Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, "Introduction" and "General History of the Word Culture" in Kroeber and Kluckholm, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952).
12. Sir Tylor's definition of culture is one of the earliest and mostly quoted anthropological definitions.
13. See the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which was adopted by the 31st Session of the General Conference of UNESCO held in Paris on Nov. 2, 2001. (accessed on 20 June 2005)
14. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 46.
15. David Held, Anthony G. McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1999), 373-340.
16. Rey Koslowski (ed.), International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).
17. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization & Culture: A Global Mélange (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
18. Dieter Buttjes, "Teaching Foreign Language and Culture: Social Impact and Political Significance" Language Learning, 40:2 (1990), 53-57.
19. Gramscian theory attempts to explain why the "inevitable" revolution of the proletariat predicted by orthodox Marxists had not occurred by the early 20th century. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from political writings (1921-1926), translated and edited by Quintin Hoare (London, U.K.: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978).
20. Ibid.
21. For Morgenthau, as the human factors of a qualitative nature which have a bearing on national power, national character, and national morale stand out both for their ubiquity and permanence, which have decisive influence upon the weight a nation is able to put into the scales of internal politics. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill Companies, 1985), 146-147.
22. Ibid. 151.
23. Ibid. 151.
24. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, 72:3 (Summer 1993), 22-28.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. See Peter Ives, "A Gmmmatical Introduction to Gramsci's Political Theory," Rethinking Marxism, 10:1 (Spring 1998), pp.34-51
28. See Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press), p.6.
29. See Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 177.
30. See Nye, Soft Power, 2004
31. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 31-32.
32. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 12.
33. See Robert Keohane After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 116.
34. See Nye, Soft Power, 11-15.
35. Kennan also commented that he would "willingly trade the entire remaining inventory of political propaganda for the results that could be achieved by such means alone." See Nye, Soft Power, 45.
36. See Nye, Soft Power, 44-46. Nye uses the poignant example of the 50,000 Soviets who visited the United States between 1958 and 1988 as writers, journalists, musicians, dancers, and academics, many of who went on to shape Soviet foreign policy and create the groundswell of support for internal change in the late 1980s.
37. Ibid, 73.
38. Ibid, 46.
39. See Nye, The Paradox of American Power
40. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Waltz 1979), p.172
41. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press 1981), p. 13
42. Richard N. Rosencrance The Rise of the Trading State (NewYork: Basic Books, 1986), p.16 and 160.
43. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, 53.
44. A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980);
45. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1981);
46. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds. Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
47. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977);
48. Robert Keohane After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984);
49. Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," in International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, edited by Robert Keohane (Boulder, CO: Westview Press., 1989);
50. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Neorealism and Neoliberalism, edited by D. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
51. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).
52. John King Fairbank, Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 2.
53. For example, the ancient Chinese referred to their empire as "all under heaven" ( tian xia), although the term 'nation-state' (guo jia) has gradually been accepted in the 20th century. See Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 544.
54. Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 37.
55. Although a focus on the Han ethnicity would inadvertently marginalize the roughly 100 million Chinese minorities, Chinese culture has been heavily influenced by Confucianism which was invented and developed by the Han Chinese.
56. Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London, U.K.: The Foreign Policy Center, 2004), 37.
57. When the Mongols occupied Beijing in 1215, their troops were resolutely intent on not becoming "sickened" by what they regarded as Chinese laziness. Within two generations, however, they were almost totally assimilated into Chinese life. Half a millennium later, the Manchus suffered the same fate.
58. It should noted, however, that the Mongols were notoriously adverse to allowing the Han Chinese, China's ethnic majority, into the upper echelons of the administration, employing instead Turkic nomads and other foreigners (perhaps even Marco Polo if he is to be believed).
59. Poetry became very popular during that time and led to the development of the first free verse poetry by the end of the dynasty. By putting some of the poems to music, the Tang Chinese made the first steps in developing opera.
