Assigning intentions when actions are unobservable: The impact of trembling in the trust game

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 73, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 307-314

  Cox, James C ^a   Deck, Cary A ^b  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750914529     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20111893     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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