Walras and Darwin: An odd couple?

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 561-573

  Joosten, Reinoud ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Evolutionary game theory; General equilibrium theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750469046     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-006-0037-1     Document Type: Article

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