Social norms, cooperation and inequality

Economic Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 89-105

  Dal Bó, Pedro ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Discrimination; Folk theorem; Inequality; Repeated games; Social capital; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750521168     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0045-7     Document Type: Article

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