Uniformity requirement and political accountability

Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 95-113

  Wrede, Matthias ^a  

^a RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Centralization; Electoral accountability; Uniformity; Voting theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750928992     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-006-0209-3     Document Type: Article

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