Subsidizing rent-seeking: Antidumping protection and the Byrd Amendment

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 490-502

  Reynolds, Kara M ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antidumping; Byrd Amendment; Free riding; Rent seeking; Trade protection

Indexed keywords

ANTIDUMPING; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; TARIFF STRUCTURE;

EID: 33751108501     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.09.002     Document Type: Article

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