60. For example, an 8th-century Chinese high monk named Jianzhen traveled to Japan to spread Chinese culture and Buddhism, ultimately contributing to the growth of Japanese civilization. Despite five failed attempts, Monk Jianzhen succeeded in his sixth effort to reach the Japanese islands at the invitation of a Buddhist temple there. It took the monk ten full years to succeed in his endeavor and, afterward, he spent the last decade of his life there spreading the Chinese culture and arts, such as Chinese painting, calligraphy, medicine, sculpture, architecture, printing, and craftsmanship.
61. See Fairbank, Chinese World Order, 1.
62. Weiming Tu, "Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center," in The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today, edited by W-m. Tu (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 2.
63. Vera Schwarez, "No Solace from Lethe: History, Memory and Cultural Identity in Twentieth-Century China," in The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today, edited by W.-m. Tu (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 65.
64. According to a Gallop Poll in 1967, 91 percent of the Americans had either 'unfavorable' (16 percent) or 'very unfavorable' (75 percent) opinions of China. See David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 385.
65. Brook Larmer, "The Center of the World," Foreign Policy, Issue 150 (September/October 2005), 66-74.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Christopher Clarey, "Point Made in Athens, China Looks toward Beijing in '8," New York Times, 65 August 2004.
69. The Chinese govermnent has set up state-funded scholarships to finance students and scholars in the rest of the world. According to the agreements or programs reached between the Chinese government and governments of other countries and international organizations, the Chinese Ministry of Education is responsible to grant the government scholarships and entrusts the Chinese Scholarships Council (CSC) with the enrollment and management of daily affairs concerning international students in China who study on the Chinese government scholarships. See relevant reports in China Daily, 20 September 2004.
70. Ibid.
71. Institute of International Education, "Open Doors 2004: Report on International Educational Exchange." (accessed on 3 August 2005).
72. Jane Perlez. "For many Asians, China is cultural magnet" International Herald Tribune 19 November 2004.
73. According to Mark Sidel, not only are American schools losing key contributors to a creative, research-based, value-added economy, but also the new rules for government classification of documents are making it difficult to research and to publish results. Campuses are not in a new McCarthy era, but views outside the mainstream are less welcome than before - a development contributing little to the war on terrorism. See Mark Sidel, More Secure, less Free? Antiterrorism Policy and Civil Liberties after September 11 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
74. See Nye, Soft Power, 45.
75. See the comments made by Diana Hicks at the American Chemical Society's 227th National Meeting in San Diego, California. (accessed on 18 May 2005).
76. See the speech made by Cheng Jinpei, China's Vice Minister of Science and Technology, at a meeting marking the 20th anniversary of the establishment of state key state laboratories and the fifth anniversary of kickoff of the national basic research and development plan. (accessed on 1 June 2005).
77. Agence France Press, "China to outpace EU in research spending in just five years: report," 9 October 2005.
78. Quoted in Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction, 152. Some Chinese scholars who study globalization, such as Ping He, divide globalization into two periods: the first was characterized by a pattern of unitarization (danyihua) and the second by pluralization (duoyuanhua). In describing the post-Cold War international structure, there are two frequently used words - multipolarization and pluralization, which have similar meanings but the latter has been commonly used by Chinese government. The nature of 'pole' is long-term stable confrontation, but the nature of 'unit' is that the dominant position of key countries is determined by the nature of specific affairs.
79. See similar arguments by Jinghua Liu. Liu described three negative consequences of globalization: "it concentrated control over the international economic and political order in the hands of a single hegemonic power; second, it threatened and constrained the sovereignty of the nation-state and led to periodic crises of national economic security and the decline of state capacity to control the economy; and third, it often resulted in crises of cultural identity, government legitimacy, and authority and hence brought about social turmoil and instability, which would hinder economic growth and modernization" (Liu quoted in Zhao 2004: 152).
80. "Link the cultures of China and the world," People's Daily Online, 4 February 2005.
81. A recent report by Robert Half Finance and Accounting, which surveyed 1,500 human resources and finance directors in nine countries in Europe, in addition to Australia and New Zealand, found that 38% of respondents expect Chinese to become the most valuable business language in the forthcoming years. See "Falling language skills could harm British business" Prospects, April 2005.
82. Joshua Fishman, "The New Linguistic Order," Foreign Policy, Issue 113 (Winter 1998-99): 31.
83. Tim Johnson, "China muscles in: From trade to diplomacy to language, the U.S. is being challenged," The Gazette (Montreal), 30 October 2005.
