The strategic depth doctrine of Turkish foreign policy

Middle Eastern Studies

Volumn 42, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 945-964

  Murinson, Alexander ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FOREIGN POLICY; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;

EURASIA; TURKEY;

EID: 33750492966     PISSN: 00263206     EISSN: 17437881     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00263200600923526     Document Type: Article

References (118)

1. Ozal attempted to revive the Ottoman 'millet' system in order to give recognition to separate religious and ethnic identities, including a Kurdish identity. He intended to redefine the character of the modern Turkish nation on the Ottoman multi-ethic model. M. Ataman, 'Ozal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Politics in 1980s, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.4 (October 2002), pp.127-8.
2. See R.D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', International Organization, Vol.42 (1988), pp.427-60
3. C. Kegley, N. Richardson and G. Richter, 'Conflict at Home and Abroad: An Empirical Extension', Journal of Politics, Vol.40 (1978), pp.742-52
4. Z. Maoz, 'Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International Conflict, 1816-1976', International Studies Quarterly, Vol.33 (1989), pp.199-231
5. T.C. Morgan and K. Bicker, 'Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.36 (1992), pp.25-52.
6. G. Fuller, 'Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities', The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004), p.59.
7. See also A. Taşgetiren, 'Davudobǧlu'nu okumak', Yeni Safak, 28 January 2003.
8. A. Han, 'The World of Business Now Spearheads Foreign Policy', an Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Times, April-May 2004.
9. M. Ataman, 'Leadership Change: Ozal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy', Alternatives, Vol.1, No.1 (Spring 2002), p.12.
10. See a discussion of these movements in M. Ataman, 'Ozal and Turkish Ethnic Policy', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.4 (October 2002), p.133.
11. Ibid.
12. A. Bayramoglu, Yeni Safak. Quoted in M. Rubin,'Shifting Sides? The Problems of Neo-Ottomanism', National Review Online, 10 August 2004, available at http://www.meforum.org/article/628
13. Ataman, 'Leadership Change', p.13.
14. Anavatan Partisi II, Oladan Büyük Kongresi Faaliyet Raporu, 18-19 Haziran 1988, Ankara Atatürk Spor Salonu.
15. The Turkish word adalet has its historical precursor in the Arabic concept of adala, that is the central function of the ruler or sultan to guarantee justice for his subjects. This political ideal provided legitimacy for sultans in the Ottoman Empire. This concept was widely held in Islamic political theory and has roots in Arabic and Persian traditions. See 'The Ottomans: Origins', available at http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/OTTOMAN/ORIGIN.HTM
16. 'Turkey expects to obtain an important trump card relating to Cyprus after the talks between Erdogan and President Bush', Vatan, 7 January 2004.
17. Ibid.
18. A. Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik/Türkiye'nin Uluslararasi Konumu [The Strategic Depth: The Turkish International Location] (Istanbul: Kuüre Yayinlari, 2000).
19. According to Philip Robins, 'multi-dimensional' foreign policy doctrine during the Erbakan period (1996-97) constituted a pursuit of improvement bilateral relations with Asian countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and African countries such as Egypt, Libya and Nigeria. The conceptual content of this policy was to 'build ties with significant middle powers to the east, without jeopardising Ankara's traditional ties with the West'. P. Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy, Madeleine Feher Annual European Scholar Lecture, publication of Begin-Sadat for Strategic Studies, August 1999, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan.
20. Vatan, 7 January 2004.
21. A. Davutoglu, 'The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order', Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec 1997-Feb 1998), p.1.
22. See also W. Thompson, On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), p.7.
23. Davutoglu, op. cit.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. This perceptional frame is poignant in view of clashes between Muslim Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis in the contemporary Iraq.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Cf. Mahan's conceptualization in A. Westcott, Mahan On Naval Warfare (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), p.77.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. The earlier American entanglement in Sudan and the current occupation of Iraq certainly provide substance to this argument.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ataman, 'Leadership Change', p.17.
39. B. Yepilada, 'Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East', in A. Eralp et al. (eds.), The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp.169-92.
40. A. Davutoglu, 'It's only natural', Al-Ahram Weekly, No.564, 13-19 December 2001.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Stratejik Derinlik.
44. See 'The "Strategic Depth" that Turkey Needs', An Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, The Turkish Daily News, 15 September 2001.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Others criticized the Turkish policy towards newly independent Turkic states as opportunistic and short-termist. Nilufer Narli characterized this policy as a 'de facto (reactive) foreign policy'. J. Naegele, 'Turkey: Foreign Policy Objectives - Part Two', 13 August 1998, available at http://www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/98-08/aug13b.rfe
52. Vatan, 7 January 2004.
53. Ibid.
54. Han, op. cit.
55. 'Gul says Arab states should press on with domestic reforms', Al-Hayat. As quoted in Al-jazeera, 18 February 2004.
56. Ibid.
57. J.C. Helicke, 'Turkey's closer ties with Syria, Iran highlight changing regional role', Associated Press, Istanbul, 17 January 2004, available at http://www.Turks.us
58. Ibid.
59. Ciragan Palace was completed in 1857, after Abdulaziz acceded to the throne. Sultan Abdulaziz demanded his palace to be built in Arab style as a memorial to his reign.
60. M. Young, 'Lebanon: Clueless on Iraq', Daily Star, 25 January 2003.
61. 'Iraq told to actively cooperate with UN: Regional conference in Istanbul', Dawn Internet edition, 24 January, 2003, available at http://signs-of-the-times.org/signs/signs70.htm
62. Ibid.
63. Vatan, 7 January 2004.
64. Ibid.
65. The territorial settlements that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, apportioned these two former Ottoman villayets to the British-dominated Iraqi Mandate. When the British found oil in the early 1920s, Turks attempted to obtain some reparations for the loss of the oil-producing provinces. In compensation, Turkey was to receive a portion of the oil revenues - including those from transportation and other petroleum products - out of Mosul for 25 years, but instead Turkey agreed to a £500,000 buyout. The post-war settlement also denied Turkish claims to large parts of northern Iraq, which holds substantial populations of Turcomans, ethnic Turks.
66. See also D. Pipes, 'Hot Spot: Turkey, Iraq, and Mosul', Middle East Quarterly, September 1995; Back-to-Iraq website, http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/000129.php
67. Turkey's Kurdish question', Daily Times, 4 June 2003.
68. 'Dangers in Northern Iraq', The New York Times, 2 March 2003. United States and Great Britain made a commitment to support the Kurdish regional autonomy in northern Iraq.
69. See Guardian, 7 January 2004.
70. D. Filkins, 'Turkey Assesses Question of Kurds', The New York Times, 21 February 2003.
71. See also 'Turkey Wants Say Over Kirkuk', Agence France Presse, 14 October 2004.
72. J.-C. Peuch, 'Turkey: Ankara Moves To Vote On Second U.S. Motion In Hope Of Containing Kurds', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 19 March 2003.
73. Ibid.
74. The Turkish deputy head of the General Staff, General Ilker Basbug, warned in a televised news conference that if that the significant change in the demographic structure of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk should occur, 'Such a development would pose an important security problem for Turkey', 27 January 2005, available at http://www.Turks.us
75. 'Turkey's accusations is an introduction for invading Kurdistan', Al Hayat, 26 July 2005.
76. See in particular the articles of the Sevres Treaty related to the status of the Kurdish peoples, Articles 62-64, Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey signed at Sevres, 10 August 1920, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/part3.html#89
77. Y. Alpogan, 'Turkey: Between the West and the Middle East', PolicyWatch, No.1074: Special Forum Report, The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy, 31 January 2006. It is unlikely that Turkey would get involved militarily in northern Iraq, if only for the reason that such involvement would endanger its officially touted pursuit of the membership in the European Union.
78. See 'Turkey Warns Syria Again Not To Support Rebel Kurds', International Herald Tribune, 6 October 1998
79. 'Syria Calls Turkish Threat a Plot', The Washington Post, 2 October 1998
80. S. Kinzer, 'Syria Agrees to Stop Supporting Kurds, Defusing Crisis With Turkey', The New York Times, 22 October 1998
81. and 'Turkish-Syrian Discussions', Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), 30 October 1998.
82. 'Very daring ideas', Al-Ahram, 9-15 January 2003.