84. Ibid.
85. "Institutes That Promote Chinese Culture" Dong-A Ilbo Daily, 28 October 2005.
86. See "Quebec to embrace wisdom of Confucius," Calgary Herald, 25 September 2005
87. and "Trading Football Flair for Mandarin Might," China Daily, 18 November 2005 for instances of diplomatic tours resulting in announcement regarding the establishment of Confucius Institutes.
88. Chinese President Hu Jintao gave the above speech to a Joint Sitting of the Australian Parliament on 24 October 2003.
89. Cf. the Web site of Western Australia's Confucius Institute located at http://www.confuciusinstitute.com.au/.
90. Ibid.
91. "Beijing uses Confucius to lead charm offensive," The Globe and Mail, 9 September 2005.
92. Zhang Hong, "Confucius School, a National Strategy for Chinese Language Teaching," China Today, 54:5, May 2005, 64-66.
93. Ibid.
94. From 1994 to 2002, Parisian students who chose to study Chinese rose by 170 percent. From 2000 to 2002, students opting for Chinese increased by 30 percent. At the beginning of 2003, some 7,600 students made Chinese study their first choice. More than 30,000 South Korean students are studying in China, the largest foreign student body in China. The above data are collected from the relevant media reports about the first "World Chinese Language Conference" held in Beijing from July 20 to 22. Furthermore, Chinese language courses are offered in nearly 200 universities in South Korea. There are two million learners of Chinese language in Japan.
95. Statistics from the US Modern Language Association (MLA) showed among 3,000 universities in the United States, 800 offer Chinese courses.
96. April Austin, "Where are the Chinese speakers of the Future?" Christian Science Monitor 10 February 2004.
97. Xinhua News Agency, "Chinese language gains popularity worldwide," 22 July 2005.
98. Nye, Soft Power, 55.
99. The poll of 22,953 people in 22 countries was conducted for the BBC World Service by the polling organization GlobeScan, together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. It was completed in most of the countries in December 2004. More information available at (accessed on 2 August 2005).
100. "China Continues to Erase Korean History," Chosun llbo 10 October 2005;
101. Scott Snyder, "A Turning Point for China-Korea Relations?" Comparative Connections, 6:3 (October 2004), 109-116;
102. David Scofield, "Northeast Asia's Intra-mural Mural Wars," Asia Times Online 23 December 2003;
103. and David Scofield, "China ups ante in ancient-kingdom feud with Korea," Asia Times Online 11 April 2003.
104. Koguryo is a 1,400-year-old kingdom that stretched from China's Inner Mongolia across the north of the country and including most of what is today the North Korea. Through the government-sponsored Northeast Asia Project, which is an important attempt to increase its soft power, China applied to UNESCO to have Koguryo-era tombs and murals within its territory registered as a World Heritage site. If UNESCO designated the tombs as Chinese cultural artifacts, it would mean that North Korea was historically Chinese territory. This triggered strong anti-China protests in South Korea. See relative report at
105. Robert Sutter, "China and Japan: Trouble Ahead?" The Washington Quarterly, 25:4, 37-49.
106. Robert Phillipson, Linguistic Imperialism (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1992).
107. David Hancock, "Power Projectors," Foreign Policy, Issue 149 (July/August 2005), 30-31.
108. Although Standard Mandarin is known as putonghua ('ordinary speech') in mainland China, it is called Guoyu in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and Huayu in Malaysia and Singapore.
109. Anthony Bubalo, "Asia's alliance with the Middle East threatens America" Financial Times, 6 October 2005.
110. Joshua Kurlantzick, "China Stepping Into US Vacuum," Bangkok Post, 30 October 2005.
111. Guangwei Xin, "China's book copyright trade, 1990-2000." (accessed on 12 July 2005).
112. Tang Song, "Xiang shijie jiangshu zhongguo wenhua" (Telling about China's culture to the world), Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 15 July 2005.
113. Gungwu Wang, "The Fourth Rise of China: Cultural Implications," China: An International Journal, 2:2, 311-322.