83. See the Protocol of the Sixth Session of the Turkish-Syrian Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific, Technical and Commercial Cooperation, Ankara, 24-29 July 2003.
84. 'Suriye'de ilk kez "Hatay" denildi', Zaman, 11 December 2003.
85. H. Koylu, 'Suriye ile mutlu gün', Zaman, 7 January 2004.
86. 'Strategic Convergence', Zaman, 26 December 2004.
87. Quoted ibid.
88. 'Turkish President, Ahmed Cezer, Visits Syria Amid U.S. Unease', Al-Jazeerah, 13 April 2005. It is noteworthy that Turkey did not raise objections to the sale of Russian short-range missiles to Syria in March 2005. These missiles were purportedly to be used against Israel with which Turkey signed the military cooperation treaty in 1996. The Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov denied that anti-aircraft Strelets missiles can threaten Israel. See 'US-Turkish Relations Go Wobbly Now Over Syria', 23 March 2005, available at http://www.Turks.us
89. 'Turkey: Period for Usage of Incirlik Base Extended', 25 April 2005, available at http://www.Turks.us. The Turkish government imposed severe restrictions on the use of the Incirlik base facilities, including 'the right of control for each flight and if any operation is seen as being against the national interests of Turkey'.
90. 'No Incirlik blank cheque for US', 3 May 2005, available at http://www.Turks.us
91. T. Ciller, 'Turkey: Today's Political and Economic Realities', PolicyWatch, No.534: Special Forum Report, WINEP, 15 May 2001.
92. Ibid.
93. 'Turkey's Iranian Relations Unaffected by US', 29 July 2004, available at http://www.Turks.us
94. 'Iran, Turkey set to boost cooperation', IRNA (Iran News Agency), 30 July 2004.
95. 'Turkey, Iran seal cooperation', 30 July 2004, available at http://www.Turks.us
96. 'Iran's envoy: Tehran-Ankara security cooperation expanding', IRNA, 21 July 2004.
97. 'Iran, Turkey Sign Security Pact', Middle East News online, 25 February 2006, available at http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2006/february/ 02-26-1.html
98. 'Iran Strikes PKK Camp on Mt. Kandil', 2 May 2006, available at http://www.Turks.us
99. 'Iraq president Talabani warns Turkey and Iran', 30 May 2006, available at http://www.Turks.us
100. See S.G. Hajjar, 'The Israel-Syria Track', Middle East Policy, Vol.VI, No.3 (February 1999), pp.22-3.
101. Hilal Koylu, op. cit.
102. A. Benn and A. Harel, 'Turkish PM to Israel: Assad serious about renewing talks', Haaretz, 8 January 2004.
103. Ibid.
104. 'Turkey won't be Israel-Syria peacemaker', Al-Jazeera, 18 February 2004.
105. L. Martin, 'Turkey's Middle East Foreign Policy', in L. Martin and D. Keridis (eds.), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), p.185.
106. 'Turkish PM: Israel a "terrorist" state', Al-Jazeera, 27 May 2004. The timing of this diplomatic attack against Israel was not accidental. At the time of the crisis in Gaza, a Turkish candidate was considered for nomination to the post of the secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The vigorous verbal attack by the Turkish prime minister on Israel swayed the OIC's vote in Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu's favour. This was the first time that Turkish representative was elected to be the leader of the largest Islamic intergovernmental organization. This position significantly enhanced the status of the Turkish republic in the Muslim world. Comments by an unidentified Turkish state official, Personal interview.
107. See also 'Emergency Meeting of OIC: Turkish State Minister Atalay: We Should Use our Influence to Resume Talks', Anadolu Agency, 22 April 2004.
108. 'Prime Minister of Turkey Arrived in Israel', Mignews.com, 1 May 2005
109. Benn, 'Visiting Turkish PM sees Role in Peace Process', Haaretz, 2 May 2005.
110. 'Turkey Rejects Israeli Criticism', BBC News, 17 February 2006.
111. 'Erdogan Terms Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Iran's Right', IRNA, 30 July 2004.
112. Quoted in Y. Schleifer, 'Caught in the Fray: Turkey Enters Debate on Iran's Nuclear Program', The Christian Science Monitor, 2 February 2006.
113. Ibid.
114. 'WP: Iranian Crisis Forces Turkey to Resort to Nuclear', 8 March 2006, available at http://www.Turks.us
115. R. Falk, 'Reconsidering Turkey', Zaman, 6 October 2004.
116. Falk describes this neo-Ottomanist foreign policy as based on 'the willingness to appreciate and respect civilizational and ethnic diversity, and to deal with political conflict in a spirit of compromise and reconciliation'. Ibid.
117. 'You can see a split between the people who run the foreign ministry and the people who run foreign policy for the AKP and that's really a struggle for the future course of Turkish foreign policy', said an Ankara-based western diplomat, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue. Quoted in Y. Schleifer, 'Turkey Aims to Bridge West and Middle East', Eurasianet, 6 April 2006.
118. Rubin, op. cit.